| JOSE Working Group | M.B. Jones |
| Internet-Draft | Microsoft |
| Intended status: Standards Track | July 15, 2013 |
| Expires: January 16, 2014 |
JSON Web Key (JWK)
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-13
A JSON Web Key (JWK) is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data structure that represents a cryptographic key. This specification also defines a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) JSON data structure for representing a set of JWKs. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification.
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A JSON Web Key (JWK) is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC4627] data structure that represents a cryptographic key. This specification also defines a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) JSON data structure for representing a set of JWKs. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specification.
Goals for this specification do not include representing certificate chains, representing certified keys, and replacing X.509 certificates.
JWKs and JWK Sets are used in the JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS] and JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] specifications.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels [RFC2119].
A JSON Web Key (JWK) is a JSON object containing specific members, as specified below. Those members that are common to all key types are defined below.
In addition to the common parameters, each JWK will have members that are specific to the kind of key being represented. These members represent the parameters of the key. Section 5 of the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specification defines multiple kinds of cryptographic keys and their associated members.
The member names within a JWK MUST be unique; recipients MUST either reject JWKs with duplicate member names or use a JSON parser that returns only the lexically last duplicate member name, as specified in Section 15.12 (The JSON Object) of ECMAScript 5.1 [ECMAScript].
Additional members MAY be present in the JWK. If not understood by implementations encountering them, they MUST be ignored. Member names used for representing key parameters for different kinds of keys need not be distinct. Any new member name SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Key Parameters registry Section 7.1 or be a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace.
The kty (key type) member identifies the cryptographic algorithm family used with the key. kty values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Key Types registry [JWA] or be a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. The kty value is a case sensitive string. Use of this member is REQUIRED.
A list of defined kty values can be found in the IANA JSON Web Key Types registry [JWA]; the initial contents of this registry are the values defined in Section 5.1 of the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specification.
Additional members used with these kty values can be found in the IANA JSON Web Key Parameters registry Section 7.1; the initial contents of this registry are the values defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specification.
The use (key use) member identifies the intended use of the key. Values defined by this specification are: use value is a case sensitive string. Use of this member is OPTIONAL.
Other values MAY be used. The
The alg (algorithm) member identifies the algorithm intended for use with the key. The values used in this field are the same as those used in the JWS [JWS] and JWE [JWE] alg and enc header parameters; these values can be found in the JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry [JWA]. Use of this member is OPTIONAL.
The kid (key ID) member can be used to match a specific key. This can be used, for instance, to choose among a set of keys within a JWK Set during key rollover. The interpretation of the kid value is unspecified. When kid values are used within a JWK Set, different keys within the JWK Set SHOULD use distinct kid values. The kid value is a case sensitive string. Use of this member is OPTIONAL.
When used with JWS or JWE, the kid value can be used to match a JWS or JWE kid header parameter value.
The x5u (X.509 URL) member is a URI [RFC3986] that refers to a resource for an X.509 public key certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280]. The identified resource MUST provide a representation of the certificate or certificate chain that conforms to RFC 5280 [RFC5280] in PEM encoded form [RFC1421]. The key in the first certificate MUST match the bare public key represented by other members of the JWK. The protocol used to acquire the resource MUST provide integrity protection; an HTTP GET request to retrieve the certificate MUST use TLS [RFC2818] [RFC5246]; the identity of the server MUST be validated, as per Section 3.1 of HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818]. Use of this member is OPTIONAL.
The x5t (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint) member is a base64url encoded SHA-1 thumbprint (a.k.a. digest) of the DER encoding of an X.509 certificate [RFC5280]. The key in the certificate MUST match the bare public key represented by other members of the JWK. Use of this member is OPTIONAL.
The x5c (X.509 Certificate Chain) member contains a chain of one or more PKIX certificates [RFC5280]. The certificate chain is represented as a JSON array of certificate value strings. Each string in the array is a base64 encoded ([RFC4648] Section 4 -- not base64url encoded) DER [ITU.X690.1994] PKIX certificate value. The PKIX certificate containing the key value MUST be the first certificate. This MAY be followed by additional certificates, with each subsequent certificate being the one used to certify the previous one. The key in the first certificate MUST match the bare public key represented by other members of the JWK. Use of this member is OPTIONAL.
A JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) is a JSON object that contains an array of JSON Web Key values as the value of its keys member.
The member names within a JWK Set MUST be unique; recipients MUST either reject JWK Sets with duplicate member names or use a JSON parser that returns only the lexically last duplicate member name, as specified in Section 15.12 (The JSON Object) of ECMAScript 5.1 [ECMAScript].
Additional members MAY be present in the JWK Set. If not understood by implementations encountering them, they MUST be ignored. Parameters for representing additional properties of JWK Sets SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Key Set Parameters registry Section 7.2 or be a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace.
The value of the keys (JSON Web Key Set) member is an array of JSON Web Key (JWK) values. Use of this member is REQUIRED.
Processing a JWK inevitably requires comparing known strings to values in JSON objects. For example, in checking what the key type is, the Unicode string encoding kty will be checked against the member names in the JWK to see if there is a matching name.
Comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode strings MUST be performed by comparing Unicode code points without normalization as specified in the String Comparison Rules in Section 5.3 of [JWS].
JWKs containing non-public key material will need to be encrypted in some contexts to prevent the disclosure of private or symmetric key values to unintended parties. The use of an Encrypted JWK, which is a JWE with a JWK as its plaintext value, is RECOMMENED for this purpose. The processing of Encrypted JWKs is identical to the processing of other JWEs. A cty (content type) header parameter value of JWK can be used to indicate that the content of the JWE is a JWK in contexts where this is useful.
JWK Sets containing non-public key material will similarly need to be encrypted. The use of an Encrypted JWK Set, which is a JWE with a JWK Set as its plaintext value, is RECOMMENED for this purpose. The processing of Encrypted JWK Sets is identical to the processing of other JWEs. A cty (content type) header parameter value of JWK-SET can be used to indicate that the content of the JWE is a JWK Set in contexts where this is useful.
The following registration procedure is used for all the registries established by this specification.
Values are registered with a Specification Required [RFC5226] after a two-week review period on the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s) may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published.
Registration requests must be sent to the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list for review and comment, with an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request for access token type: example"). [[ Note to RFC-EDITOR: The name of the mailing list should be determined in consultation with the IESG and IANA. Suggested name: jose-reg-review. ]]
Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s) and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list.
This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Key Parameters registry for reserved JWK parameter names. The registry records the reserved parameter name and a reference to the specification that defines it. It also records whether the parameter conveys public or private information. This specification registers the parameter names defined in Section 3. The same JWK parameter name may be registered multiple times, provided that duplicate parameter registrations are only for algorithm-specific JWK parameters; in this case, the meaning of the duplicate parameter name is disambiguated by the kty value of the JWK containing it.
This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Key Set Parameters registry for reserved JWK Set parameter names. The registry records the reserved parameter name and a reference to the specification that defines it. This specification registers the parameter names defined in Section 4.
This specification registers the JWK and JWK-SET type values in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values registry [JWS], which can be used to indicate, respectively, that the content is a JWK or a JWK Set.
This specification registers the application/jwk+json and application/jwk-set+json Media Types [RFC2046] in the MIME Media Type registry [RFC4288], which can be used to indicate, respectively, that the content is a JWK or a JWK Set.
All of the security issues faced by any cryptographic application must be faced by a JWS/JWE/JWK agent. Among these issues are protecting the user's private and symmetric keys, preventing various attacks, and helping the user avoid mistakes such as inadvertently encrypting a message for the wrong recipient. The entire list of security considerations is beyond the scope of this document, but some significant considerations are listed here.
A key is no more trustworthy than the method by which it was received.
Private and symmetric keys must be protected from disclosure to unintended parties. One recommended means of doing so is to encrypt JWKs or JWK Sets containing them by using the JWK or JWK Set value as the plaintext of a JWE.
The security considerations in RFC 3447 [RFC3447] and RFC 6030 [RFC6030] about protecting private and symmetric keys also apply to this specification.
The security considerations in XML DSIG 2.0 [W3C.CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124], about key representations also apply to this specification, other than those that are XML specific.
The TLS Requirements in [JWS] also apply to this specification.
| [RFC3447] | Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003. |
| [RFC4122] | Leach, P., Mealling, M. and R. Salz, "A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, July 2005. |
| [RFC6030] | Hoyer, P., Pei, M. and S. Machani, "Portable Symmetric Key Container (PSKC)", RFC 6030, October 2010. |
| [MagicSignatures] | Panzer (editor), J., Laurie, B. and D. Balfanz, "Magic Signatures", January 2011. |
The following example JWK Set contains two public keys represented as JWKs: one using an Elliptic Curve algorithm and a second one using an RSA algorithm. The first specifies that the key is to be used for encryption. The second specifies that the key is to be used with the RS256 algorithm. Both provide a Key ID for key matching purposes. In both cases, integers are represented using the base64url encoding of their big endian representations. (Long lines are broken are for display purposes only.)
{"keys":
[
{"kty":"EC",
"crv":"P-256",
"x":"MKBCTNIcKUSDii11ySs3526iDZ8AiTo7Tu6KPAqv7D4",
"y":"4Etl6SRW2YiLUrN5vfvVHuhp7x8PxltmWWlbbM4IFyM",
"use":"enc",
"kid":"1"},
{"kty":"RSA",
"n": "0vx7agoebGcQSuuPiLJXZptN9nndrQmbXEps2aiAFbWhM78LhWx
4cbbfAAtVT86zwu1RK7aPFFxuhDR1L6tSoc_BJECPebWKRXjBZCiFV4n3oknjhMs
tn64tZ_2W-5JsGY4Hc5n9yBXArwl93lqt7_RN5w6Cf0h4QyQ5v-65YGjQR0_FDW2
QvzqY368QQMicAtaSqzs8KJZgnYb9c7d0zgdAZHzu6qMQvRL5hajrn1n91CbOpbI
SD08qNLyrdkt-bFTWhAI4vMQFh6WeZu0fM4lFd2NcRwr3XPksINHaQ-G_xBniIqb
w0Ls1jF44-csFCur-kEgU8awapJzKnqDKgw",
"e":"AQAB",
"alg":"RS256",
"kid":"2011-04-29"}
]
}
The following example JWK Set contains two keys represented as JWKs containing both public and private key values: one using an Elliptic Curve algorithm and a second one using an RSA algorithm. This example extends the example in the previous section, adding private key values. (Line breaks are for display purposes only.)
{"keys":
[
{"kty":"EC",
"crv":"P-256",
"x":"MKBCTNIcKUSDii11ySs3526iDZ8AiTo7Tu6KPAqv7D4",
"y":"4Etl6SRW2YiLUrN5vfvVHuhp7x8PxltmWWlbbM4IFyM",
"d":"870MB6gfuTJ4HtUnUvYMyJpr5eUZNP4Bk43bVdj3eAE",
"use":"enc",
"kid":"1"},
{"kty":"RSA",
"n":"0vx7agoebGcQSuuPiLJXZptN9nndrQmbXEps2aiAFbWhM78LhWx4
cbbfAAtVT86zwu1RK7aPFFxuhDR1L6tSoc_BJECPebWKRXjBZCiFV4n3oknjhMst
n64tZ_2W-5JsGY4Hc5n9yBXArwl93lqt7_RN5w6Cf0h4QyQ5v-65YGjQR0_FDW2Q
vzqY368QQMicAtaSqzs8KJZgnYb9c7d0zgdAZHzu6qMQvRL5hajrn1n91CbOpbIS
D08qNLyrdkt-bFTWhAI4vMQFh6WeZu0fM4lFd2NcRwr3XPksINHaQ-G_xBniIqbw
0Ls1jF44-csFCur-kEgU8awapJzKnqDKgw",
"e":"AQAB",
"d":"X4cTteJY_gn4FYPsXB8rdXix5vwsg1FLN5E3EaG6RJoVH-HLLKD9
M7dx5oo7GURknchnrRweUkC7hT5fJLM0WbFAKNLWY2vv7B6NqXSzUvxT0_YSfqij
wp3RTzlBaCxWp4doFk5N2o8Gy_nHNKroADIkJ46pRUohsXywbReAdYaMwFs9tv8d
_cPVY3i07a3t8MN6TNwm0dSawm9v47UiCl3Sk5ZiG7xojPLu4sbg1U2jx4IBTNBz
nbJSzFHK66jT8bgkuqsk0GjskDJk19Z4qwjwbsnn4j2WBii3RL-Us2lGVkY8fkFz
me1z0HbIkfz0Y6mqnOYtqc0X4jfcKoAC8Q",
"p":"83i-7IvMGXoMXCskv73TKr8637FiO7Z27zv8oj6pbWUQyLPQBQxtPV
nwD20R-60eTDmD2ujnMt5PoqMrm8RfmNhVWDtjjMmCMjOpSXicFHj7XOuVIYQyqV
WlWEh6dN36GVZYk93N8Bc9vY41xy8B9RzzOGVQzXvNEvn7O0nVbfs",
"q":"3dfOR9cuYq-0S-mkFLzgItgMEfFzB2q3hWehMuG0oCuqnb3vobLyum
qjVZQO1dIrdwgTnCdpYzBcOfW5r370AFXjiWft_NGEiovonizhKpo9VVS78TzFgx
kIdrecRezsZ-1kYd_s1qDbxtkDEgfAITAG9LUnADun4vIcb6yelxk",
"dp":"G4sPXkc6Ya9y8oJW9_ILj4xuppu0lzi_H7VTkS8xj5SdX3coE0oim
YwxIi2emTAue0UOa5dpgFGyBJ4c8tQ2VF402XRugKDTP8akYhFo5tAA77Qe_Nmtu
YZc3C3m3I24G2GvR5sSDxUyAN2zq8Lfn9EUms6rY3Ob8YeiKkTiBj0",
"dq":"s9lAH9fggBsoFR8Oac2R_E2gw282rT2kGOAhvIllETE1efrA6huUU
vMfBcMpn8lqeW6vzznYY5SSQF7pMdC_agI3nG8Ibp1BUb0JUiraRNqUfLhcQb_d9
GF4Dh7e74WbRsobRonujTYN1xCaP6TO61jvWrX-L18txXw494Q_cgk",
"qi":"GyM_p6JrXySiz1toFgKbWV-JdI3jQ4ypu9rbMWx3rQJBfmt0FoYzg
UIZEVFEcOqwemRN81zoDAaa-Bk0KWNGDjJHZDdDmFhW3AN7lI-puxk_mHZGJ11rx
yR8O55XLSe3SPmRfKwZI6yU24ZxvQKFYItdldUKGzO6Ia6zTKhAVRU",
"alg":"RS256",
"kid":"2011-04-29"}
]
}
The following example JWK Set contains two symmetric keys represented as JWKs: one designated as being for use with the AES Key Wrap algorithm and a second one that is an HMAC key. (Line breaks are for display purposes only.)
{"keys":
[
{"kty":"oct",
"alg":"A128KW",
"k":"GawgguFyGrWKav7AX4VKUg"},
{"kty":"oct",
"k":"AyM1SysPpbyDfgZld3umj1qzKObwVMkoqQ-EstJQLr_T-1qS0gZH75
aKtMN3Yj0iPS4hcgUuTwjAzZr1Z9CAow",
"kid":"HMAC key used in JWS A.1 example"}
]
}
The following is a non-normative example of a JWK with a RSA signing key represented both as a bare public key and as an X.509 certificate using the x5c parameter:
{"kty":"RSA",
"use":"sig",
"kid":"1b94c",
"n":"vrjOfz9Ccdgx5nQudyhdoR17V-IubWMeOZCwX_jj0hgAsz2J_pqYW08
PLbK_PdiVGKPrqzmDIsLI7sA25VEnHU1uCLNwBuUiCO11_-7dYbsr4iJmG0Q
u2j8DsVyT1azpJC_NG84Ty5KKthuCaPod7iI7w0LK9orSMhBEwwZDCxTWq4a
YWAchc8t-emd9qOvWtVMDC2BXksRngh6X5bUYLy6AyHKvj-nUy1wgzjYQDwH
MTplCoLtU-o-8SNnZ1tmRoGE9uJkBLdh5gFENabWnU5m1ZqZPdwS-qo-meMv
VfJb6jJVWRpl2SUtCnYG2C32qvbWbjZ_jBPD5eunqsIo1vQ",
"e":"AQAB",
"x5c":
["MIIDQjCCAiqgAwIBAgIGATz/FuLiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMGIxCzAJB
gNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIEwJDTzEPMA0GA1UEBxMGRGVudmVyMRwwGgYD
VQQKExNQaW5nIElkZW50aXR5IENvcnAuMRcwFQYDVQQDEw5CcmlhbiBDYW1
wYmVsbDAeFw0xMzAyMjEyMzI5MTVaFw0xODA4MTQyMjI5MTVaMGIxCzAJBg
NVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIEwJDTzEPMA0GA1UEBxMGRGVudmVyMRwwGgYDV
QQKExNQaW5nIElkZW50aXR5IENvcnAuMRcwFQYDVQQDEw5CcmlhbiBDYW1w
YmVsbDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAL64zn8/QnH
YMeZ0LncoXaEde1fiLm1jHjmQsF/449IYALM9if6amFtPDy2yvz3YlRij66
s5gyLCyO7ANuVRJx1NbgizcAblIgjtdf/u3WG7K+IiZhtELto/A7Fck9Ws6
SQvzRvOE8uSirYbgmj6He4iO8NCyvaK0jIQRMMGQwsU1quGmFgHIXPLfnpn
fajr1rVTAwtgV5LEZ4Iel+W1GC8ugMhyr4/p1MtcIM42EA8BzE6ZQqC7VPq
PvEjZ2dbZkaBhPbiZAS3YeYBRDWm1p1OZtWamT3cEvqqPpnjL1XyW+oyVVk
aZdklLQp2Btgt9qr21m42f4wTw+Xrp6rCKNb0CAwEAATANBgkqhkiG9w0BA
QUFAAOCAQEAh8zGlfSlcI0o3rYDPBB07aXNswb4ECNIKG0CETTUxmXl9KUL
+9gGlqCz5iWLOgWsnrcKcY0vXPG9J1r9AqBNTqNgHq2G03X09266X5CpOe1
zFo+Owb1zxtp3PehFdfQJ610CDLEaS9V9Rqp17hCyybEpOGVwe8fnk+fbEL
2Bo3UPGrpsHzUoaGpDftmWssZkhpBJKVMJyf/RuP2SmmaIzmnw9JiSlYhzo
4tpzd5rFXhjRbg4zW9C+2qok+2+qDM1iJ684gPHMIY8aLWrdgQTxkumGmTq
gawR+N5MDtdPTEQ0XfIBc2cJEUyMTY5MPvACWpkA6SdS4xSvdXK3IVfOWA=="]
}
A JSON representation for RSA public keys was previously introduced by John Panzer, Ben Laurie, and Dirk Balfanz in Magic Signatures [MagicSignatures].
This specification is the work of the JOSE Working Group, which includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular, the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording that influenced this specification:
Dirk Balfanz, Richard Barnes, John Bradley, Brian Campbell, Breno de Medeiros, Joe Hildebrand, Edmund Jay, Ben Laurie, James Manger, Matt Miller, Tony Nadalin, Axel Nennker, John Panzer, Eric Rescorla, Nat Sakimura, Jim Schaad, Paul Tarjan, Hannes Tschofenig, and Sean Turner.
Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and Sean Turner and Stephen Farrell served as Security area directors during the creation of this specification.
[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
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