IPCDN Working Group Eugene Nechamkin
Internet-Draft Broadcom Corp.
Expires: July 20, 2005 Jean-Francois Mule
CableLabs
January 21, 2005
Multimedia Terminal Adapter (MTA) Management Information Base
for PacketCable and IPCablecom compliant devices
draft-ietf-ipcdn-pktc-mtamib-06.txt
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
of section 3 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, each
author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of
which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of
which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
RFC 3668.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as
Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
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This Internet-Draft will expire in July 2005.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved.
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Abstract
This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB)
for use with network management protocols in the Internet community.
In particular, it defines a basic set of managed objects for
SNMP-based management of PacketCable and IPCablecom compliant
Multimedia Terminal Adapter devices.
Table of Contents
1. The Internet-Standard Management Framework....................2
2. Terminology...................................................3
3. Introduction..................................................5
3.1 Structure of the MTA MIB..................................5
3.2 pktcMtaDevBase............................................6
3.3 pktcMtaDevServer..........................................6
3.4 pktcMtaDevSecurity........................................7
3.5 Relationship between MIB Objects in the MTA MIB...........7
4. Definitions..................................................10
5. Acknowledgments..............................................46
6. Normative References.........................................47
7. Informative References.......................................49
8. Security Considerations......................................50
9. IANA Considerations..........................................53
10. Authors' Addresses..........................................53
11. Intellectual Property Statement.............................54
1. The Internet-Standard Management Framework
For a detailed overview of the documents that describe the current
Internet-Standard Management Framework, please refer to section 7 of
RFC 3410 [RFC3410].
Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed
the Management Information Base or MIB. MIB objects are generally
accessed through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the
Structure of Management Information (SMI). This memo specifies a
MIB module that is compliant to the SMIv2, which is described in STD
58, RFC 2578 [RFC2578], STD 58, RFC 2579 [RFC2579] and STD 58, RFC
2580 [RFC2580].
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2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL", when used in the guidelines in this memo, are to be
interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
The terms "MIB module" and "information module" are used
interchangeably in this memo. As used here, both terms refer to any
of the three types of information modules defined in section 3 of
RFC 2578 [RFC2578].
Some of the terms used in this memo are defined below. Some
additional terms are also defined in the PacketCable MTA Device
Provisioning Specification [PKT-SP-PROV] and the PacketCable
Security Specification [PKT-SP-SEC].
DOCSIS
The CableLabs(R) Certified(TM) Cable Modem project, also known as
DOCSIS(R) (Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification), defines
interface requirements for cable modems involved in high-speed data
distribution over cable television system networks.
DOCSIS also refers to the ITU-T J.112 recommendation, Annex B for
cable modem systems [ITU-T-J112].
Cable Modem
A Cable Modem (CM) acts as a data transport agent used to transfer
call management and voice data packets over a DOCSIS compliant cable
system.
Multimedia Terminal Adapter
A Multimedia Terminal Adapter (MTA) is a PacketCable or IPCablecom
compliant device providing telephony services over a cable or hybrid
system used to deliver video signals to a community. It contains an
interface to endpoints, a network interface, CODECs, and all
signaling and encapsulation functions required for Voice over IP
transport, call signaling, and Quality of Service signaling.
An MTA can be an embedded or a standalone device. An Embedded MTA
(E-MTA) is an MTA device containing an embedded DOCSIS Cable Modem.
A Standalone MTA (S-MTA) is an MTA device separated from the DOCSIS
cable modem by non-DOCSIS MAC interface (e.g. Ethernet, USB).
Endpoint
An endpoint or MTA endpoint is a standard RJ-11 telephony physical
port located on the MTA and used for attaching the telephone device
to the MTA.
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X.509 Certificate
A X.509 certificate is an Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
certificate developed as part of the ITU-T X.500 Directory
recommendations. It is defined in RFC 2459 [RFC2459].
Voice Over IP
Voice Over IP (VoIP) is a technology providing the means to transfer
the digitized packets with the voice information over IP networks.
Public Key Certificate
A Public Key Certificate (also known as a Digital Certificate) is a
binding between an entity's public key and one or more attributes
relating to its identity.
DHCP
The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is defined by
RFC 2131 [RFC2131]. In addition, commonly used DHCP options are
defined in RFC 2132 [RFC2132]. Additional DHCP options used by
PacketCable and IPCablecom MTAs can be found in the CableLabs Client
Configuration DHCP specifications, RFC 3495 [RFC3495] and RFC 3594
[RFC3594].
TFTP
The Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) is defined by the RFC 1350
[RFC1350].
HTTP
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1) is defined by the RFC
2616 [RFC2616].
Call Management Server
A Call Management Server (CMS) is an element of the PacketCable
network infrastructure which controls audio connections between
MTAs.
CODEC, COder-DECoder
A Coder-DECoder is a hardware or software component used in
audio/video systems to convert an analog signal to digital, and then
(possibly) to compress it so that lower bandwidth telecommunications
channels can be used. The signal is decompressed and converted
(decoded) back to analog output by a compatible CODEC at the
receiving end.
Operations Systems Support
An Operations Systems Support system (OSS) is a system of back
office software components used for fault, configuration,
accounting, performance, and security management working in
interaction with each other and providing the operations support in
deployed PacketCable systems.
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Key Distribution Center
A Key Distribution Center (KDC) is an element of the OSS systems
functioning as a Kerberos Security Server providing mutual
authentication of the various components of the PacketCable system
(e.g. mutual authentication between an MTA and a CMS, or between an
MTA and the Provisioning Server).
Security Association
A Security Association (SA) is a one-way relationship between sender
and receiver offering security services on the communication flow.
3. Introduction
This MIB module provides a set of objects required for the
management of PacketCable, ETSI and ITU-T IPCablecom compliant MTA
devices. The MTA MIB module is intended to supersede various MTA
MIB modules from which it is partly derived:
- the PacketCable 1.0 MTA MIB Specification
[PKT-SP-MIB-MTA-I09],
- the ITU-T IPCablecom MTA MIB requirements [ITU-T-J168],
- the ETSI MTA MIB [ETSI TS 101 909-8]. The ETSI MTA MIB
requirements also refer to various signal characteristics
defined in [EN 300 001] and [EN 300 659-1].
Several normative and informative references are used to help define
MTA MIB objects. As a convention, wherever PacketCable and
IPCablecom requirements are equivalent, the PacketCable reference is
used in the object REFERENCE clause. IPCablecom compliant MTA
devices MUST use the equivalent IPCablecom references.
3.1 Structure of the MTA MIB
The MTA MIB module is identified by pktcMtaMib and is structured in
three object groups:
- pktcMtaDevBase defines the management information pertinent to the
MTA device itself,
- pktcMtaDevServer defines the management information pertinent to
the provisioning back office servers,
- pktcMtaDevSecurity defines the management information pertinent to
the PacketCable and IPCablecom security mechanisms.
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The first two object groups, pktcMtaDevBase and pktcMtaDevServer,
contain only scalar information objects describing the corresponding
characteristics of the MTA device and back office servers.
The third group, pktcMtaDevSecurity, contains two tables controlling
the logical associations between KDC realms and Application Servers
(CMS and Provisioning Server). The rows in the various tables of
the MTA MIB module can be created automatically (e.g. by the device
according to the current state information) or they can be created
by the management station depending on the operational situation.
The tables defined in the MTA MIB module may have a mixture of both
types of rows.
3.2 pktcMtaDevBase
This object group contains the management information related to the
MTA device itself. It also contains some objects used to control
the MTA state. Some highlights are as follows:
- pktcMtaDevSerialNumber, this object contains the MTA Serial
Number,
- pktcMtaDevEndPntCount, this object contains the number of
endpoints present in the managed MTA,
- pktcMtaDevProvisioningState, this object contains the information
describing the completion state of the MTA initialization process,
- pktcMtaDevEnabled, this object controls the administrative state
of the MTA endpoints and allows operators to enable or disable
telephony services on the device,
- pktcMtaDevResetNow, this object is used to instruct the MTA to
reset.
3.3 pktcMtaDevServer
This object group contains the management information describing the
back office servers and the parameters related to the communication
timers. It also includes some objects controlling the initial MTA
interaction with the Provisioning Server.
Some highlights are as follows:
- pktcMtaDevServerDhcp1, this object contains the IP address of the
primary DHCP server designated for the MTA provisioning,
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- pktcMtaDevServerDhcp2, this object contains the IP address of the
secondary DHCP server designated for the MTA provisioning,
- pktcMtaDevServerDns1, this object contains the IP address of the
primary DNS used by the managed MTA to resolve the Fully Qualified
Domain Name (FQDN) and IP addresses,
- pktcMtaDevServerDns2, this object contains the IP address of the
secondary DNS used by the managed MTA to resolve the FQDN and IP
addresses,
- pktcMtaDevConfigFile, this object contains the name of the
provisioning configuration file the managed MTA must download from
the Provisioning Server,
- pktcMtaDevProvConfigHash, this object contains the hash value of
the MTA configuration file calculated over its content. When the
managed MTA downloads the file, it authenticates the configuration
file using the hash value provided in this object.
3.4 pktcMtaDevSecurity
This object group contains the management information describing the
security related characteristics of the managed MTA. It contains
two tables describing logical dependencies and parameters necessary
to establish Security Associations between the MTA and other
Application Servers (back office components and CMSes).
The CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsTable) and the realm table
(pktcMtaDevRealmTable) are used for managing the MTA signaling
security. The realm table defines the CMS domains. The CMS table
defines the CMS within the domains. Each MTA endpoint is associated
with one CMS at any given time.
The two tables in this object group are:
- pktcMtaDevRealmTable, this table is used in conjunction with any
Application Server that communicates securely with the managed MTA
(CMS or Provisioning Server),
- pktcMtaDevCmsTable, this table contains the parameters describing
the SA establishment between the MTA and CMSes.
3.5 Relationship between MIB Objects in the MTA MIB
This section clarifies the relationship between various MTA MIB
objects with respect to the role they play in the process of
establishing Security Associations.
The process of Security Association establishment between an MTA and
Application Servers is described in the PacketCable Security
Specification [PKT-SP-SEC]. In particular, an MTA communicates with
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2 types of back office Application Servers: Call Management Servers
and Provisioning Servers.
The SA establishment process consists of two steps:
a. Authentication Server exchange (AS-exchange):
This step provides mutual authentication between the parties, i.e.
between an MTA and an Authentication Server.
The process of AS-exchange is defined by a number of parameters
grouped per each realm. These parameters are gathered in the Realm
Table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable). The Realm Table is indexed by the
Index Counter and contains conceptual column with the Kerberos realm
name.
b. Application server exchange (AP-exchange):
This step allows for the establishment of Security Associations
between authenticated parties.
The CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsTable) contains the parameters for the
AP-exchange process between an MTA and a CMS. The CMS table is
indexed by the Index Counter and contains the CMS FQDN (the
conceptual column pktcMtaDevCmsFqdn). Each row contains the
Kerberos realm name associated with each CMS FQDN. This allows for
each CMS to exist in a different Kerberos realm.
The MTA MIB module also contains a group of scalar MIB objects in
the server group (pktcMtaDevServer). These objects define various
parameters for the AP-exchange process between an MTA and the
Provisioning Server. These objects are:
- pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout,
- pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout,
- pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries,
- pktcMtaDevProvSolicitedKeyTimeout.
3.6 Secure Software Download
E-MTAs are embedded with DOCSIS 1.1 cable modems. E-MTAs have their
software upgraded by the Cable Modem according to the DOCSIS
requirements.
While E-MTAs have their software upgraded by the Cable Modem
according to the DOCSIS requirements, S-MTAs implement a specific
mechanism for Secure Software Download.
The Secure Software Download mechanism provides means to verify the
code upgrade using Code Verification Certificates and is modeled
after the DOCSIS mechanism implemented in Cable Modems. This is the
reason why the MTA MIB and the S-MTA compliance modules also rely on
two MIB object groups:
- docsBpi2CodeDownloadGroup defined in the IETF BPI Plus MIB
module (DOCS-IETF-BPI2-MIB [RFCyyyy]), and,
-- ************************************************************
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-- * NOTES TO RFC Editor (to be removed prior to publication) *
-- * *
-- * The I-D <draft-ietf-ipcdn-bpiplus-mib-15.txt> *
-- * is expected to become RFC before this draft. *
-- * Please replace RFCyyyy with the RFC number of bpiplus and *
-- * remove this note *
-- * *
-- ************************************************************
- docsDevSoftwareGroupV2 defined in the IETF Cable Devicev2 MIB
module (DOCS-CABLE-DEVICE-MIB [RFCxxxx]).
************************************************************
* NOTES TO RFC Editor (to be removed prior to publication) *
* *
* An updated version of the I-D
* < draft-ietf-ipcdn-device-mibv2-06.txt> or draft07 *
* is expected to become RFC before this draft. *
* Please replace RFCxxxx with the RFC number and *
* update the reference statement with the correct date: *
* Monthxxxx, 2005 *
* *
************************************************************
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4. Definitions
PKTC-IETF-MTA-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
MODULE-IDENTITY,
OBJECT-TYPE,
OBJECT-IDENTITY,
Unsigned32,
Counter32,
NOTIFICATION-TYPE,
mib-2
FROM SNMPv2-SMI
RowStatus,
TruthValue
FROM SNMPv2-TC
OBJECT-GROUP,
MODULE-COMPLIANCE,
NOTIFICATION-GROUP
FROM SNMPv2-CONF
InetAddressType,
InetAddress
FROM INET-ADDRESS-MIB
sysDescr
FROM SNMPv2-MIB
SnmpAdminString
FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB
docsDevSoftwareGroupV2
FROM DOCS-CABLE-DEVICE-MIB
DocsX509ASN1DEREncodedCertificate,
docsBpi2CodeDownloadGroup
FROM DOCS-IETF-BPI2-MIB
-- DOCS-IETF-BPI2-MIB per [RFCyyyy]
-- ************************************************************
-- * NOTES TO RFC Editor (to be removed prior to publication) *
-- * *
-- * The I-D <draft-ietf-ipcdn-bpiplus-mib-15.txt> *
-- * is expected to become RFC before this draft. *
-- * Please replace RFCyyyy with the RFC number of bpiplus and*
-- * remove this note *
-- * *
-- ************************************************************
ifPhysAddress
FROM IF-MIB;
pktcMtaMib MODULE-IDENTITY
LAST-UPDATED "200501210000Z" -- January 21, 2005
ORGANIZATION "IETF IP over Cable Data Network Working Group"
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CONTACT-INFO
"Eugene Nechamkin
Broadcom Corporation,
200-13711 International Place,
Richmond, BC, V6V 2Z8
CANADA
Phone: +1 604 233 8500
Email: enechamkin@broadcom.com
Jean-Francois Mule
Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.
858 Coal Creek Circle
Louisville, CO 80027-9750
U.S.A.
Phone: +1 303 661 9100
Email: jf.mule@cablelabs.com
IETF IPCDN Working Group
General Discussion: ipcdn@ietf.org
Subscribe: http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipcdn
Archive: ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf-mail-archive/ipcdn
Co-Chair: Jean-Francois Mule, jf.mule@cablelabs.com
Co-Chair: Richard Woundy, Richard_Woundy@cable.comcast.com"
DESCRIPTION
"This MIB module defines the basic management object
for the Multimedia Terminal Adapter devices compliant
with PacketCable and IPCablecom requirements.
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This version of
this MIB module is part of RFC nnnn; see the RFC itself for
full legal notices."
-- RFC Ed: replace nnnn with actual RFC number and remove this note
REVISION "200501210000Z" -- January 21, 2005
DESCRIPTION
"Initial version, published as RFC nnnn."
-- RFC Ed: replace nnnn with actual RFC number and remove this note
::= { mib-2 XXX }
-- RFC Ed: replace XXX with IANA-assigned number and remove this
-- note
--=================================================================
-- The MTA MIB module only supports a single Provisioning Server.
--=================================================================
pktcMtaMibObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaMib 1 }
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pktcMtaDevBase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaMibObjects 1 }
pktcMtaDevServer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaMibObjects 2 }
pktcMtaDevSecurity OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaMibObjects 3 }
pktcMtaDevErrors OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaMibObjects 4 }
--
-- The following pktcMtaDevBase group describes the base MTA objects
--
pktcMtaDevResetNow OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TruthValue
MAX-ACCESS read-write
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object controls the MTA software reset.
Reading this object always returns 'false'. Setting this
object to 'true' causes the device to reset immediately
and the following actions occur:
1. All connections (if present) are flushed locally.
2. All current actions such as ringing immediately
terminate.
3. Requests for signaling notifications such as
notification based on digit map recognition are
flushed.
4. All endpoints are disabled.
5. The provisioning flow is started at step MTA-1."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification."
::= { pktcMtaDevBase 1 }
pktcMtaDevSerialNumber OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object specifies the manufacturer's serial
number of this MTA. The value of this object MUST be
identical to the value specified in DHCP option 43
sub-option 4."
::= { pktcMtaDevBase 2 }
pktcMtaDevSwCurrentVers OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object identifies the software version currently
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operating in the MTA.
The MTA MUST return a string descriptive of the current
software load. This object should use the syntax
defined by the individual vendor to identify the software
version. The data presented in this object MUST be
identical to the software version information contained
in the 'sysDescr' MIB object of the MTA. The value of
this object MUST be identical to the value specified in
DHCP option 43 sub-option 6."
::= { pktcMtaDevBase 3 }
pktcMtaDevFQDN OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the Fully Qualified Domain Name for
this MTA."
::= { pktcMtaDevBase 4 }
pktcMtaDevEndPntCount OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..255)
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the number of physical endpoints for
this MTA."
::= { pktcMtaDevBase 5 }
pktcMtaDevEnabled OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TruthValue
MAX-ACCESS read-write
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the MTA Admin Status of this device.
If this object is set to 'true', the MTA is
administratively enabled and the MTA MUST be able to
interact with the PacketCable entities such as CMS,
Provisioning Server, KDC, and other MTAs and MGs on all
PacketCable interfaces.
If this object is set to 'false', the MTA is
administratively disabled and the MTA MUST perform the
following actions for all endpoints:
- shutdown all media sessions if present,
- shutdown NCS signaling by following the Restart in
Progress procedures in the PacketCable NCS
specification.
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Additionally, the MTA MUST maintain the SNMP Interface
For management and also SNMP Key management interface.
Also, the MTA MUST NOT continue Kerberized key management
with CMSes until this object is set to 'true'.
Note: MTAs MUST renew the CMS Kerberos tickets according
to the PacketCable Security or IPCablecom Specification."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
PacketCable Security Specification;
PacketCable Network-Based Call Signaling Protocol
Specification."
::= { pktcMtaDevBase 6 }
pktcMtaDevTypeIdentifier OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object provides the MTA device type identifier. The
value of this object must be a copy of the DHCP option 60
value exchanged between the MTA and the DHCP server."
REFERENCE
" RFC 2132, DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor Extensions;
PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification."
::= { pktcMtaDevBase 7 }
pktcMtaDevProvisioningState OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX INTEGER {
pass (1),
inProgress (2),
failConfigFileError (3),
passWithWarnings (4),
passWithIncompleteParsing (5),
failureInternalError (6),
failureOtherReason (7)
}
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object indicates the completion state of the MTA
device provisioning process.
pass:
If the configuration file could be parsed successfully
and the MTA is able to reflect the same in its
MIB, the MTA MUST return the value 'pass'.
inProgress:
If the MTA is in the process of being provisioned,
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the MTA MUST return the value 'inProgress'.
failConfigFileError:
If the configuration file was in error due to incorrect
values in the mandatory parameters, the MTA MUST reject
the configuration file and the MTA MUST return the value
'failConfigFileError'.
passWithWarnings:
If the configuration file had proper values for all the
mandatory parameters but has errors in any of the optional
parameters (this includes any vendor specific OIDs which
are incorrect or not known to the MTA), the MTA MUST
return the value 'passWithWarnings'.
passWithIncompleteParsing:
If the configuration file is valid, but the MTA cannot
reflect the same in its configuration (for example, too
many entries caused memory exhaustion), it must accept
the CMS configuration entries related and the MTA MUST
return the value 'passWithIncompleteParsing'.
failureInternalError:
If the configuration file cannot be parsed due to an
Internal error, the MTA MUST return the value
'failureInternalError'.
failureOtherReason:
If the MTA cannot accept the configuration file for any
other reason than the ones stated above, the MTA MUST
return the value 'failureOtherReason'.
When a final SNMP INFORM is sent as part of Step 25 of the
MTA Provisioning process, this parameter is also included
in the final INFORM message."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification."
::= { pktcMtaDevBase 8 }
pktcMtaDevHttpAccess OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TruthValue
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object indicates whether the HTTP protocol is
supported for the MTA configuration file transfer."
::= { pktcMtaDevBase 9 }
pktcMtaDevProvisioningTimer OBJECT-TYPE
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SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..30)
UNITS "minutes"
MAX-ACCESS read-write
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object defines the time interval for the provisioning
flow to complete. The MTA MUST finish all provisioning
operations starting from the moment when an MTA receives
its DHCP ACK and ending at the moment when the MTA
downloads its configuration file (e.g., MTA5 to MTA23)
within the period of time set by this object.
Failure to comply with this condition constitutes
a provisioning flow failure. If the object is set to 0,
the MTA MUST ignore the provisioning timer condition."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification."
DEFVAL {10}
::= {pktcMtaDevBase 10}
pktcMtaDevProvisioningCounter OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This object counts the number of times the
provisioning cycle has looped through step MTA-1."
::= {pktcMtaDevBase 11}
pktcMtaDevErrorOidsTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF PktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This table contains the list of configuration errors or
warnings the MTA encountered when parsing the
configuration file it received from the Provisioning
Server.
For each error, an entry is created in this table
containing the configuration parameters the MTA rejected
and the associated reason (e.g. wrong or unknown OID,
inappropriate object values, etc.). If the MTA
did not report a provisioning state of 'pass(1)' in
the pktcMtaDevProvisioningState object, this table MUST be
populated for each error or warning instance. Even if
different parameters share the same error type (e.g., all
realm name configuration parameters are invalid), all
observed errors or warnings must be reported as
different instances. Errors are placed into the table in
no particular order. The table MUST be cleared each time
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IPCDN MTA MIB January 2005
the MTA reboots."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification."
::= {pktcMtaDevBase 12 }
pktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX PktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This entry contains the necessary information the MTA MUST
attempt to provide in case of configuration file errors or
warnings."
INDEX { pktcMtaDevErrorOidIndex }
::= {pktcMtaDevErrorOidsTable 1}
PktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
pktcMtaDevErrorOidIndex Unsigned32,
pktcMtaDevErrorOid SnmpAdminString,
pktcMtaDevErrorValue SnmpAdminString,
pktcMtaDevErrorReason SnmpAdminString
}
pktcMtaDevErrorOidIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..1024)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object is the index of the MTA configuration error
table. It is an integer value which starts at value '1'
and is incremented for each encountered configuration
file error or warning.
The maximum number of errors or warnings that can be
recorded in the pktcMtaDevErrorOidsTable is set to 1024 as
a configuration file is usually validated by operators
before deployment. Given the possible number of
configuration parameter assignments in the MTA
configuration file, 1024 is perceived as a sufficient
limit even with future extensions.
If the number of the errors in the configuration file
exceeds 1024, all errors beyond the 1024th one MUST
be ignored and not be reflected in the
pktcMtaDevErrorOidsTable."
::= {pktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry 1}
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pktcMtaDevErrorOid OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains a human readable representation
(character string) of the OID corresponding to the
configuration file parameter that caused the particular
error.
For example, if the value of the pktcMtaDevEnabled object
in the configuration file caused an error, then this
object instance will contain the human readable string of
'1.3.6.1.2.1.XXX.1.1.6.0'.
-- ************************************************************
-- * NOTES TO RFC Editor (to be removed prior to publication) *
-- * *
-- * Please replace XXX with the IANA-assigned number under *
-- * mib-2. *
-- ************************************************************
If the MTA generated an error because it was not able
to recognize a particular OID, then this object
instance would contain an empty value (zero-length
string).
For example, if the value of an OID in the configuration
file was interpreted by the MTA as being 1.2.3.4.5, and
the MTA was not able to recognize this OID as a valid one,
this object instance will contain a zero-length string.
If the numbers of errors in the configuration file exceeds
1024, then for all subsequent errors, the
pktcMtaDevErrorOid of the table's 1024th entry MUST
contain a human readable representation of the
pktcMtaDevErrorsTooManyErrors object, i.e. the string
'1.3.6.1.2.1.XXX.1.1.4.1.0'.
-- ************************************************************
-- * NOTES TO RFC Editor (to be removed prior to publication) *
-- * *
-- * Please replace XXX with the IANA-assigned number under *
-- * mib-2. *
-- ************************************************************
Note that the syntax of this object is SnmpAdminString
rather than OBJECT IDENTIFIER because the object value may
not be a valid OID due to human or configuration tool
encoding errors."
::= {pktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry 2}
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pktcMtaDevErrorValue OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the value of the OID corresponding to
the configuration file parameter that caused the error.
If the MTA cannot recognize the OID of the
configuration parameter causing the error, then this
object instance contains the OID itself as interpreted
by the MTA in human readable representation.
If the MTA can recognize the OID but generate an error due
to a wrong value of the parameter, then the object
instance contains the erroneous value of the parameter as
read from the configuration file.
In both cases, the value of this object must be
represented in human readable form as a character string.
For example, if the value of the pktcMtaDevEnabled object
in the configuration file was 3 (invalid value), then the
pktcMtaDevErrorValue object instance will contain the
human readable (string) representation of value '3'.
Similarly, if the OID in the configuration file has been
interpreted by the MTA as being 1.2.3.4.5, and the MTA
cannot recognize this OID as a valid one, then this
pktcMtaDevErrorValue object instance will contain human
readable (string) representation of value '1.2.3.4.5'.
If the numbers of errors in the configuration file exceeds
1024, then for all subsequent errors, the
pktcMtaDevErrorValue of the table's 1024th entry MUST
contain a human readable representation of the
pktcMtaDevErrorsTooManyErrors object, i.e. the string
'1.3.6.1.2.1.XXX.1.1.4.1.0'."
-- ************************************************************
-- * NOTES TO RFC Editor (to be removed prior to publication) *
-- * *
-- * Please replace XXX with the IANA-assigned number under *
-- * mib-2. *
-- ************************************************************
::= {pktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry 3}
pktcMtaDevErrorReason OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object indicates the reason for the error or warning,
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IPCDN MTA MIB January 2005
as per the MTA's interpretation, in human readable form,
for example:
'VALUE NOT IN RANGE', 'VALUE DOES NOT MATCH TYPE',
'UNSUPPORTED VALUE', 'LAST 4 BITS MUST BE SET TO ZERO',
'OUT OF MEMORY - CANNOT STORE', etc.
This object may also contain vendor specific errors for
private vendor OIDs and any proprietary error codes or
messages which can help diagnose configuration errors.
If the number of errors in the configuration file exceeds
1024, then for all subsequent errors, the
pktcMtaDevErrorReason of the table's 1024th entry MUST
contain a human readable string indicating the reason
for an error, for example,
'Too many errors in the configuration file.'."
::= {pktcMtaDevErrorOidsEntry 4}
--
-- The following group describes server access and parameters used
-- for the initial MTA provisioning and bootstrapping phases.
--
pktcMtaDevServerAddressType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressType
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the Internet address type for the
PacketCable servers specified in MTA MIB."
DEFVAL { ipv4 }
::= { pktcMtaDevServer 1}
pktcMtaDevServerDhcp1 OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddress
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the Internet Address of the primary
DHCP server the MTA uses during provisioning.
The type of this address is determined by the value of
the pktcMtaDevServerAddressType object.
When the latter has the value 'ipv4(1)', this object
contains the IP address of the primary DHCP
server. It is provided by the CM to the MTA via the DHCP
option code 122 sub-option 1 as defined in RFC 3495.
The behavior of this object when the value of
pktcMtaDevServerAddressType is other than 'ipv4(1)'
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IPCDN MTA MIB January 2005
is not presently specified, but may be specified
in future versions of this MIB module.
If this object is of value
0.0.0.0, the MTA MUST stop all provisioning
attempts as well as all other activities.
If this object is of value 255.255.255.255, it means there
was no preference given for the primary DHCP server,
and, the MTA must follow the logic of RFC2131, and the
value of DHCP option 122 sub-option 2 must be ignored."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
RFC 2131, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol;
RFC 3495, DHCP Option for CableLabs Client Configuration."
::= { pktcMtaDevServer 2 }
pktcMtaDevServerDhcp2 OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddress
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the Internet Address of the secondary
DHCP server the MTA uses during provisioning.
The type of this address is determined by the value of
the pktcMtaDevServerAddressType object.
When the latter has the value 'ipv4(1)', this object
contains the IP address of the secondary DHCP
server. It is provided by the CM to the MTA via the DHCP
option code 122 sub-option 2 as defined in RFC 3495.
The behavior of this object when the value of
pktcMtaDevServerAddressType is other than 'ipv4(1)'
is not presently specified, but may be specified
in future versions of this MIB module.
If there was no secondary DHCP server provided in DHCP
Option 122 sub-option 2, this object must return the value
0.0.0.0."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
RFC 3495, DHCP Option for CableLabs Client Configuration."
::= { pktcMtaDevServer 3 }
pktcMtaDevServerDns1 OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddress
MAX-ACCESS read-write
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the IP Address of the primary
DNS server to be used by the MTA. The type of this address
is determined by the value of the
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IPCDN MTA MIB January 2005
pktcMtaDevServerAddressType object.
When the latter has the value 'ipv4(1)', this object
contains the IP address of the primary DNS server.
As defined in RFC 2132, PacketCable compliant MTAs receive
the IP addresses of the DNS Servers in the DHCP option 6.
The behavior of this object when the value of
pktcMtaDevServerAddressType is other than 'ipv4(1)'
is not presently specified, but may be specified
in future versions of this MIB module."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
RFC 2132, DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor Extensions."
::= { pktcMtaDevServer 4 }
pktcMtaDevServerDns2 OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddress
MAX-ACCESS read-write
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the IP Address of the secondary
DNS server to be used by the MTA. The type of this address
is determined by the value of the
pktcMtaDevServerAddressType object.
When the latter has the value 'ipv4(1)', this object
contains the IP address of the secondary DNS
server. As defined in RFC 2132, PacketCable compliant MTAs
receive the IP addresses of the DNS Servers in the DHCP
option 6.
The behavior of this object when the value of
pktcMtaDevServerAddressType is other than 'ipv4(1)'
is not presently specified, but may be specified
in future versions of this MIB module."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
RFC 2132, DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor Extensions."
::= { pktcMtaDevServer 5 }
pktcMtaDevTimeServer OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddress
MAX-ACCESS read-write
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the Internet Address of the Time
Server used by an S-MTA for Time Synchronization. The type
of this address is determined by the value of the
pktcMtaDevServerAddressType object.
When the latter has the value 'ipv4(1)', this object
contains the IP address of the Time Server used for Time
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Synchronization.
In the case of an S-MTA, this object must be
populated with a value other than 0.0.0.0 as obtained
from DHCP Option 4. The protocol by which the time of day
MUST be retrieved is defined in RFC 868.
In the case of an E-MTA, this object must contain a
value of 0.0.0.0 if the address type is 'ipv4(1)' since
an E-MTA does not use the Time Protocol for time
synchronization (an E-MTA uses the time retrieved by the
DOCSIS cable modem).
The behavior of this object when the value of
pktcMtaDevServerAddressType is other than 'ipv4(1)' is not
presently specified, but may be specified in future
versions of this MIB module."
REFERENCE
" RFC 868, Time Protocol;
RFC 2131, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol;
RFC 2132, DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor Extensions."
::= { pktcMtaDevServer 6}
pktcMtaDevConfigFile OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString
MAX-ACCESS read-write
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object specifies the MTA device configuration file
information, including the access method, the server name
and the configuration file name. The value of this object
is the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) of the configuration
file for TFTP or HTTP download.
If this object value is a TFTP URL, it must be formatted
as defined in RFC 3617.
If this object value is an HTTP URL, it must be formatted
as defined in RFC 2616.
If the MTA SNMP Enrollment mechanism is used, then the MTA
must download the file provided by the Provisioning Server
during provisioning via an SNMP SET on this object.
If the MTA SNMP Enrollment mechanism is not used, this
object MUST contain the URL value corresponding to the
'siaddr' and 'file' fields received in the DHCP ACK to
locate the configuration file: the 'siaddr' & 'file'
fields represents the host and file of the TFTP URL.
In this case, the MTA MUST return an
'inconsistentValue' error in response to SNMP SET
operations.
The MTA MUST return a zero-length string if the server
address (host part of the URL) is unknown."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
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IPCDN MTA MIB January 2005
RFC 3617, URI Scheme for TFTP; RFC 2616, HTTP 1.1"
::= { pktcMtaDevServer 7 }
pktcMtaDevSnmpEntity OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the FQDN of the SNMP entity of the
Provisioning Server. When the MTA SNMP Enrollment
Mechanism is used, this object represents the server the
MTA communicates with, to receive the configuration file
URL from, and, to send the enrollment notification to.
The SNMP entity is also the destination entity for all
the provisioning notifications. It may be used for
post-provisioning SNMP operations.
During the provisioning phase, this SNMP
entity FQDN is supplied to the MTA via the DHCP option 122
sub-option 3 as defined in RFC 3495."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
RFC 3495, DHCP Option for CableLabs Client Configuration."
::= { pktcMtaDevServer 8 }
pktcMtaDevProvConfigHash OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(20))
MAX-ACCESS read-write
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the hash value of the contents of the
configuration file.
The authentication algorithm is SHA-1, and the length
is 160 bits. The hash calculation MUST follow the
requirements defined in the PacketCable Security
Specification.
When the MTA SNMP Enrollment mechanism is used, this
hash value is calculated and sent to the MTA prior
to sending the config file. This object value is then
provided by the Provisioning server via an SNMP
SET operation
When the MTA SNMP Enrollment mechanism is not in use, the
hash value is provided in the configuration file itself
and it is also calculated by the MTA. This object value
MUST represent the hash value calculated by the MTA.
When the MTA SNMP Enrollment mechanism is not in use, the
MTA must reject all SNMP SET operations on this object and
return an 'inconsistentValue' error."
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REFERENCE
" PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
PacketCable Security Specification."
::= { pktcMtaDevServer 9 }
pktcMtaDevProvConfigKey OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(0|8))
MAX-ACCESS read-write
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the key used to encrypt/decrypt
the configuration file when secure SNMPv3 provisioning
is used.
The privacy algorithm is defined by the PacketCable
Security Specification, it is DES in CBC mode and the key
length is 64 bits.
If this object is set at any other provisioning steps than
the one(s) allowed by the PacketCable MTA Device
Provisioning Specification, or, if this object is
set to a zero-length string value, the MTA MUST return
an 'inconsistentValue' error.
This object must not be used in non secure provisioning
mode. In non secure provisioning modes, the MTA MUST
return an 'inconsistentValue' in response to SNMP SET
operations, and, the MTA MUST return a zero-length string
in response to SNMP GET operations."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
PacketCable Security Specification."
::= { pktcMtaDevServer 10 }
pktcMtaDevProvSolicitedKeyTimeout OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..180)
UNITS "seconds"
MAX-ACCESS read-write
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object defines a Kerberos Key Management timer on the
MTA. It is the time period during which the MTA saves the
nonce and Server Kerberos Principal Identifier to match an
AP Request and its associated AP Reply response from the
Provisioning Server.
After the timeout has been exceeded, the client discards
this (nonce, Server Kerberos Principal Identifier) pair,
after which it will no longer accept a matching AP Reply.
This timer only applies when the Provisioning Server
initiated key management for SNMPv3 (with a
Wake Up message).
If this object is set to a zero value, the MTA MUST return
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IPCDN MTA MIB January 2005
an 'inconsistentValue' in response to SNMP SET operations.
This object should not be used in non secure provisioning
modes. In non secure provisioning modes, the MTA MUST
return an 'inconsistentValue' in response to SNMP SET
operations, and the MTA MUST return a zero value in
response to SNMP GET operations."
DEFVAL { 3 }
::= { pktcMtaDevServer 11 }
--=================================================================
--
-- Unsolicited key updates are retransmitted based on an
-- exponential back-off mechanism using two timers and a maximum
-- retry counter for AS replies.
-- The initial retransmission timer value is the nominal timer
-- value (pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout). The
-- retransmissions occur with an exponentially increasing interval
-- that caps at the maximum timeout value
-- (pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout).
-- Retransmissions stop when the maximum retry counter is reached
-- (pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries).
-- For example, with values of 3 seconds for the nominal
-- timer, 100 seconds for the maximum timeout, 8 retries max and
-- an exponential value of 2, this results in retransmission
-- intervals of 3 s, 6 s, 12 s, 24 s, 48 s, 96 s, 100 s, 100 s, and
-- then retransmissions stop because the maximum number of
-- retries (8) has been reached.
--
--=================================================================
--
-- Timeouts for unsolicited key management updates are only
-- pertinent before the first SNMPv3 message is sent between the
-- MTA and the Provisioning Server and before the configuration
-- file is loaded.
--
--=================================================================
pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..600)
UNITS "seconds"
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object defines the timeout value that applies to
an MTA-initiated AP-REQ/REP key management exchange with
the Provisioning Server in SNMPv3 provisioning.
It is the maximum timeout value and it may not be exceeded
in the exponential back-off algorithm. If the DHCP option
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IPCDN MTA MIB January 2005
code 122 sub-option 5 is provided to the MTA, it
overwrites this value.
If this object is set to a zero value, the MTA MUST return
an 'inconsistentValue' in response to SNMP SET operations.
In non secure provisioning modes, the MTA MUST
MTA MUST return a zero value in response to SNMP GET
operations."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable Security Specification."
DEFVAL {600}
::= { pktcMtaDevServer 12 }
pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..600)
UNITS "seconds"
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object defines the starting value of the timeout
for the AP-REQ/REP Backoff and Retry mechanism
with exponential timeout in SNMPv3 provisioning.
If the DHCP option code 122 sub-option 5 is provided
the MTA, it overwrites this value.
If this object is set to a zero value, the MTA MUST return
an 'inconsistentValue' in response to SNMP SET operations.
In non secure provisioning modes, the MTA MUST
MTA MUST return a zero value in response to SNMP GET
operations."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable Security Specification."
DEFVAL {3}
::= { pktcMtaDevServer 13}
pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..32)
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains a retry counter that applies to
an MTA-initiated AP-REQ/REP key management exchange with
the Provisioning Server in secure SNMPv3 provisioning.
It is the maximum number of retries before the MTA stops
attempting to establish a Security Association with
Provisioning Server.
If the DHCP option code 122 sub-option 5 is provided to
the MTA, it overwrites this value.
If this object is set to a zero value, the MTA MUST return
an 'inconsistentValue' in response to SNMP SET operations.
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In non secure provisioning modes, the MTA MUST
MTA MUST return a zero value in response to SNMP GET
operations."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable Security Specification."
DEFVAL {8}
::= { pktcMtaDevServer 14 }
pktcMtaDevProvKerbRealmName OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString (SIZE(1..255))
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the name of the associated
provisioning Kerberos realm acquired during the MTA4
provisioning step (DHCP Ack) for SNMPv3 provisioning.
This object value is used as an index into the
pktcMtaDevRealmTable. The upper case ASCII representation
of the associated Kerberos realm name MUST be used by both
the Manager (SNMP entity) and the MTA.
The Kerberos realm name for the Provisioning Server is
supplied to the MTA via DHCP option code 122 sub-option 6
as defined in RFC 3495. In secure SNMP provisioning mode
the value of the Kerberos realm name for the Provisioning
Server supplied in the MTA configuration file must match
the value supplied in the DHCP option code 122
sub-option 6. Otherwise the value of this object must
contain the value supplied in DHCP Option 122
sub-option 6."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification;
RFC 3495, DHCP Option for CableLabs Client Configuration."
::= { pktcMtaDevServer 15 }
pktcMtaDevProvState OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX INTEGER {
operational (1),
waitingForSnmpSetInfo (2),
waitingForTftpAddrResponse (3),
waitingForConfigFile (4)
}
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object defines the MTA provisioning state.
If the state is:
'operational(1)', the device has completed the loading
and processing of the initialization parameters.
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IPCDN MTA MIB January 2005
'waitingForSnmpSetInfo(2)', the device is waiting on
its configuration file download access information.
Note that this state is only reported when the MTA
SNMP enrollment mechanism is used.
'waitingForTftpAddrResponse(3)', the device has sent a
DNS request to resolve the server providing the
configuration file and it is awaiting for a response.
Note that this state is only reported when the MTA
SNMP enrollment mechanism is used.
'waitingForConfigFile(4)', the device has sent a
request via TFTP or HTTP for the download of its
configuration file and it is awaiting for a response or
the file download is in progress."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification,
PacketCable Security Specification."
::= { pktcMtaDevServer 16 }
--
-- The following object group describes the security objects.
--
pktcMtaDevManufacturerCertificate OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DocsX509ASN1DEREncodedCertificate
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the MTA Manufacturer Certificate.
The object value must be the ASN.1 DER encoding of the MTA
manufacturer's X.509 public key certificate. The MTA
Manufacturer Certificate is issued to each MTA
manufacturer and is installed into each MTA at the time of
manufacture or with a secure code download. The specific
requirements related to this certificate are defined in
the PacketCable or IPCablecom Security specifications."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable Security Specification."
::= {pktcMtaDevSecurity 1}
pktcMtaDevCertificate OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DocsX509ASN1DEREncodedCertificate
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the MTA Device Certificate.
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IPCDN MTA MIB January 2005
The object value must be the ASN.1 DER encoding of the
MTA's X.509 public-key certificate issued by the
manufacturer and installed into the MTA at the time of
manufacture or with a secure code download.
This certificate contains the MTA MAC address. The
specific requirements related to this certificate are
defined in the PacketCable or IPCablecom Security
specifications."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable Security Specification."
::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 2 }
pktcMtaDevCorrelationId OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains a correlation ID, an arbitrary value
generated by the MTA that will be exchanged as part of the
device capability data to the Provisioning Application.
This random value is used as an identifier to correlate
related events in the MTA provisioning sequence.
This value is intended for use only during the MTA
initialization and configuration file download."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable MTA Device Provisioning Specification."
::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 3 }
pktcMtaDevTelephonyRootCertificate OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DocsX509ASN1DEREncodedCertificate
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the telephony Service Provider Root
certificate. The object value is the ASN.1 DER encoding of
the IP Telephony Service Provider Root X.509 public key
certificate. This certification is stored in the MTA
non-volatile memory and can be updated with a secure code
download. This certificate is used to validate the initial
AS Reply received by the MTA from the KDC during the MTA
initialization. The specific requirements related to this
certificate are defined in the PacketCable or IPCablecom
Security specifications."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable Security Specification."
::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 4 }
--=================================================================
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IPCDN MTA MIB January 2005
--
-- Informative procedures for setting up Security Associations:
--
-- A Security Association may be setup either via configuration or
-- via NCS signaling.
--
-- I. Security association setup via configuration.
--
-- The realm must be configured first. Associated with the realm
-- is a KDC. The realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable) indicates
-- information about the realm (e.g., name, organization name) and
-- parameters associated with KDC communications (e.g., grace
-- periods, AS Request/AS Reply adaptive back-off parameters).
--
-- Once the realm is established, one or more CMS(es) may be
-- defined in the realm. Associated with each CMS
-- entry in the pktcMtaDevCmsTable is an explicit reference
-- to a Realm via the realm name( pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName),
-- the FQDN of the CMS, and parameters associated with IPSec
-- key management with the CMS (e.g., clock skew, AP Request/
-- AP Reply adaptive back-off parameters).
--
-- II. Security association setup via NCS signaling.
--
-- The procedure of establishing the Security Associations
-- for NCS signaling is described in the PacketCable Security
-- specification.
-- It involves the analysis of the pktcNcsEndPntConfigTable row
-- for the corresponding endpoint number and correlating
-- the CMS FQDN from this row with the CMS Table and
-- consequently - with the Realm Table. Both of these tables
-- are defined below. The pktcNcsEndPntConfigTable is defined in
-- the IPCDN NCS Signaling MIB [RFCzzz].
-- ************************************************************
-- * NOTES TO RFC Editor (to be removed prior to publication) *
-- * *
-- * Please replace RFCzzz with this RFC number for *
-- * see informative reference section for details and remove *
-- * the note. *
-- ************************************************************
--
-- III. When the MTA receives wake-up or re-key messages from a
-- CMS, it performs key management based on the corresponding
-- entry in the CMS table. If the matching CMS entry does not
-- exist, it must ignore the wake-up or re-key messages.
--
--=================================================================
--=================================================================
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--
-- pktcMtaDevRealmTable
--
-- The pktcMtaDevRealmTable shows the KDC realms. The table is
-- indexed with pktcMtaDevRealmIndex. The Realm Table contains the
-- pktcMtaDevRealmName in conjunction with any server which needs
-- a Security Association with the MTA. Upper case must be used
-- to compare the pktcMtaDevRealmName content.
--
--=================================================================
pktcMtaDevRealmAvailSlot OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..64)
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the index number of the first
available entry in the realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable).
If all the entries in the realm table have been assigned,
this object contains the value of zero.
A management station should create new entries in the
realm table using the following procedure:
first, issue a management protocol retrieval operation
to determine the value of the first available index in the
realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmAvailSlot);
second, issue a management protocol SET operation
to create an instance of the pktcMtaDevRealmStatus
object by setting its value to 'createAndWait(5)'.
third, if the SET operation succeeded, continue
modifying the object instances corresponding to the newly
created conceptual row, without fear of collision with
other management stations. When all necessary conceptual
columns of the row are properly populated (via SET
operations or default values), the management station may
SET the pktcMtaDevRealmStatus object to 'active(1)'."
::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 5 }
pktcMtaDevRealmTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF PktcMtaDevRealmEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the realm table.
The CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsTable) and the realm table
(pktcMtaDevRealmTable) are used for managing the MTA-CMS
Security Associations. The realm table defines the
Kerberos realms for the Application Servers (CMSes & the
Provisioning Server)."
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::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 6 }
pktcMtaDevRealmEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX PktcMtaDevRealmEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This table entry object lists the MTA security parameters
for a single Kerberos realm. The conceptual rows MUST NOT
persist across MTA reboots."
INDEX { pktcMtaDevRealmIndex }
::= { pktcMtaDevRealmTable 1 }
PktcMtaDevRealmEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
pktcMtaDevRealmIndex Unsigned32,
pktcMtaDevRealmName SnmpAdminString,
pktcMtaDevRealmPkinitGracePeriod Unsigned32,
pktcMtaDevRealmTgsGracePeriod Unsigned32,
pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName SnmpAdminString,
pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout Unsigned32,
pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout Unsigned32,
pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries Unsigned32,
pktcMtaDevRealmStatus RowStatus
}
pktcMtaDevRealmIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..32)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object defines the realm table index."
::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 1}
pktcMtaDevRealmName OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString (SIZE(1..255))
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object identifies the Kerberos realm name in all
capitals. The MTA MUST prohibit the instantiation of any
two rows with identical Kerberos realm names. The MTA MUST
also verify that any search operation involving Kerberos
realm names is done using the upper case ASCII
representation of the characters."
::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 2 }
pktcMtaDevRealmPkinitGracePeriod OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (15..600)
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UNITS "minutes"
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the PKINIT Grace Period. For the
purpose of key management with Application Servers (CMSes
or the Provisioning Server), the MTA must utilize the
PKINIT exchange to obtain Application Server tickets. The
MTA may utilize the PKINIT exchange to obtain Ticket
Granting Tickets (TGTs), which are then used to obtain
Application Server tickets in a TGS exchange.
The PKINIT exchange occurs based on the current Ticket
Expiration Time (TicketEXP) and on the PKINIT Grace Period
(PKINITGP). The MTA MUST initiate the PKINIT exchange at
the time: TicketEXP - PKINITGP."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable Security Specification."
DEFVAL { 15 }
::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 3 }
pktcMtaDevRealmTgsGracePeriod OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..600)
UNITS "minutes"
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the Ticket Granting Server Grace
Period (TGSGP). The Ticket Granting Server (TGS)
Request / Reply exchange may be performed by the MTA
on-demand whenever an Application Server ticket is
needed to establish security parameters. If the MTA
possesses a ticket that corresponds to the Provisioning
Server or a CMS that currently exists in the CMS table,
the MTA MUST initiate the TGS Request / Reply exchange
at the time: TicketEXP - TGSGP."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable Security Specification."
DEFVAL { 10 }
::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 4 }
pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString(SIZE (1..64))
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the X.500 organization name attribute
as defined in the subject name of the service provider
certificate. The value of the organization name includes
the prefix 'O='."
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REFERENCE
" PacketCable Security Specification."
::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 5 }
--=================================================================
--
-- Unsolicited key updates are retransmitted based on an
-- exponential back-off mechanism using two timers and a maximum
-- retry counter for AS replies.
-- The initial retransmission timer value is the nominal timer
-- value (pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout). The
-- retransmissions occur with an exponentially increasing interval
-- that caps at the maximum timeout value
-- (pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout).
-- Retransmissions stop when the maximum retry counter is reached
-- (pktcMatDevRealmUnsolicitedMaxRetries).
-- For example, with values of 3 seconds for the nominal
-- timer, 20 seconds for the maximum timeout and 5 retries max,
-- this results in retransmission intervals of 3 s, 6 s, 12 s,
-- 20 s, 20 s, and then retransmissions stop because the maximum
-- number of retries has been reached.
--
--=================================================================
pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..600)
UNITS "seconds"
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object specifies the maximum time the MTA will
attempt to perform the exponential back-off algorithm.
This timer only applies when the MTA initiated key
management. If the DHCP option code 122 sub-option 4 is
provided to the MTA, it overwrites this value. "
REFERENCE
" PacketCable Security Specification."
DEFVAL { 100 }
::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 6 }
pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (100..600000)
UNITS "milliseconds"
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object specifies the initial timeout value
for the AS-REQ/AS-REP exponential back-off and retry
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mechanism. If the DHCP option code 122 sub-option 4 is
provided to the MTA, it overwrites this value.
This value should account for the average roundtrip
time between the MTA and the KDC as well as the
processing delay on the KDC."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable Security Specification."
DEFVAL { 3000 }
::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 7 }
pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..1024)
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object specifies the maximum number of retries the
MTA attempts to obtain a ticket from the KDC."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable Security Specification."
DEFVAL { 5 }
::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 8 }
pktcMtaDevRealmStatus OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RowStatus
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object defines the row status of this realm in the
realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable).
An entry in this table is not qualified for activation
until the object instances of all corresponding columns
have been initialized, either by default values, or via
explicit SET operations. Until all object instances in
this row are initialized, the status value for this realm
must be 'notReady(3)'.
In particular, two columnar objects must be explicitly
SET: the realm name (pktcMtaDevRealmName) and the
organization name (pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName). Once these 2
objects have been set and the row status is SET to
'active(1)', the MTA MUST NOT allow any modification of
these 2 object values.
The value of this object has no effect on whether other
columnar objects in this row can be modified."
::= { pktcMtaDevRealmEntry 9 }
--=================================================================
--
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-- The CMS table, pktcMtaDevCmsTable
--
-- The CMS table and the realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable) are used
-- for managing the MTA signaling security. The CMS table defines
-- the CMSes the MTA is allowed to communicate with and contains
-- the parameters describing the SA establishment between the MTA
-- and a CMS.
-- The CMS table is indexed by pktcMtaDevCmsIndex. The table
-- contains the CMS FQDN (pktcMtaDevCmsFQDN) and the associated
-- Kerberos realm name (pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName) so that the MTA
-- can find the corresponding Kerberos realm name in the
-- pktcMtaDevRealmTable.
--
--=================================================================
pktcMtaDevCmsAvailSlot OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..128)
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object contains the index number of the first
available entry in the CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsTable).
If all the entries in the CMS table have been assigned,
this object contains the value of zero.
A management station should create new entries in the
CMS table using the following procedure:
first, issue a management protocol retrieval operation
to determine the value of the first available index in the
CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsAvailSlot);
second, issue a management protocol SET operation
to create an instance of the pktcMtaDevCmsStatus
object by setting its value to 'createAndWait(5)'.
third, if the SET operation succeeded, continue
modifying the object instances corresponding to the newly
created conceptual row, without fear of collision with
other management stations. When all necessary conceptual
columns of the row are properly populated (via SET
operations or default values), the management station may
SET the pktcMtaDevCmsStatus object to 'active(1)'."
::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 7 }
pktcMtaDevCmsTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF PktcMtaDevCmsEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object defines the CMS table.
The CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsTable) and the realm table
(pktcMtaDevRealmTable) are used for managing security
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between the MTA and CMSes. Each CMS table entry defines
a CMS the managed MTA is allowed to communicate with
and contains security parameters for key management with
that CMS."
::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 8 }
pktcMtaDevCmsEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX PktcMtaDevCmsEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This table entry object lists the MTA key management
parameters used when establishing Security Associations
with a CMS. The conceptual rows MUST NOT persist across
MTA reboots."
INDEX { pktcMtaDevCmsIndex }
::= { pktcMtaDevCmsTable 1 }
PktcMtaDevCmsEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
pktcMtaDevCmsIndex Unsigned32,
pktcMtaDevCmsFqdn SnmpAdminString,
pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName SnmpAdminString,
pktcMtaDevCmsMaxClockSkew Unsigned32,
pktcMtaDevCmsSolicitedKeyTimeout Unsigned32,
pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout Unsigned32,
pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout Unsigned32,
pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries Unsigned32,
pktcMtaDevCmsIpsecCtrl TruthValue,
pktcMtaDevCmsStatus RowStatus
}
pktcMtaDevCmsIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..64)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object defines the CMS table index."
::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 1 }
pktcMtaDevCmsFqdn OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString (SIZE(1..255))
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object specifies the CMS FQDN. The MTA must
prohibit the instantiation of any two rows with identical
FQDNs. The MTA must also verify that any search and/or
comparison operation involving a CMS FQDN is case
insensitive."
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::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 2 }
pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString (SIZE(1..255))
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object identifies the Kerberos realm name in upper
case characters associated with the CMS defined in this
conceptual row. The object value is a reference
point to the corresponding Kerberos realm name in the
realm table (pktcMtaDevRealmTable)."
::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 3 }
pktcMtaDevCmsMaxClockSkew OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..1800)
UNITS "seconds"
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object specifies the maximum allowable clock skew
between the MTA and the CMS defined in this row."
DEFVAL { 300 }
::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 4 }
pktcMtaDevCmsSolicitedKeyTimeout OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (100..30000)
UNITS "milliseconds"
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object defines a Kerberos Key Management timer on the
MTA. It is the time period during which the MTA saves the
nonce and Server Kerberos Principal Identifier to match an
AP Request and its associated AP Reply response from the
CMS. This timer only applies when the CMS initiated key
management (with a Wake Up message or a Rekey message)."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable Security Specification."
DEFVAL { 1000 }
::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 5 }
--=================================================================
--
-- Unsolicited key updates are retransmitted based on an
-- exponential back-off mechanism using two timers and a maximum
-- retry counter for AS replies.
-- The initial retransmission timer value is the nominal timer
-- value (pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout). The
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-- retransmissions occur with an exponentially increasing interval
-- that caps at the maximum timeout value
-- (pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout).
-- Retransmissions stop when the maximum retry counter is reached
-- (pktcMatDevCmsUnsolicitedMaxRetries).
-- For example, with values of 3 seconds for the nominal
-- timer, 20 seconds for the maximum timeout and 5 retries max,
-- this results in retransmission intervals of 3 s, 6 s, 12 s,
-- 20 s, 20 s, and then retransmissions stop due to the
-- maximum number of retries reached.
--
--=================================================================
pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..600)
UNITS "seconds"
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object defines the timeout value that only applies
to an MTA-initiated key management exchange. It is the
maximum timeout and it may not be exceeded in the
exponential back-off algorithm."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable Security Specification."
DEFVAL { 600 }
::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 6 }
pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (100..30000)
UNITS "milliseconds"
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object defines the starting value of the timeout
for an MTA-initiated key management. It should account for
the average roundtrip time between the MTA and the CMS and
the processing time on the CMS."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable Security Specification."
DEFVAL { 500 }
::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 7 }
pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..1024)
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
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" This object contains the maximum number of retries before
the MTA stops attempting to establish a Security
Association with the CMS."
REFERENCE
" PacketCable Security Specification."
DEFVAL { 5 }
::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 8 }
pktcMtaDevCmsIpsecCtrl OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TruthValue
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object specifies the MTA IPSec control flag.
If the object value is 'true', the MTA must use Kerberos
Key Management and IPsec to communicate with this CMS. If
it is 'false', IPSec Signaling Security and Kerberos key
management are disabled for this specific CMS."
DEFVAL { true }
::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 9 }
pktcMtaDevCmsStatus OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RowStatus
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object defines the row status associated with this
particular CMS in the CMS table (pktcMtaDevCmsTable).
An entry in this table is not qualified for activation
until the object instances of all corresponding columns
have been initialized, either by default values, or via
explicit SET operations. Until all object instances in
this row are initialized, the status value for this realm
must be 'notReady(3)'.
In particular, two columnar objects must be SET: the
CMS FQDN (pktcMtaDevCmsFqdn) and the Kerberos realm name
(pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName). Once these 2 objects have
been set and the row status is SET to 'active(1)', the MTA
MUST NOT allow any modification of these 2 object values.
The value of this object has no effect on
whether other columnar objects in this row can be
modified."
::= { pktcMtaDevCmsEntry 10 }
pktcMtaDevResetKrbTickets OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX BITS {
invalidateProvOnReboot (0),
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IPCDN MTA MIB January 2005
invalidateAllCmsOnReboot (1)
}
MAX-ACCESS read-write
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This object defines a Kerberos Ticket Control Mask that
instructs the MTA to invalidate the specific Application
Server Kerberos ticket(s) that are stored locally in the
MTA NVRAM (non-volatile or persistent memory).
If the MTA does not store Kerberos tickets in NVRAM, it
MUST ignore setting of this object, and MUST report a BITS
value of zero when the object is read.
If the MTA supports Kerberos tickets storage in NVRAM, the
object value is encoded as follows:
- setting the invalidateProvOnReboot bit (bit 0) to 1
means that the MTA MUST invalidate the Kerberos
Application Ticket(s) for the Provisioning Application
at the next MTA reboot if secure SNMP provisioning mode
is used. In non secure provisioning modes, the MTA MUST
return an 'inconsistentValue' in response to SNMP SET
operations with a bit 0 set to 1.
- setting the invalidateAllCmsOnReboot bit (bit 1) to 1
means that the MTA MUST invalidate the Kerberos
Application Ticket(s) for all CMSes currently assigned
to the MTA endpoints."
REFERENCE
"PacketCable Security Specification."
DEFVAL { { } }
::= { pktcMtaDevSecurity 9 }
--
-- The following group, pktcMtaDevErrors defines an OID
-- corresponding to error conditions encountered during the MTA
-- provisioning.
--
pktcMtaDevErrorsTooManyErrors OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This object defines the OID corresponding to the error
condition when too many errors are encountered in the
MTA configuration file during provisioning."
::= { pktcMtaDevErrors 1 }
pktcMtaNotificationPrefix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaMib 2 }
pktcMtaNotification OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
pktcMtaNotificationPrefix 0 }
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pktcMtaConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaMib 3 }
pktcMtaDevProvisioningEnrollment NOTIFICATION-TYPE
OBJECTS {
sysDescr,
pktcMtaDevSwCurrentVers,
pktcMtaDevTypeIdentifier,
ifPhysAddress,
pktcMtaDevCorrelationId
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This INFORM notification is issued by the MTA to initiate
the PacketCable provisioning process when the MTA SNMP
enrollment mechanism is used.
It contains the system description, the current software
version, the MTA device type identifier, the MTA MAC
address (obtained in the MTA ifTable in the ifPhysAddress
object that corresponds to the ifIndex 1) and a
correlation ID."
::= { pktcMtaNotification 1 }
pktcMtaDevProvisioningStatus NOTIFICATION-TYPE
OBJECTS {
ifPhysAddress,
pktcMtaDevCorrelationId,
pktcMtaDevProvisioningState
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" This INFORM notification may be issued by the MTA to
confirm the completion of the PacketCable provisioning
process, and to report its provisioning completion
status.
It contains the MTA MAC address (obtained in the MTA
ifTable in the ifPhysAddress object that corresponds
to the ifIndex 1), a correlation ID and the MTA
provisioning state as defined in
pktcMtaDevProvisioningState."
::= { pktcMtaNotification 2 }
--
-- Compliance Statements
--
pktcMtaCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaConformance 1 }
pktcMtaGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pktcMtaConformance 2 }
pktcMtaBasicCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
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IPCDN MTA MIB January 2005
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" The compliance statement for MTA devices that implement
PacketCable or IPCablecom requirements.
This compliance statement applies to MTA implementations
that support PacketCable 1.0 or IPCablecom requirements,
which are not IPv6-capable at the time of this
RFC publication."
MODULE -- Unconditionally mandatory groups for MTAs
MANDATORY-GROUPS {
pktcMtaGroup,
pktcMtaNotificationGroup
}
OBJECT pktcMtaDevServerAddressType
SYNTAX InetAddressType
DESCRIPTION
" Support for address types other than 'ipv4(1)'
is not presently specified and therefore, is not
required. It may be defined in future versions of
this MIB module."
::= { pktcMtaCompliances 1 }
pktcMtaGroup OBJECT-GROUP
OBJECTS {
pktcMtaDevResetNow,
pktcMtaDevSerialNumber,
pktcMtaDevSwCurrentVers,
pktcMtaDevFQDN,
pktcMtaDevEndPntCount,
pktcMtaDevEnabled,
pktcMtaDevProvisioningCounter,
pktcMtaDevErrorOid,
pktcMtaDevErrorValue,
pktcMtaDevErrorReason,
pktcMtaDevTypeIdentifier,
pktcMtaDevProvisioningState,
pktcMtaDevHttpAccess,
pktcMtaDevCertificate,
pktcMtaDevCorrelationId,
pktcMtaDevManufacturerCertificate,
pktcMtaDevServerAddressType,
pktcMtaDevServerDhcp1,
pktcMtaDevServerDhcp2,
pktcMtaDevServerDns1,
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pktcMtaDevServerDns2,
pktcMtaDevTimeServer,
pktcMtaDevConfigFile,
pktcMtaDevSnmpEntity,
pktcMtaDevRealmPkinitGracePeriod,
pktcMtaDevRealmTgsGracePeriod,
pktcMtaDevRealmAvailSlot,
pktcMtaDevRealmName,
pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName,
pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout,
pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout,
pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries,
pktcMtaDevRealmStatus,
pktcMtaDevCmsAvailSlot,
pktcMtaDevCmsFqdn,
pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName,
pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout,
pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout,
pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries,
pktcMtaDevCmsSolicitedKeyTimeout,
pktcMtaDevCmsMaxClockSkew,
pktcMtaDevCmsIpsecCtrl,
pktcMtaDevCmsStatus,
pktcMtaDevResetKrbTickets,
pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout,
pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout,
pktcMtaDevProvUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries,
pktcMtaDevProvKerbRealmName,
pktcMtaDevProvSolicitedKeyTimeout,
pktcMtaDevProvConfigHash,
pktcMtaDevProvConfigKey,
pktcMtaDevProvState,
pktcMtaDevProvisioningTimer,
pktcMtaDevTelephonyRootCertificate
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" A collection of objects for managing PacketCable or
IPCablecom MTA implementations."
::= { pktcMtaGroups 1 }
pktcMtaNotificationGroup NOTIFICATION-GROUP
NOTIFICATIONS {
pktcMtaDevProvisioningStatus,
pktcMtaDevProvisioningEnrollment
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" A collection of notifications dealing with the change of
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IPCDN MTA MIB January 2005
MTA provisioning status."
::= { pktcMtaGroups 2 }
pktcMtaBasicSmtaCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
" The compliance statement for S-MTA devices
that implement PacketCable or IPCablecom requirements.
This compliance statement applies to S-MTA implementations
that support PacketCable or IPCablecom requirements,
which are not IPv6-capable at the time of this
RFC publication."
-- Unconditionally Mandatory Groups for S-MTA devices
MODULE
MANDATORY-GROUPS {
pktcMtaGroup,
pktcMtaNotificationGroup
}
MODULE DOCS-CABLE-DEVICE-MIB
MANDATORY-GROUPS {
docsDevSoftwareGroupV2
}
MODULE DOCS-IETF-BPI2-MIB
MANDATORY-GROUPS {
docsBpi2CodeDownloadGroup
}
::= { pktcMtaCompliances 2 }
END
5. Acknowledgments
The current editors would like to thank the members of the IETF
IPCDN working group and the CableLabs PacketCable Provisioning and
OSS focus team for their comments and suggestions.
In particular, we wish to express our gratitude for the
contributions made by the following individuals (in no particular
order): Angela Lyda,Sumanth Channabasappa, Matt A. Osman, Klaus
Hermanns, Paul Duffy, Rick Vetter, Sasha Medvinsky, Roy Spitzer,
Itay Sherman, Satish Kumar and Eric Rosenfeld.
Finally, special thanks to our area director Bert Wijnen, Rich
Woundy, Randy Presuhn, Mike Heard and Dave Thaler.
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6. Normative References
[RFC868] Postel, J., "Time Protocol", STD 26, RFC 868, May 1983.
[RFC1350] Sollins, K., "THE TFTP PROTOCOL (REVISION 2)", STD 33,
RFC 1350, July 1992.
[RFC2131] R. Droms, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", March
1997.
[RFC2132] S. Alexander, R. Droms, "DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor
Extensions", March 1997.
[RFC2459] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W. and D. Solo "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL
Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999.
[RFC2578] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J.,
Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Structure of Management
Information Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578, April
1999.
[RFC2579] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J.,
Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Textual Conventions for
SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2579, April 1999.
[RFC2580] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J.,
Rose, M. and S. Waldbusser, "Conformance Statements for
SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2580, April 1999.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach P., and Berners-Lee T., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1.", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC2863] McCloghrie, K., Kastenholz, F., "The Interfaces Group
MIB", June 2000.
[RFC3411] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and Wijnen, B., "An
Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", STD 62,
December 2002.
[RFC3418] Presuhn, R., Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M.,
and Waldbusser, S., "Management Information Base (MIB)
for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
STD 62, December 2002.
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IPCDN MTA MIB January 2005
[RFC3291] Daniele, M., Haberman, B., Routhier, S., Schoenwaelder,
J., "Textual Conventions for Internet Network Addresses",
RFC 3291, May 2002.
************************************************************
* NOTES TO RFC Editor (to be removed prior to publication) *
* *
* The I-D <draft-ietf-ops-rfc3291bis-05.txt> (or a *
* successor) is expected to eventually replace RFC 3291. *
* If that draft (or a successor) is published as a RFC *
* prior to or concurrently with this document, then the *
* normative reference [RFC3291] should be updated to *
* point to the replacement RFC, and the reference tag *
* [RFC3291] should be updated to match. *
* *
************************************************************
[RFC3495] B. Beser, P. Duffy, Ed., "Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP) Option for CableLabs Client
Configuration.", RFC 3495, March 2003.
[RFC3594] P. Duffy, "PacketCable Security Ticket Control Sub-Option
PacketCable Security Ticket Control Sub-Option.",
September 2003.
[RFC3617] E. Lear, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Scheme and
Applicability Statement for the Trivial File Transfer
Protocol (TFTP).", RFC 3617, October 2003.
[RFCyyyy] S. Green, K. Ozawa, A. Katsnelson, E. Cardona, "Management
Information Base for DOCSIS Cable Modems and Cable Modem
Termination Systems for Baseline Privacy Plus", RFCyyyy,
Monthyyy, 2005.
************************************************************
* NOTES TO RFC Editor (to be removed prior to publication) *
* *
* The I-D <draft-ietf-ipcdn-bpiplus-mib-12.txt> *
* is expected to become RFC before this draft. *
* Please replace RFCyyyy with the RFC number of bpiplus and*
* update the reference statement with the correct date: *
* Monthyyyy, 2005 *
* *
************************************************************
Nechamkin/Mule Expires - July 2005 [Page 48]
IPCDN MTA MIB January 2005
[RFCxxxx] R. Woundy, "Cable Device Management Information Base for
DOCSIS compliant Cable Modems and Cable Modem
Termination Systems", RFCxxxx, Monthxxxx, 2005.
************************************************************
* NOTES TO RFC Editor (to be removed prior to publication) *
* *
* An updated version of the I-D
* < draft-ietf-ipcdn-device-mibv2-06.txt> or draft07 *
* is expected to become RFC before this draft. *
* Please replace RFCxxxx with the RFC number and *
* update the reference statement with the correct date: *
* Monthxxxx, 2005 *
* *
************************************************************
[PKT-SP-PROV] Packetcable MTA Device Provisioning Specification,
Issued,PKT-SP-PROV-I10-040730, July 2004.
http://www.packetcable.com/specifications/
http://www.cablelabs.com/specifications/archives/
[PKT-SP-SEC] PacketCable Security Specification,
Issued, PKT-SP-SEC-I11-040730, July 2004.
http://www.packetcable.com/specifications/
http://www.cablelabs.com/specifications/archives/
[ITU-T-J112] Transmission Systems for Interactive Cable Television
Services, Annex B, J.112, ITU-T, March, 1998.
[ITU-T-J168] IPCablecom Multimedia Terminal Adapter (MTA) MIB
requirements, J.168, ITU-T, March, 2001.
7. Informative References
[RFC3410] Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D. and B. Stewart,
"Introduction and Applicability Statements for
Internet-Standard Management Framework", RFC 3410,
December 2002.
[PKT-SP-MIB-MTA-I09] Packetcable MTA MIB Specification,
Issued, PKT-SP-MIB-MTA-I09-040402, April 2004.
http://www.packetcable.com/specifications/
http://www.cablelabs.com/specifications/archives/
Nechamkin/Mule Expires - July 2005 [Page 49]
IPCDN MTA MIB January 2005
[ETSI TS 101 909-8] ETSI TS 101 909-8: "Access and Terminals (AT);
Digital Broadband Cable Access to the Public
Telecommunications Network; IP Multimedia Time
Critical Services; Part 8: Media Terminal
Adaptor (MTA) Management Information Base
(MIB)".
[EN 300 001] EN 300 001 V1.5.1 (1998-10):"European Standard
(Telecommunications series) Attachments to Public
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN); General technical
requirements for equipment connected to an analogue
subscriber interface in the PSTN; Chapter 3: Ringing
signal characteristics (national deviations are in
Table 3.1.1)".
[EN 300 659-1] EN 300 659-1: "Public Switched Telephone Network
(PSTN); Subscriber line protocol over the local loop
for display (and related) services; Part 1: On hook
data transmission".
[RFCzzz] Beacham G., Kumar S., Channabasappa S., "Network Control
Signaling (NCS) Signaling MIB for PacketCable and
IPCablecom Multimedia Terminal Adapters (MTAs)", RFCzzz,
Monthzzz, 2004.
************************************************************
* NOTES TO RFC Editor (to be removed prior to publication) *
* *
* The I-D < draft-ietf-ipcdn-pktc-signaling-07.txt> *
* is expected to become RFC with this draft. *
* Please replace RFCzzz with the RFC number of pktc-sig and*
* update the reference statement with the correct date: *
* Monthzzz, 2005 *
* *
************************************************************
8. Security Considerations
There are a number of management objects defined in this MIB module
with a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. Such
objects may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network
environments. The support for SET operations in a non-secure
environment without proper protection can have a negative effect on
network operations. Improper manipulation of the objects defined in
this MIB may result in random behavior of MTA devices and may result
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IPCDN MTA MIB January 2005
in service disruption. These are the tables and objects and their
sensitivity/vulnerability:
- The following objects, if SET maliciously would cause the MTA
device to reset and/or stop its service:
pktcMtaDevResetNow,
pktcMtaDevEnabled.
- All writable objects in the pktcMtaDevServer group and some in the
pktcMtaDevRealmTable share the potential, if SET maliciously, to
prevent the MTA from provisioning properly. Hence they are
considered very sensitive for service delivery. The objects in
question are:
pktcMtaDevProvisioningTimer,
pktcMtaDevServerAddressType,
pktcMtaDevServerDns1,
pktcMtaDevServerDns2,
pktcMtaDevTimeServer,
pktcMtaDevConfigFile,
pktcMtaDevProvConfigHash,
pktcMtaDevProvConfigKey,
pktcMtaDevProvSolicitedKeyTimeout,
pktcMtaDevRealmName,
pktcMtaDevRealmOrgName,
pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout,
pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout,
pktcMtaDevRealmUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries,
pktcMtaDevRealmStatus.
Certain of the above objects have additional specific
vulnerabilities:
o pktcMtaDevServerDns1 and pktcMtaDevServerDns2, if SET
maliciously, could prevent the MTA from being authenticated and
consequently from getting telephony services.
o pktcMtaDevRealmStatus, if SET maliciously, could cause the
whole row of the table to be deleted which may prevent MTA from
getting telephony services.
- All writable objects in the pktcMtaDevCmsTable table share the
potential, if SET maliciously, to disrupt the telephony service by
altering which Call Management Server the MTA must send signaling
registration to, in particular:
pktcMtaDevCmsFqdn,
pktcMtaDevCmsKerbRealmName,
pktcMtaDevCmsMaxClockSkew,
pktcMtaDevCmsSolicitedKeyTimeout,
pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxTimeout,
pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyNomTimeout,
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pktcMtaDevCmsUnsolicitedKeyMaxRetries - this object, if set to a
zero value '0', may prevent the MTA from retrying its attempt to
establish a Security Association with the CMS,
pktcMtaDevCmsStatus.
- Some writable objects in the pktcMtaDevRealmTable table will not
have an immediate effect on service, if SET maliciously. However,
they may impact the service performance and cause avalanche attacks
on provisioning and Kerberos KDC servers, especially after massive
device reboots occur. The objects in question are:
pktcMtaDevResetKrbTickets: this object, if set to 'true' value,
will cause the MTA to request a new Kerberos ticket at reboot,
pktcMtaDevRealmPkinitGracePeriod, pktcMtaDevRealmTgsGracePeriod:
these 2 objects, if set to short time periods, will cause the MTA to
renew its tickets more frequently.
Some of the readable objects in this MIB module(i.e., objects with a
MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered sensitive or
vulnerable in some network environments. Some of these objects may
contain information that may be sensitive from a business or
customer perspective. It is thus important to control even GET
and/or NOTIFY access to these objects and possibly to even encrypt
the values of these objects when sending them over the network via
SNMP.
These are the tables and objects and their sensitivity and
vulnerability:
- Some readable objects in the pktcMtaDevBase, pktcMtaDevServer and
pktcMtaDevSecurity groups share the potential, if read maliciously,
to facilitate Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks against provisioning
or Kerberos servers. The object in question are:
pktcMtaDevServerDhcp1, pktcMtaDevServerDhcp2 and
pktcMtaDevSnmpEntity: the values of these objects may be used to
launch DoS attacks on the Telephony Service Provider DHCP or
Provisioning servers,
pktcMtaDevProvKerbRealmName, pktcMtaDevManufacturerCertificate,
pktcMtaDevCertificate and pktcMtaDevTelephonyRootCertificate: the
values of these objects may be used by attackers to launch DoS
attacks against Kerberos servers.
- One additional readable object may expose some security threats,
pktcMtaDevFQDN. This object may include sensitive information about
the domain name and potentially, the domain topology.
SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security.
Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPSec),
even then, there is no control as to who on the secure network is
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IPCDN MTA MIB January 2005
allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the
objects in this MIB module.
It is RECOMMENDED that implementers consider the security features
as provided by the SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410], section 8),
including full support for the SNMPv3 cryptographic mechanisms (for
authentication and privacy).
Further, deployment of SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 is NOT
RECOMMENDED. Instead, it is RECOMMENDED to deploy SNMPv3 and to
enable cryptographic security. It is then a customer/operator
responsibility to ensure that the SNMP entity giving access to an
instance of this MIB module is properly configured to give access to
the objects only to those principals (users) that have legitimate
rights to indeed GET or SET (change/create/delete) them.
9. IANA Considerations
The MIB module defined in this document uses the following
IANA-assigned OBJECT IDENTIFIER values recorded in the SMI Numbers
registry:
Descriptor OBJECT IDENTIFIER value
---------- -----------------------
pktcMtaMib { mib-2 XXX }
-- Editor's Note (to be removed prior to publication): the IANA is
requested to assign a value for "XXX" under the 'mib-2' sub-tree and
to record the assignment in the SMI Numbers registry.
When the assignment has been made, the RFC Editor is asked to
replace "XXX" (here and in the MIB module) with the assigned value
and to remove this note.
10. Authors' Addresses
Eugene Nechamkin
Broadcom Corporation,
200 - 13711 International Place
Richmond, BC, V6V 2Z8
CANADA
Phone: +1 604 233 8500
E-mail: enechamkin@broadcom.com
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Jean-Francois Mule
Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.
858 Coal Creek Circle
Louisville, Colorado 80027-9750
U.S.A.
Phone: +1 303 661 9100
E-mail: jf.mule@cablelabs.com
11. Intellectual Property Statement
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed
to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described
in this document or the extent to which any license under such
rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that
it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights.
Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC
documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use
of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository
at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention
any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other
proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required
to implement this standard. Please address the information to the
IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Disclaimer of Validity
This document and the information contained herein are provided on
an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE
INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Nechamkin/Mule Expires - July 2005 [Page 54]
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Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
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