NSIS
Internet Draft Hannes Tschofenig
Siemens
Richard Graveman
RFG Security
Document:
draft-ietf-nsis-rsvp-sec-properties-05.txt
Expires: March 2005 September 2004
RSVP Security Properties
<draft-ietf-nsis-rsvp-sec-properties-05.txt>
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document summarizes the security properties of RSVP. The goal
of this analysis is to benefit from previous work done on RSVP and
to capture knowledge about past activities.
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RSVP Security Properties September 2004
Table of Contents
1. Introduction..................................................2
2. Terminology and Architectural Assumptions.....................3
3. Overview......................................................5
3.1 The RSVP INTEGRITY Object.................................5
3.2 Security Associations.....................................7
3.3 RSVP Key Management Assumptions...........................8
3.4 Identity Representation...................................8
3.5 RSVP Integrity Handshake.................................12
4. Detailed Security Property Discussion........................13
4.1 Network Topology.........................................13
4.2 Host/Router..............................................14
4.3 User to PEP/PDP..........................................18
4.4 Communication between RSVP-Aware Routers.................27
5. Miscellaneous Issues.........................................29
5.1 First Hop Issue..........................................29
5.2 Next-Hop Problem.........................................29
5.3 Last-Hop Issue...........................................32
5.4 RSVP and IPsec protected data traffic....................33
5.5 End-to-End Security Issues and RSVP......................35
5.6 IPsec protection of RSVP signaling messages..............35
5.7 Authorization............................................36
6. Conclusions..................................................37
7. Security Considerations......................................39
8. IANA considerations..........................................39
9. Acknowledgments..............................................39
10. Normative References........................................41
11. Informative References......................................42
Author's Contact Information....................................45
1. Introduction
As the work of the NSIS working group has begun, there are also
concerns about security and its implications for the design of a
signaling protocol. In order to understand the security properties
and available options of RSVP a number of documents have to be read.
This document summarizes the security properties of RSVP and is part
of the overall process of analyzing other signaling protocols and
learning from their design considerations. This document should also
provide a starting point for further discussions.
The content of this document is organized as follows:
Section 3 provides an overview of the security mechanisms provided
by RSVP including the INTEGRITY object, a description of the
identity representation within the POLICY_DATA object (i.e., user
authentication), and the RSVP Integrity Handshake mechanism.
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Section 4 provides a more detailed discussion of the mechanisms used
and tries to describe in detail the mechanisms provided.
Finally a number of miscellaneous issues are described, which
address first-hop, next-hop, and last-hop issues. Furthermore the
problem of IPsec security protection of data traffic and RSVP
signaling messages is discussed.
RSVP also supports multicast but this document does not address
security aspects for supporting multicast QoS signaling. Multicast
is currently outside the scope of the NSIS working group.
2. Terminology and Architectural Assumptions
This section describes some important terms and explains some
architectural assumptions:
- Chain-of-Trust
The security mechanisms supported by RSVP [RFC2747] heavily rely on
optional hop-by-hop protection using the built-in INTEGRITY object.
Hop-by-hop security with the INTEGRITY object inside the RSVP
message thereby refers to the protection between RSVP-supporting
network elements. Additionally, there is the notion of policy-aware
network elements that understand the POLICY_DATA element within the
RSVP message. Because this element also includes an INTEGRITY
object, there is an additional hop-by-hop security mechanism that
provides security between policy-aware nodes. Policy-ignorant nodes
are not affected by the inclusion of this object in the POLICY_DATA
element, because they do not try to interpret it.
To protect signaling messages that are possibly modified by each
RSVP router along the path, it must be assumed that each incoming
request is authenticated, integrity protected, and replay protected.
This provides protection against unauthorized nodes' injecting bogus
messages. Furthermore, each RSVP-router is assumed to behave in the
expected manner. Outgoing messages transmitted to the next hop
network element receive protection according RSVP security
processing.
Using the above described mechanisms, a chain-of-trust is created
whereby a signaling message transmitted by router A via router B and
received by router C is supposed to be secure if routers A and B and
routers B and C share security associations and all routers behave
as expected. Hence router C trusts router A although router C does
not have a direct security association with router A. We can
therefore conclude that the protection achieved with this hop-by-hop
security for the chain-of-trust is no better than the weakest link
in the chain.
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If one router is malicious (for example because an adversary has
control over this router), then it can arbitrarily modify messages,
cause unexpected behavior, and mount a number of attacks not limited
only to QoS signaling. Additionally, it must be mentioned that some
protocols demand more protection than others (which depends in part
on which nodes are executing these protocols). For example, edge
devices, where end-users are attached, may more likely be attacked
in comparison with the more secure core network of a service
provider. In some cases a network service provider may choose not to
use the RSVP-provided security mechanisms inside the core network
because a different security protection is deployed.
Section 6 of [RFC2750] mentions the term chain-of-trust in the
context of RSVP integrity protection. In Section 6 of [HH01] the
same term is used in the context of user authentication with the
INTEGRITY object inside the POLICY_DATA element. Unfortunately the
term is not explained in detail and the assumptions behind it are
not clearly specified.
- Host and User Authentication
The presence of RSVP protection and a separate user identity
representation leads to the fact that both user-identity and host-
identity are used for RSVP protection. Therefore, user-based
security and host-based security are covered separately, because of
the different authentication mechanisms provided. To avoid confusion
about the different concepts, Section 3.4 describes the concept of
user authentication in more detail.
- Key Management
It is assumed that most of the security associations required for
the protection of RSVP signaling messages are already available, and
hence key management was done in advance. There is, however, an
exception with respect to support for Kerberos. Using Kerberos, an
entity is able to distribute a session key used for RSVP signaling
protection.
- RSVP INTEGRITY and POLICY_DATA INTEGRITY Objects
RSVP uses an INTEGRITY object in two places in a message. The first
is in the RSVP message itself and covers the entire RSVP message as
defined in [RFC2747]. The second is included in the POLICY_DATA
object and defined in [RFC2750]. To differentiate the two objects
regarding their scope of protection, the two terms RSVP INTEGRITY
and POLICY_DATA INTEGRITY object are used, respectively. The data
structure of the two objects, however, is the same.
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- Hop versus Peer
In the past, the terminology for nodes addressed by RSVP has been
discussed considerably. In particular, two favorite terms have been
used: hop and peer. This document uses the term hop, which is
different from an IP hop. Two neighboring RSVP nodes communicating
with each other are not necessarily neighboring IP nodes (i.e., they
may be more than one IP hop away).
3. Overview
This section describes the security mechanisms provided by RSVP.
Although use of IPsec is mentioned in Section 10 of [RFC2747], the
security mechanisms primarily envisioned for RSVP are described.
3.1 The RSVP INTEGRITY Object
The RSVP INTEGRITY object is the major component of RSVP security
protection. This object is used to provide integrity and replay
protection for the content of the signaling message between two RSVP
participating routers. Furthermore, the RSVP INTEGRITY object
provides data origin authentication. The attributes of the object
are briefly described:
- Flags field
The Handshake Flag is the only defined flag. It is used to
synchronize sequence numbers if the communication gets out of sync
(e.g., it allows a restarting host to recover the most recent
sequence number). Setting this flag to one indicates that the sender
is willing to respond to an Integrity Challenge message. This flag
can therefore be seen as a negotiation capability transmitted within
each INTEGRITY object.
- Key Identifier
The Key Identifier selects the key used for verification of the
Keyed Message Digest field and, hence, must be unique for the
sender. It has a fixed 48-bit length. The generation of this Key
Identifier field is mostly a decision of the local host. [RFC2747]
describes this field as a combination of an address, sending
interface, and key number. We assume that the Key Identifier is
simply a (keyed) hash value computed over a number of fields with
the requirement to be unique if more than one security association
is used in parallel between two hosts (e.g., as is the case with
security associations having overlapping lifetimes). A receiving
system uniquely identifies a security association based on the Key
Identifier and the sender's IP address. The sender's IP address may
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be obtained from the RSVP_HOP object or from the source IP address
of the packet if the RSVP_HOP object is not present. The sender uses
the outgoing interface to determine which security association to
use. The term outgoing interface may be confusing. The sender
selects the security association based on the receiver's IP address
(i.e., the address of the next RSVP-capable router). The process of
determining which node is the next RSVP-capable router is not
further specified and is likely to be statically configured.
- Sequence Number
The sequence number used by the INTEGRITY object is 64 bits in
length, and the starting value can be selected arbitrarily. The
length of the sequence number field was chosen to avoid exhaustion
during the lifetime of a security association as stated in Section 3
of [RFC2747]. In order for the receiver to distinguish between a new
and a replayed message, the sequence number must be monotonically
incremented modulo 2^64 for each message. We assume that the first
sequence number seen (i.e., the starting sequence number) is stored
somewhere. The modulo-operation is required because the starting
sequence number may be an arbitrary number. The receiver therefore
only accepts packets with a sequence number larger (modulo 2^64)
than the previous packet. As explained in [RFC2747] this process is
started by handshaking and agreeing on an initial sequence number.
If no such handshaking is available then the initial sequence number
must be part of the establishment of the security association.
The generation and storage of sequence numbers is an important step
in preventing replay attacks and is largely determined by the
capabilities of the system in presence of system crashes, failures
and restarts. Section 3 of [RFC2747] explains some of the most
important considerations. However, the description of how the
receiver distinguishes proper from improper sequence numbers is
incomplete--it implicitly assumes that gaps large enough to cause
the sequence number to wrap around cannot occur.
If delivery in order were guaranteed, the following procedure would
work: The receiver keeps track of the first sequence number
received, INIT-SEQ, and most recent sequence number received, LAST-
SEQ, for each key identifier in a security association. When the
first message is received, set INIT-SEQ = LAST-SEQ = value received
and accept. When a subsequent message is received, if its sequence
number is strictly between LAST-SEQ and INIT-SEQ, modulo 2^64,
accept and update LAST-SEQ with the value just received. If it is
between INIT-SEQ and LAST-SEQ, inclusive, modulo 2^64, reject and
leave the value of LAST-SEQ unchanged. Because delivery in order is
not guaranteed, the above rules need to be combined with a method of
allowing a fixed sized window in the neighborhood of LAST-SEQ for
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out-of-order delivery, for example, as described in Appendix C of
[RFC2401].
- Keyed Message Digest
The Keyed Message Digest is a security mechanism built into RSVP and
used to provide integrity protection of a signaling message
(including its sequence number). Prior to computing the value for
the Keyed Message Digest field, the Keyed Message Digest field
itself must be set to zero and a keyed hash computed over the entire
RSVP packet. The Keyed Message Digest field is variable in length
but must be a multiple of four octets. If HMAC-MD5 is used, then the
output value is 16 bytes long. The keyed hash function HMAC-MD5
[RFC2104] is required for a RSVP implementation as noted in Section
1 of [RFC2747]. Hash algorithms other than MD5 [RFC1321] like SHA-1
[SHA] may also be supported.
The key used for computing this Keyed Message Digest may be obtained
from the pre-shared secret, which is either manually distributed or
the result of a key management protocol. No key management protocol,
however, is specified to create the desired security associations.
Also, no guidelines for key length are given. It should be
recommended that HMAC-MD5 keys be 128 bits and SHA-1 key 160 bits,
as in IPsec AH [RFC2402]and ESP [RFC2406].
3.2 Security Associations
Different attributes are stored for security associations of sending
and receiving systems (i.e., unidirectional security associations).
The sending system needs to maintain the following attributes in
such a security association [RFC2747]:
- Authentication algorithm and algorithm mode
- Key
- Key Lifetime
- Sending Interface
- Latest sequence number (sent with this key identifier)
The receiving system has to store the following fields:
- Authentication algorithm and algorithm mode
- Key
- Key Lifetime
- Source address of the sending system
- List of last n sequence numbers (received with this key
identifier)
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Note that the security associations need to have additional fields
to indicate their state. It is necessary to have an overlapping
lifetime of security associations to avoid interrupting an ongoing
communication because of expired security associations. During such
a period of overlapping lifetime it is necessary to authenticate
either one or both active keys. As mentioned in [RFC2747], a sender
and a receiver may have multiple active keys simultaneously.
If more than one algorithm is supported then the algorithm used must
be specified for a security association.
3.3 RSVP Key Management Assumptions
[RFC2205] assumes that security associations are already available.
An implementation must provide manual key distribution as noted in
Section 5.2 of [RFC2747]. Manual key distribution, however, has
different requirements for key storage - a simple plaintext ASCII
file may be sufficient in some cases. If multiple security
associations with different lifetimes need to be supported at the
same time, then a key engine would be more appropriate. Further
security requirements listed in Section 5.2 of [RFC2747] are the
following:
- The manual deletion of security associations must be supported.
- The key storage should persist a system restart.
- Each key must be assigned a specific lifetime and a specific Key
Identifier.
3.4 Identity Representation
In addition to host-based authentication with the INTEGRITY object
inside the RSVP message, user-based authentication is available as
introduced in [RFC2750]. Section 2 of [RFC3182] states that
"Providing policy based admission control mechanism based on user
identities or application is one of the prime requirements." To
identify the user or the application, a policy element called
AUTH_DATA, which is contained in the POLICY_DATA object, is created
by the RSVP daemon at the user's host and transmitted inside the
RSVP message. The structure of the POLICY_DATA element is described
in [RFC2750]. Network nodes like the policy decision point (PDP)
then use the information contained in the AUTH_DATA element to
authenticate the user and to allow policy-based admission control to
be executed. As mentioned in [RFC3182], the policy element is
processed and the PDP replaces the old element with a new one for
forwarding to the next hop router.
A detailed description of the POLICY_DATA element can be found in
[RFC2750]. The attributes contained in the authentication data
policy element AUTH_DATA, which is defined in [RFC3182], are briefly
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explained in this Section. Figure 1 shows the abstract structure of
the RSVP message with its security-relevant objects and the scope of
protection. The RSVP INTEGRITY object (outer object) covers the
entire RSVP message, whereas the POLICY_DATA INTEGRITY object only
covers objects within the POLICY_DATA element.
+--------------------------------------------------------+
| RSVP Message |
+--------------------------------------------------------+
| INTEGRITY +-------------------------------------------+|
| Object |POLICY_DATA Object ||
| +-------------------------------------------+|
| | INTEGRITY +------------------------------+||
| | Object | AUTH_DATA Object |||
| | +------------------------------+||
| | | Various Authentication |||
| | | Attributes |||
| | +------------------------------+||
| +-------------------------------------------+|
+--------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 1: Security Relevant Objects and Elements within the RSVP
Message
The AUTH_DATA object contains information for identifying users and
applications together with credentials for those identities. The
main purpose of these identities seems to be usage for policy-based
admission control and not authentication and key management. As
noted in Section 6.1 of [RFC3182], an RSVP message may contain more
than one POLICY_DATA object and each of them may contain more than
one AUTH_DATA object. As indicated in Figure 1 and in [RFC3182], one
AUTH_DATA object may contain more than one authentication attribute.
A typical configuration for Kerberos-based user authentication
includes at least the Policy Locator and an attribute containing the
Kerberos session ticket.
Successful user authentication is the basis for executing policy-
based admission control. Additionally, other information such as
time-of-day, application type, location information, group
membership, etc. may be relevant to implement an access control
policy.
The following attributes are defined for the usage in the AUTH_DATA
object:
a) Policy Locator
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The policy locator string that is an X.500 distinguished name (DN)
used to locate user or application specific policy information. The
following types of X.500 DNs are listed:
- ASCII_DN
- UNICODE_DN
- ASCII_DN_ENCRYPT
- UNICODE_DN_ENCRYPT
The first two types are the ASCII and the Unicode representation of
the user or application DN identity. The two "encrypted"
distinguished name types are either encrypted with the Kerberos
session key or with the private key of the user's digital
certificate (i.e., digitally signed). The term encrypted together
with a digital signature is easy to misconceive. If user identity
confidentiality is provided, then the policy locator has to be
encrypted with the public key of the recipient. How to obtain this
public key is not described in the document. Such an issue may be
specified in a concrete architecture where RSVP is used.
b) Credentials
Two cryptographic credentials are currently defined for a user:
Authentication with Kerberos V5 [RFC1510], and authentication with
the help of digital signatures based on X.509 [RFC2495] and PGP
[RFC2440]. The following list contains all defined credential types
currently available and defined in [RFC3182]:
+--------------+--------------------------------+
| Credential | Description |
| Type | |
+===============================================|
| ASCII_ID | User or application identity |
| | encoded as an ASCII string |
+--------------+--------------------------------+
| UNICODE_ID | User or application identity |
| | encoded as a Unicode string |
+--------------+--------------------------------+
| KERBEROS_TKT | Kerberos V5 session ticket |
+--------------+--------------------------------+
| X509_V3_CERT | X.509 V3 certificate |
+--------------+--------------------------------+
| PGP_CERT | PGP certificate |
+--------------+--------------------------------+
Table 1: Credentials Supported in RSVP
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The first two credentials contain only a plaintext string, and
therefore they do not provide cryptographic user authentication.
These plaintext strings may be used to identify applications, which
are included for policy-based admission control. Note that these
plain-text identifiers may, however, be protected if either the RSVP
INTEGRITY or the INTEGRITY object of the POLICY_DATA element is
present. Note that the two INTEGRITY objects can terminate at
different entities depending on the network structure. The digital
signature may also provide protection of application identifiers. A
protected application identity (and the entire content of the
POLICY_DATA element) cannot be modified as long as no policy
ignorant nodes are encountered in between.
A Kerberos session ticket, as previously mentioned, is the ticket of
a Kerberos AP_REQ message [RFC1510] without the Authenticator.
Normally, the AP_REQ message is used by a client to authenticate to
a server. The INTEGRITY object (e.g., of the POLICY_DATA element)
provides the functionality of the Kerberos Authenticator, namely
protecting against replay and showing that the user was able to
retrieve the session key following the Kerberos protocol. This is,
however, only the case if the Kerberos session was used for the
keyed message digest field of the INTEGRITY object. Section 7 of
[RFC2747] discusses some issues for establishment of keys for the
INTEGRITY object. The establishment of the security association for
the RSVP INTEGRITY object with the inclusion of the Kerberos Ticket
within the AUTH_DATA element may be complicated by the fact that the
ticket can be decrypted by node B whereas the RSVP INTEGRITY object
terminates at a different host C. The Kerberos session ticket
contains, among many other fields, the session key. The Policy
Locator may also be encrypted with the same session key. The
protocol steps that need to be executed to obtain such a Kerberos
service ticket are not described in [RFC3182] and may involve
several roundtrips depending on many Kerberos-related factors. The
Kerberos ticket does not need to be included in every RSVP message
as an optimization, as described in Section 7.1 of [RFC2747]. Thus
the receiver must store the received service ticket. If the lifetime
of the ticket has expired, then a new service ticket must be sent.
If the receiver lost its state information (because of a crash or
restart) then it may transmit an Integrity Challenge message to
force the sender to re-transmit a new service ticket.
If either the X.509 V3 or the PGP certificate is included in the
policy element, then a digital signature must be added. The digital
signature computed over the entire AUTH_DATA object provides
authentication and integrity protection. The SubType of the digital
signature authentication attribute is set to zero before computing
the digital signature. Whether or not a guarantee of freshness with
replay protection (either timestamps or sequence numbers) is
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provided by the digital signature is an open issue as discussed in
Section 4.3.
c) Digital Signature
The digital signature computed over the data of the AUTH_DATA object
must be the last attribute. The algorithm used to compute the
digital signature depends on the authentication mode listed in the
credential. This is only partially true, because, for example, PGP
again allows different algorithms to be used for computing a digital
signature. The algorithm identifier used for computing the digital
signature is not included in the certificate itself. The algorithm
identifier included in the certificate only serves the purpose of
allowing the verification of the signature computed by the
certificate authority (except for the case of self-signed
certificates).
d) Policy Error Object
The Policy Error Object is used in the case of a failure of policy-
based admission control or other credential verification. Currently
available error messages allow notification if the credentials are
expired (EXPIRED_CREDENTIALS), if the authorization process
disallowed the resource request (INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGES), or if the
given set of credentials is not supported
(UNSUPPORTED_CREDENTIAL_TYPE). The last error message returned by
the network allows the user's host to discover the type of
credentials supported. Particularly for mobile environments this
might be quite inefficient. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a user
supports different types of credentials. The purpose of the error
message IDENTITY_CHANGED is unclear. Also, the protection of the
error message is not discussed in [RFC3182].
3.5 RSVP Integrity Handshake
The Integrity Handshake protocol was designed to allow a crashed or
restarted host to obtain the latest valid challenge value stored at
the receiving host. Due to the absence of key management, it must be
guaranteed that two messages do not use the same sequence number
with the same key. A host stores the latest sequence number of a
cryptographically verified message. An adversary can replay
eavesdropped packets if the crashed host has lost its sequence
numbers. A signaling message from the real sender with a new
sequence number would therefore allow the crashed host to update the
sequence number field and prevent further replays. Hence, if there
is a steady flow of RSVP protected messages between the two hosts,
an attacker may find it difficult to inject old messages, because
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new, authenticated messages with higher sequence numbers arrive and
get stored immediately.
The following description explains the details of a RSVP Integrity
Handshake that is started by Node A after recovering from a
synchronization failure:
Integrity Challenge
(1) Message (including
+----------+ a Cookie) +----------+
| |-------------------------->| |
| Node A | | Node B |
| |<--------------------------| |
+----------+ Integrity Response +----------+
(2) Message (including
the Cookie and the
INTEGRITY object)
Figure 2: RSVP Integrity Handshake
The details of the messages are as follows:
CHALLENGE:=(Key Identifier, Challenge Cookie)
Integrity Challenge Message:=(Common Header, CHALLENGE)
Integrity Response Message:=(Common Header, INTEGRITY, CHALLENGE)
The "Challenge Cookie" is suggested to be a MD5 hash of a local
secret and a timestamp [RFC2747].
The Integrity Challenge message is not protected with an INTEGRITY
object as shown in the protocol flow above. As explained in Section
10 of [RFC2747] this was done to avoid problems in situations where
both communicating parties do not have a valid starting sequence
number.
Using the RSVP Integrity Handshake protocol is recommended although
it is not mandatory (since it may not be needed in all network
environments).
4. Detailed Security Property Discussion
The purpose of this section is to describe the protection of the
RSVP-provided mechanisms individually for authentication,
authorization, integrity and replay protection, user identity
confidentiality, and confidentiality of the signaling messages.
4.1 Network Topology
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The main purpose of this paragraph is to show the basic interfaces
in a simple RSVP network architecture. The architecture below
assumes that there is only a single domain and that two routers are
RSVP and policy aware. These assumptions are relaxed in the
individual paragraphs as necessary. Layer 2 devices between the
clients and their corresponding first hop routers are not shown.
Other network elements like a Kerberos Key Distribution Center and
for example a LDAP server, from which the PDP retrieves its policies
are also omitted. The security of various interfaces to the
individual servers (KDC, PDP, etc.) depends very much on the
security policy of a specific network service provider.
+--------+
|Policy |
|Decision|
+----+Point +---+
| +--------+ |
| |
| |
| |
+------+ +-+----+ +---+--+ +------+
|Client| |Router| |Router| |Client|
| A +-------+ 1 +--------+ 2 +----------+ B |
+------+ +------+ +------+ +------+
Figure 3: Simple RSVP Architecture
4.2 Host/Router
When considering authentication in RSVP it is important to make a
distinction between user and host authentication of the signaling
messages. By using the RSVP INTEGRITY object the host is
authenticated while credentials inside the AUTH_DATA object can be
used to authenticate the user. In this section the focus is on host
authentication whereas the next section covers user authentication.
a) Authentication
The term host authentication is used above, because the selection of
the security association is bound to the host's IP address as
mentioned in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Depending on the key management
protocol used to create this security association and the identity
used, it is also possible to bind a user identity to this security
association. Because the key management protocol is not specified,
it is difficult to evaluate this part and hence we speak about data
origin authentication based on the host's identity for RSVP
INTEGRITY objects. The fact that the host identity is used for
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selecting the security association has already been described in
Section 3.1.
Data origin authentication is provided with the keyed hash value
computed over the entire RSVP message excluding the keyed message
digest field itself. The security association used between the
user's host and the first-hop router is, as previously mentioned,
not established by RSVP and must therefore be available before
signaling is started.
- Kerberos for the RSVP INTEGRITY object
As described in Section 7 of [RFC2747], Kerberos may be used to
create the key for the RSVP INTEGRITY object. How to learn the
principal name (and realm information) of the other node is outside
the scope of [RFC2747]. Section 4.2.1 of [RFC2747] states that the
required identities can be obtained statically or dynamically via a
directory service or DHCP. [HA01] describes a way to distribute
principal and realm information via DNS, which can be used for this
purpose (assuming that the FQDN or the IP address of the other node
for which this information is desired is known). All that is
required is to encapsulate the Kerberos ticket inside the policy
element. It is furthermore mentioned that Kerberos tickets with
expired lifetime must not be used and the initiator is responsible
for requesting and exchanging a new service ticket before
expiration.
RSVP multicast processing in combination with Kerberos requires
additional considerations:
Section 7 of [RFC2747] states that in the multicast case all
receivers must share a single key with the Kerberos Authentication
Server, i.e., a single principal used for all receivers). From a
personal discussion with Rodney Hess it seems that there is
currently no other solution available in the context of Kerberos.
Multicast handling therefore leaves some open questions in this
context.
In the case where one entity crashed, the established security
association is lost and therefore the other node must retransmit the
service ticket. The crashed entity can use an Integrity Challenge
message to request a new Kerberos ticket to be retransmitted by the
other node. If a node receives such a request, then a reply message
must be returned.
b) Integrity Protection
Integrity protection between the user's host and the first hop
router is based on the RSVP INTEGRITY object. HMAC-MD5 is preferred,
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although other keyed hash functions may also be used within the RSVP
INTEGRITY object. In any case, both communicating entities must have
a security association that indicates the algorithm to use. This
may, however, be difficult, because no negotiation protocol is
defined to agree on a specific algorithm. Hence, if RSVP is used in
a mobile environment, it is likely that HMAC-MD5 is the only usable
algorithm for the RSVP INTEGRITY object. Only in local environments
may it be useful to switch to a different keyed hash algorithm. The
other possible alternative is that every implementation must support
the most important keyed hash algorithms for example MD5, SHA-1,
RIPEMD-160, etc. HMAC-MD5 was mainly chosen because of its
performance characteristics. The weaknesses of MD5 [DBP96] are known
and described in [Dob96]. Other algorithms like SHA-1 [SHA] and
RIPEMD-160 [DBP96] have stronger security properties.
c) Replay Protection
The main mechanism used for replay protection in RSVP is based on
sequence numbers, whereby the sequence number is included in the
RSVP INTEGRITY object. The properties of this sequence number
mechanism are described in Section 3.1. The fact that the receiver
stores a list of sequence numbers is an indicator for a window
mechanism. This somehow conflicts with the requirement that the
receiver only has to store the highest number given in Section 3 of
[RFC2747]. We assume that this is a typo. Section 4.1 of [RFC2747]
gives a few comments about the out-of-order delivery and the ability
of an implementation to specify the replay window. Appendix C of
[RFC2401] describes a window mechanism for handling out-of-sequence
delivery.
- Integrity Handshake
The mechanism of the Integrity Handshake is explained in Section
3.5. The Cookie value is suggested to be hash of a local secret and
a timestamp. The Cookie value is not verified by the receiver. The
mechanism used by the Integrity Handshake is a simple
Challenge/Response message, which assumes that the key shared
between the two hosts survives the crash. If, however, the security
association is dynamically created, then this assumption may not be
true.
In Section 10 of [RFC2747] the authors note that an adversary can
create a faked Integrity Handshake message including challenge
cookies. Subsequently it could store the received response and later
try to replay these responses while a responder recovers from a
crash or restart. If this replayed Integrity Response value is valid
and has a lower sequence number than actually used, then this value
is stored at the recovering host. In order for this attack to be
successful the adversary must either have collected a large number
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of challenge/response value pairs or have "discovered" the cookie
generation mechanism (for example by knowing the local secret). The
collection of Challenge/Response pairs is even more difficult,
because they depend on the Cookie value, the sequence number
included in the response message, and the shared key used by the
INTEGRITY object.
d) Confidentiality
Confidentiality is not considered to be a security requirement for
RSVP. Hence it is not supported by RSVP, except as described in
paragraph d) of Section 4.3. This assumption may not hold, however,
for enterprises or carriers who want to protect, in addition to
users' identities, also billing data, network usage patterns, or
network configurations from eavesdropping and traffic analysis.
Confidentiality may also help make certain other attacks more
difficult. For example, the PathErr attack described in Section 5.2
is harder to carry out if the attacker cannot observe the Path
message to which the PathErr corresponds.
e) Authorization
The task of authorization consists of two subcategories: network
access authorization and RSVP request authorization. Access
authorization is provided when a node is authenticated to the
network, e.g., using EAP [RFC2284] in combination with AAA protocols
(for example using RADIUS [RFC2865] or DIAMETER [CA+02]). Issues
related to network access authentication and authorization are
outside the scope of RSVP.
The second authorization refers to RSVP itself. Depending on the
network configuration:
- the router either forwards the received RSVP request to the policy
decision point, e.g., by using COPS (see [RFC2748] and [RFC2749]),
to request that an admission control procedure be executed or
- the router supports the functionality of a PDP and therefore there
is no need to forward the request or
- the router may already be configured with the appropriate policy
information to decide locally whether to grant this request or
not.
Based on the result of the admission control, the request may be
granted or rejected. Information about the resource-requesting
entity must be available to provide policy-based admission control.
f) Performance
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The computation of the keyed message digest for a RSVP INTEGRITY
object does not represent a performance problem. The protection of
signaling messages is usually not a problem, because these messages
are transmitted at a low rate. Even a high volume of messages does
not cause performance problems for a RSVP routers due to the
efficiency of the keyed message digest routine.
Dynamic key management, which is computationally more demanding, is
more important for scalability. Because RSVP does not specify a
particular key exchange protocol, it is difficult to estimate the
effort to create the required security associations. Furthermore,
the number of key exchanges to be triggered depends on security
policy issues like lifetime of a security association, required
security properties of the key exchange protocol, authentication
mode used by the key exchange protocol, etc. In a stationary
environment with a single administrative domain, manual security
association establishment may be acceptable and may provide the best
performance characteristics. In a mobile environment, asymmetric
authentication methods are likely to be used with a key exchange
protocol, and some sort of public key or certificate verification
needs to be supported.
4.3 User to PEP/PDP
As noted in the previous section, both user-based and host-based
authentication are supported by RSVP. Using RSVP, a user may
authenticate to the first hop router or to the PDP as specified in
[RFC2747], depending on the infrastructure provided by the network
domain or the architecture used (e.g., the integration of RSVP and
Kerberos V5 into the Windows 2000 Operating System [MADS01]).
Another architecture in which RSVP is tightly integrated is the one
specified by the PacketCable organization. The interested reader is
referred to [PKTSEC] for a discussion of their security
architecture.
a) Authentication
When a user sends a RSVP PATH or RESV message, this message may
include some information to authenticate the user. [RFC3182]
describes how user and application information is embedded into the
RSVP message (AUTH_DATA object) and how to protect it. A router
receiving such a message can use this information to authenticate
the client and forward the user or application information to the
policy decision point (PDP). Optionally the PDP itself can
authenticate the user, which is described in the next section. To be
able to authenticate the user, to verify the integrity, and to check
for replays, the entire POLICY_DATA element has to be forwarded from
the router to the PDP, e.g., by including the element into a COPS
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message. It is assumed, although not clearly specified in [RFC3182],
that the INTEGRITY object within the POLICY_DATA element is sent to
the PDP along with all other attributes.
Certificate Verification
Using the policy element as described in [RFC3182] it is not
possible to provide a certificate revocation list or other
information to prove the validity of the certificate inside the
policy element. A specific mechanism for certificate verification is
not discussed in [RFC3182] and hence a number of them can be used
for this purpose. For certificate verification, the network element
(a router or the policy decision point), which has to authenticate
the user, could frequently download certificate revocation lists or
use a protocol like the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
[RFC2560] and the Simple Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)
[MHHF01] to determine the current status of a digital certificate.
User Authentication to the PDP
This alternative authentication procedure uses the PDP to
authenticate the user instead of the first hop router. In Section
4.2.1 of [RFC3182] the choice is given for the user to obtain a
session ticket either for the next hop router or for the PDP. As
noted in the same Section, the identity of the PDP or the next hop
router is statically configured or dynamically retrieved.
Subsequently, user authentication to the PDP is considered.
Kerberos-based Authentication to the PDP
If Kerberos is used to authenticate the user, then a session ticket
for the PDP needs to be requested first. A user who roams between
different routers in the same administrative domain does not need to
request a new service ticket, because the PDP is likely to be used
by most or all first-hop routers within the same administrative
domain. This is different from the case in which a session ticket
for a router has to be obtained and authentication to a router is
required. The router therefore plays a passive role of forwarding
the request only to the PDP and executing the policy decision
returned by the PDP.
Appendix B describes one example of user-to-PDP authentication.
User authentication with the policy element only provides unilateral
authentication whereby the client authenticates to the router or to
the PDP. If a RSVP message is sent to the user's host and public key
based authentication is used, then the message does not contain a
certificate and digital signature. Hence no mutual authentication
can be assumed. In case of Kerberos, mutual authentication may be
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accomplished if the PDP or the router transmits a policy element
with an INTEGRITY object computed with the session key retrieved
from the Kerberos ticket or if the Kerberos ticket included in the
policy element is also used for the RSVP INTEGRITY object as
described in Section 4.2. This procedure only works if a previous
message was transmitted from the end host to the network and such
key is already established. [RFC3182] does not discuss this issue
and therefore there is no particular requirement dealing with
transmitting network-specific credentials back to the end-user's
host.
b) Integrity Protection
Integrity protection is applied separately to the RSVP message and
the POLICY_DATA element as shown in Figure 1. In case of a policy-
ignorant node along the path, the RSVP INTEGRITY object and the
INTEGRITY object inside the policy element terminate at different
nodes. Basically, the same is true for the user credentials if they
are verified at the policy decision point instead of the first hop
router.
- Kerberos
If Kerberos is used to authenticate the user to the first hop
router, then the session key included in the Kerberos ticket may be
used to compute the INTEGRITY object of the policy element. It is
the keyed message digest that provides the authentication. The
existence of the Kerberos service ticket inside the AUTH_DATA object
does not provide authentication and a guarantee of freshness for the
receiving host. Authentication and guarantee of freshness are
provided by the keyed hash value of the INTEGRITY object inside the
POLICY_DATA element. This shows that the user actively participated
in the Kerberos protocol and was able to obtain the session key to
compute the keyed message digest. The Authenticator used in the
Kerberos V5 protocol provides similar functionality, but replay
protection is based on timestamps (or on a sequence number if the
optional seq-number field inside the Authenticator is used for
KRB_PRIV/KRB_SAFE messages as described in Section 5.3.2 of
[RFC1510]).
- Digital Signature
If public key based authentication is provided, then user
authentication is accomplished with a digital signature. As
explained in Section 3.3.3 of [RFC3182], the DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
attribute must be the last attribute in the AUTH_DATA object, and
the digital signature covers the entire AUTH_DATA object. Which hash
algorithm and public key algorithm are used for the digital
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signature computation is described in [RFC2440] in the case of PGP.
In the case of X.509 credentials the situation is more complex,
because different mechanisms like CMS [RFC2630] or PKCS#7 [RFC2315]
may be used for digitally signing the message element. X.509 only
provides the standard for the certificate layout, which seems to
provide insufficient information for this purpose. Therefore, X.509
certificates are supported for example by CMS and PKCS#7. [RFC3182],
however, does not make any statements about the usage of CMS and
PKCS#7. Currently there is no support for CMS or PKCS#7 described in
[RFC3182], which provides more than just public key based
authentication (e.g., CRL distribution, key transport, key
agreement, etc.). Furthermore, the use of PGP in RSVP is vaguely
defined, because there are different versions of PGP (including
OpenPGP [RFC2440]), and no indication is given as to which should be
used.
Supporting public key based mechanisms in RSVP might increase the
risks of denial of service attacks. Additionally, the large
processing, memory, and bandwidth utilization should be considered.
Fragmentation might also be an issue here.
If the INTEGRITY object is not included in the POLICY_DATA element
or not sent to the PDP, then we have to make the following
observations:
a) For the digital signature case, only the replay protection
provided by the digital signature algorithm can be used. It is
not clear, however, whether this usage was anticipated or not.
Hence, we might assume that replay protection is based on the
availability of the RSVP INTEGRITY object used with a security
association that is established by other means.
b) Including only the Kerberos session ticket is insufficient,
because freshness is not provided (since the Kerberos
Authenticator is missing). Obviously there is no guarantee that
the user actually followed the Kerberos protocol and was able to
decrypt the received TGS_REP (or in rare cases the AS_REP if a
session ticket is requested with the initial AS_REQ).
c) Replay Protection
Figure 4 shows the interfaces relevant for replay protection of
signaling messages in a more complicated architecture. In this case,
the client uses the policy data element with PEP2, because PEP1 is
not policy aware. The interfaces between the client and PEP1 and
between PEP1 and PEP2 are protected with the RSVP INTEGRITY object.
The link between the PEP2 and the PDP is protected, for example, by
using the COPS built-in INTEGRITY object. The dotted line between
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the Client and the PDP indicates the protection provided by the
AUTH_DATA element, which has no RSVP INTEGRITY object included.
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AUTH_DATA +----+
+- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -+PDP +-+
+----+ |
| |
|
| COPS |
INTEGRITY|
| |
|
| |
+--+---+ RSVP INTEGRITY +----+ RSVP INTEGRITY +----+ |
|Client+-------------------+PEP1+----------------------+PEP2+-+
+--+---+ +----+ +-+--+
| |
+-----------------------------------------------------+
POLICY_DATA INTEGRITY
Figure 4: Replay Protection
Host authentication with the RSVP INTEGRITY object and user
authentication with the INTEGRITY object inside the POLICY_DATA
element both use the same anti-replay mechanism. The length of the
Sequence Number field, sequence number rollover, and the Integrity
Handshake have already been explained in Section 3.1.
Section 9 of [RFC3182] states: "RSVP INTEGRITY object is used to
protect the policy object containing user identity information from
security (replay) attacks." When using public key based
authentication, RSVP based replay protection is not supported,
because the digital signature does not cover the POLICY_DATA
INTEGRITY object with its Sequence Number field. The digital
signature covers only the entire AUTH_DATA object.
The use of public key cryptography within the AUTH_DATA object
complicates replay protection. Digital signature computation with
PGP is described in [PGP] and in [RFC2440]. The data structure
preceding the signed message digest includes information about the
message digest algorithm used and a 32-bit timestamp of when the
signature was created ("Signature creation time"). The timestamp is
included in the computation of the message digest. The IETF
standardized OpenPGP version [RFC2440] contains more information and
describes the different hash algorithms (MD2, MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD-
160) supported. [RFC3182] does not make any statements as to whether
the "Signature creation time" field is used for replay protection.
Using timestamps for replay protection requires different
synchronization mechanisms in the case of clock-skew. Traditionally,
these cases assume "loosely synchronized" clocks but also require
specifying a replay-window.
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If the "Signature creation time" is not used for replay protection,
then a malicious, policy-ignorant node can use this weakness to
replace the AUTH_DATA object without destroying the digital
signature. If this was not simply an oversight, it is therefore
assumed that replay protection of the user credentials was not
considered an important security requirement, because the hop-by-hop
processing of the RSVP message protects the message against
modification by an adversary between two communicating nodes.
The lifetime of the Kerberos ticket is based on the fields starttime
and endtime of the EncTicketPart structure in the ticket, as
described in Section 5.3.1 of [RFC1510]. Because the ticket is
created by the KDC located at the network of the verifying entity,
it is not difficult to have the clocks roughly synchronized for the
purpose of lifetime verification. Additional information about
clock-synchronization and Kerberos can be found in [DG96].
If the lifetime of the Kerberos ticket expires, then a new ticket
must be requested and used. Rekeying is implemented with this
procedure.
d) (User Identity) Confidentiality
This section discusses privacy protection of identity information
transmitted inside the policy element. User identity confidentiality
is of particular interest because there is no built-in RSVP
mechanism for encrypting the POLICY_DATA object or the AUTH_DATA
elements. Encryption of one of the attributes inside the AUTH_DATA
element, the POLICY_LOCATOR attribute, is discussed.
To protect the user's privacy it is important not to reveal the
user's identity to an adversary located between the user's host and
the first-hop router (e.g., on a wireless link). User identities
should furthermore not be transmitted outside the domain of the
visited network provider, i.e., the user identity information inside
the policy data element should be removed or modified by the PDP to
prevent revealing its contents to other (non-authorized) entities
along the signaling path. It is not possible (with the offered
mechanisms) to hide the user's identity in such a way that it is not
visible to the first policy-aware RSVP node (or to the attached
network in general).
The ASCII or Unicode distinguished name of user or application
inside the POLICY_LOCATOR attribute of the AUTH_DATA element may be
encrypted as specified in Section 3.3.1 of [RFC3182]. The user (or
application) identity is then encrypted with either the Kerberos
session key or with the private key in case of public key based
authentication. When the private key is used, we usually speak of a
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digital signature that can be verified by everyone possessing the
public key. Because the certificate with the public key is included
in the message itself, decryption is no obstacle. Furthermore, the
included certificate together with the additional (unencrypted)
information in the RSVP message provides enough identity information
for an eavesdropper. Hence, the possibility of encrypting the policy
locator in case of public key based authentication is problematic.
To encrypt the identities using asymmetric cryptography, the user's
host must be able somehow to retrieve the public key of the entity
verifying the policy element (i.e., the first policy aware router or
the PDP). Then, this public key could be used to encrypt a symmetric
key, which in turn encrypts the user's identity and certificate, as
is done, e.g., by PGP. Currently no such mechanism is defined in
[RFC3182].
The algorithm used to encrypt the POLICY_LOCATOR with the Kerberos
session key is assumed to be the same as the one used for encrypting
the service ticket. The information about the algorithm used is
available in the etype field of the EncryptedData ASN.1 encoded
message part. Section 6.3 of [RFC1510] lists the supported
algorithms. [Rae01] defines new encryption algorithms (Rijndael,
Serpent, and Twofish).
Evaluating user identity confidentiality requires also looking at
protocols executed outside of RSVP (for example, the Kerberos
protocol). The ticket included in the CREDENTIAL attribute may
provide user identity protection by not including the optional cname
attribute inside the unencrypted part of the Ticket. Because the
Authenticator is not transmitted with the RSVP message, the cname
and the crealm of the unencrypted part of the Authenticator are not
revealed. In order for the user to request the Kerberos session
ticket for inclusion in the CREDENTIAL attribute, the Kerberos
protocol exchange must be executed. Then the Authenticator sent with
the TGS_REQ reveals the identity of the user. The AS_REQ must also
include the user's identity to allow the Kerberos Authentication
Server to respond with an AS_REP message that is encrypted with the
user's secret key. Using Kerberos, it is therefore only possible to
hide the content of the encrypted policy locator, which is only
useful if this value differs from the Kerberos principal name. Hence
using Kerberos it is not "entirely" possible to provide user
identity confidentiality.
It is important to note that information stored in the policy
element may be changed by a policy-aware router or by the policy
decision point. Which parts are changed depends upon whether
multicast or unicast is used, how the policy server reacts, where
the user is authenticated, whether the user needs to be re-
authenticated in other network nodes, etc. Hence, user and
application specific information can leak after the messages leave
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the first hop within the network where the user's host is attached.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, this information
leakage is assumed to be intentional.
e) Authorization
In addition to the description of the authorization steps of the
Host-to-Router interface, user-based authorization is performed with
the policy element providing user credentials. The inclusion of user
and application specific information enables policy-based admission
control with special user policies that are likely to be stored at a
dedicated server. Hence a Policy Decision Point can query, for
example, a LDAP server for a service level agreement stating the
amount of resources a certain user is allowed to request. In
addition to the user identity information, group membership and
other non-security-related information may contribute to the
evaluation of the final policy decision. If the user is not
registered to the currently attached domain, then there is the
question of how much information the home domain of the user is
willing to exchange. This also impacts the user's privacy policy. In
general, the user may not want to distribute much of this policy
information. Furthermore, the lack of a standardized authorization
data format may create interoperability problems when exchanging
policy information. Hence, we can assume that the policy decision
point may use information from an initial authentication and key
agreement protocol, which may have already required cross-realm
communication with the user's home domain if only to assume that the
home domain knows the user and that the user is entitled to roam and
to be able to forward accounting messages to this domain. This
represents the traditional subscriber-based accounting scenario.
Non-traditional or alternative means of access might be deployed in
the near future that do not require any type of inter-domain
communication.
Additional discussions are required to determine the expected
authorization procedures. [TB+03a] and [TB+03b] discuss
authorization issues for QoS signaling protocols. Furthermore, a
number of mobililty implications for policy handling in RSVP are
described in [Tho02].
f) Performance
If Kerberos is used for user authentication, then a Kerberos ticket
must be included in the CREDENTIAL Section of the AUTH_DATA element.
The Kerberos ticket has a size larger than 500 bytes but only needs
to be sent once, because a performance optimization allows the
session key to be cached as noted in Section 7.1 of [RFC2747]. It is
assumed that subsequent RSVP messages only include the POLICY_DATA
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INTEGRITY object with a keyed message digest that uses the Kerberos
session key. This, however, assumes that the security association
required for the POLICY_DATA INTEGRITY object is created (or
modified) to allow the selection of the correct key. Otherwise, it
difficult to say which identifier is used to index the security
association.
When Kerberos is used as an authentication system then, from a
performance perspective, the message exchange to obtain the session
key needs to be considered, although the exchange only needs to be
done once in the lifetime of the session ticket. This is
particularly true in a mobile environment with a fast roaming user's
host.
Public key based authentication usually provides the best
scalability characteristics for key distribution, but the protocols
are performance demanding. A major disadvantage of the public key
based user authentication in RSVP is the lack of a method to derive
a session key. Hence every RSVP PATH or RESV message includes the
certificate and a digital signature, which is a huge performance and
bandwidth penalty. For a mobile environment with low power devices,
high latency, channel noise, and low bandwidth links, this seems to
be less encouraging. Note that a public key infrastructure is
required to allow the PDP (or the first-hop router) to verify the
digital signature and the certificate. To check for revoked
certificates, certificate revocation lists or protocols like the
Online Certificate Status Protocol [RFC2560] and the Simple
Certificate Validation Protocol [MHHF01] are needed. Then the
integrity of the AUTH_DATA object via the digital signature can be
verified.
4.4 Communication between RSVP-Aware Routers
a) Authentication
RSVP signaling messages are data origin authenticated and protected
against modification and replay using the RSVP INTEGRITY object. The
RSVP message flow between routers is protected based on the chain of
trust and hence each router only needs to have a security
association with its neighboring routers. This assumption was made
because of performance advantages and because of special security
characteristics of the core network where no user hosts are directly
attached. In the core network the network structure does not change
frequently and the manual distribution of shared secrets for the
RSVP INTEGRITY object may be acceptable. The shared secrets may be
either manually configured or distributed by using appropriately
secured network management protocols like SNMPv3.
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Independent of the key distribution mechanism, host authentication
with RSVP built-in mechanisms is accomplished with the keyed message
digest in the RSVP INTEGRITY object computed using the previously
exchanged symmetric key.
b) Integrity Protection
Integrity protection is accomplished with the RSVP INTEGRITY object
with the variable length Keyed Message Digest field.
c) Replay Protection
Replay protection with the RSVP INTEGRITY object is extensively
described in previous sections.
To enable crashed hosts to learn the latest sequence number used,
the Integrity Handshake mechanism is provided in RSVP.
d) Confidentiality
Confidentiality is not provided by RSVP.
e) Authorization
Depending on the RSVP network, QoS resource authorization at
different routers may need to contact the PDP again. Because the PDP
is allowed to modify the policy element, a token may be added to the
policy element to increase the efficiency of the re-authorization
procedure. This token is used to refer to an already computed policy
decision. The communications interface from the PEP to the PDP must
be properly secured.
f) Performance
The performance characteristics for the protection of the RSVP
signaling messages is largely determined by the key exchange
protocol, because the RSVP INTEGRITY object is only used to compute
a keyed message digest of the transmitted signaling messages.
The security associations within the core network, i.e., between
individual routers (in comparison with the security association
between the user's host and the first-hop router or with the
attached network in general) can be established more easily because
of the normally strong trust assumptions. Furthermore, it is
possible to use security associations with an increased lifetime to
avoid frequent rekeying. Hence, there is less impact on the
performance compared with the user-to-network interface. The
security association storage requirements are also less problematic.
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5. Miscellaneous Issues
This section describes a number of issues that illustrate some of
the shortcomings of RSVP with respect to security.
5.1 First Hop Issue
In case of end-to-end signaling, an end host starts signaling to its
attached network. The first-hop communication is often more
difficult to secure because of the different requirements and a
missing trust relationship. An end host must therefore obtain some
information to start RSVP signaling:
- Does this network support RSVP signaling?
- Which node supports RSVP signaling?
- To which node is authentication required?
- Which security mechanisms are used for authentication?
- Which algorithms have to be used?
- Where should the keys and security association come from?
- Should a security association be established?
RSVP, as specified today, is used as a building block. Hence, these
questions have to be answered as part of overall architectural
considerations. Without giving an answer to this question, ad hoc
RSVP communication by an end host roaming to an unknown network is
not possible. A negotiation of security mechanisms and algorithms is
not supported for RSVP.
5.2 Next-Hop Problem
Throughout the document it was assumed that the next RSVP node along
the path is always known. Knowing your next hop is important to be
able to select the correct key for the RSVP Integrity object and to
apply the proper protection. In case in which an RSVP node assumes
it knows which node is the next hop the following protocol exchange
can occur:
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RSVP Security Properties September 2004
Integrity
(A<->C) +------+
(3) | RSVP |
+------------->+ Node |
| | B |
Integrity | +--+---+
(A<->C) | |
+------+ (2) +--+----+ |
(1) | RSVP +----------->+Router | | Error
----->| Node | | or +<-----------+ (I am B)
| A +<-----------+Network| (4)
+------+ (5) +--+----+
Error .
(I am B) . +------+
. | RSVP |
...............+ Node |
| C |
+------+
Figure 5: Next-Hop Issue
When RSVP node A in Figure 5 receives an incoming RSVP Path message,
standard RSVP message processing takes place. Node A then has to
decide which key to select to protect the signaling message. We
assume that some unspecified mechanism is used to make this
decision. In this example node A assumes that the message will
travel to RSVP node C. However, because of some reasons (e.g. a
route change, inability to learn the next RSVP hop along the path,
etc.) the message travels to node B via a non-RSVP supporting router
that cannot verify the integrity of the message (or cannot decrypt
the Kerberos service ticket). The processing failure causes a
PathErr message to be returned to the originating sender of the Path
message. This error message also contains information about the node
recognizing the error. In many cases a security association might
not be available. Node A receiving the PathErr message might use the
information returned with the PathErr message to select a different
security association (or to establish one).
Figure 5 describes a behavior that might help node A learn that an
error occurred. However, the description of Section 4.2 of [RFC2747]
describes in step (5) that a signaling message is silently discarded
if the receiving host cannot properly verify the message: "If the
calculated digest does not match the received digest, the message is
discarded without further processing." For RSVP Path and similar
messages this functionality is not really helpful.
The RSVP Path message therefore provides a number of functions: path
discovery, detecting route changes, learning of QoS capabilities
along the path using the Adspec object, (with some interpretation)
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next-hop discovery, and possibly security association establishment
(for example, in the case of Kerberos).
From a security point of view there is a conflict between
- Idempotent message delivery and efficiency
The RSVP Path message especially performs a number of functions.
Supporting idempotent message delivery somehow contradicts with
security association establishment, efficient message delivery, and
message size. For example, a "real" idempotent signaling message
would contain enough information to perform security processing
without depending on a previously executed message exchange. Adding
a Kerberos ticket with every signaling message is, however,
inefficient. Using public key based mechanisms is even more
inefficient when included in every signaling message. With public
key based protection for idempotent messages, there is additionally
a risk of introducing denial of service attacks.
- RSVP Path message functionality and next-hop discovery
To protect an RSVP signaling message (and a RSVP Path message in
particular) it is necessary to know the identity of the next RSVP-
aware node (and some other parameters). Without a mechanism for
next-hop discovery, an RSVP Path message is also responsible for
this task. Without knowing the identity of the next hop, the
Kerberos principal name is also unknown. The so-called Kerberos
user-to-user authentication mechanism, which would allow the
receiver to trigger the process of establishing Kerberos
authentication, is not supported. This issue will again be discussed
in relationship with the last-hop problem.
It is fair to assume that a RSVP-supporting node might not have
security associations with all immediately neighboring RSVP nodes.
Especially for inter-domain signaling, IntServ over DiffServ, or
some new applications such as firewall signaling, the next RSVP-
aware node might not be known in advance. The number of next RSVP
nodes might be considerably large if they are separated by a large
number of non-RSVP aware nodes. Hence, a node transmitting a RSVP
Path message might experience difficulties in properly protecting
the message if it serves as a mechanism to detect both the next RSVP
node (i.e., Router Alert Option added to the signaling message and
addressed to the destination address) and to detect route changes.
It is fair to note that in an intra-domain case with a dense
distribution of RSVP nodes this might be possible with manual
configuration.
Nothing prevents an adversary from continuously flooding an RSVP
node with bogus PathErr messages, although it might be possible to
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protect the PathErr message with an existing, available security
association. A legitimate RSVP node would believe that a change in
the path took place. Hence, this node might try to select a
different security association or try to create one with the
indicated node. If an adversary is located somewhere along the path
and either authentication or authorization is not performed with the
necessary strength and accuracy, then it might also be possible to
act as a man-in-the-middle. One method of reducing susceptibility to
this attack is as follows: when a PathErr message is received from a
node with which no security association exists, attempt to establish
a security association and then repeat the action that led to the
PathErr message.
5.3 Last-Hop Issue
This section tries to address practical difficulties when
authentication and key establishment are accomplished with a two-
party protocol that shows some asymmetry in message processing.
Kerberos is such a protocol and also the only supported protocol
that provides dynamic session key establishment for RSVP. For first-
hop communication, authentication is typically done between a user
and some router (for example the access router). Especially in a
mobile environment, it is not feasible to authenticate end hosts
based on their IP or MAC address. To illustrate this problem, the
typical processing steps for Kerberos are shown for first-hop
communication:
a) The end host A learns the identity (i.e., Kerberos principal
name) of some entity B. This entity B is either the next RSVP node,
a PDP, or the next policy-aware RSVP node.
b) Entity A then requests a ticket granting ticket for the network
domain. This assumes that the identity of the network domain is
known.
c) Entity A then requests a service ticket for entity B, whose name
was learned in step (a).
d) Entity A includes the service ticket with the RSVP signaling
message (inside the policy object). The Kerberos session key is used
to protect the integrity of the entire RSVP signaling message.
For last-hop communication this processing step theoretically has to
be reversed; entity A is then a node in the network (for example the
access router) and entity B is the other end host (under the
assumption that RSVP signaling is accomplished between two end hosts
and not between an end host and a application server). The access
router might, however, in step (a) not be able to learn the user's
principal name, because this information might not be available.
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Entity A could reverse the process by triggering an IAKERB exchange.
This would cause entity B to request a service ticket for A as
described above. IAKERB is however not supported in RSVP.
5.4 RSVP and IPsec protected data traffic
QoS signaling requires flow information to be established at routers
along a path. This flow identifier installed at each device tells
the router which data packets should receive QoS treatment. RSVP
typically establishes a flow identifier based on the 5-tuple (source
IP address, destination IP address, transport protocol type, source
port, and destination port). If this 5-tuple information is not
available, then other identifiers have to be used. IPsec-protected
data traffic is such an example where the transport protocol and the
port numbers are not accessible. Hence the IPsec SPI is used as a
substitute for them. RFC 2207 considers these IPsec implications for
RSVP and is based on three assumptions:
a) An end host, which initiates the RSVP signaling message exchange,
has to be able to retrieve the SPI for given flow. This requires
some interaction with the IPsec security association database (SAD)
and security policy database (SPD) [RFC2401]. An application usually
does not know the SPI of the protected flow and cannot provide the
desired values. It can provide the signaling protocol daemon with
flow identifiers. The signaling daemon would then need to query the
SAD by providing the flow identifiers as input parameters and the
SPI as an output parameter.
b) RFC 2207 assumes end-to-end IPsec protection of the data traffic.
If IPsec is applied in a nested fashion, then parts of the path do
not experience QoS treatment. This can be treated as a tunneling
problem, but it is initiated by the end host. A figure better
illustrates the problem in the case of enforcing secure network
access:
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+------+ +---------------+ +--------+ +-----+
| Host | | Security | | Router | | Host|
| A | | Gateway (SGW) | | Rx | | B |
+--+---+ +-------+-------+ +----+---+ +--+--+
| | | |
|IPsec-Data( | | |
| OuterSrc=A, | | |
| OuterDst=SGW, | | |
| SPI=SPI1, | | |
| InnerSrc=A, | | |
| OuterDst=B, | | |
| Protocol=X, |IPsec-Data( | |
| SrcPort=Y, | SrcIP=A, | |
| DstPort=Z) | DstIP=B, | |
|=====================>| Protocol=X, |IPsec-Data( |
| | SrcPort=Y, | SrcIP=A, |
| --IPsec protected-> | DstPort=Z) | DstIP=B, |
| data traffic |------------------>| Protocol=X, |
| | | SrcPort=Y, |
| | | DstPort=Z) |
| | |---------------->|
| | | |
| | --Unprotected data traffic-> |
| | | |
Figure 6: RSVP and IPsec protected data traffic
Host A transmitting data traffic would either indicate a 3-tuple <A,
SGW, SPI1> or a 5-tuple <A, B, X, Y, Z>. In any case it is not
possible to make a QoS reservation for the entire path. Two similar
examples are remote access using a VPN and protection of data
traffic between a home agent (or a security gateway in the home
network) and a mobile node. With a nested application of IPsec (for
example, IPsec between A and SGW and between A and B) the same
problem occurs.
One possible solution to this problem is to change the flow
identifier along the path to capture the new flow identifier after
an IPsec endpoint.
IPsec tunnels that neither start nor terminate at one of the
signaling end points (for example between two networks) should be
addressed differently by recursively applying an RSVP signaling
exchange for the IPsec tunnel. RSVP signaling within tunnels is
addressed in [RFC2746].
c) It is assumed that SPIs do not change during the lifetime of the
established QoS reservation. If a new IPsec SA is created, then a
new SPI is allocated for the security association. To reflect this
change, either a new reservation has to be established or the flow
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identifier of the existing reservation has to be updated. Because
IPsec SAs usually have a longer lifetime, this does not seem to be a
major issue. IPsec protection of SCTP data traffic might more often
require an IPsec SA (and an SPI) change to reflect added and removed
IP addresses from an SCTP association.
5.5 End-to-End Security Issues and RSVP
End-to-end security for RSVP has not been discussed throughout the
document. In this context end-to-end security refers to credentials
transmitted between the two end hosts using RSVP. It is obvious that
care must be taken to ensure that routers along the path are able to
process and modify the signaling messages according to prescribed
processing procedures. Some objects or mechanisms, however, could be
used for end-to-end protection. The main question however is what
the benefit of such an end-to-end security is. First, there is the
question of how to establish the required security association.
Between two arbitrary hosts on the Internet this might turn out to
be quite difficult. Furthermore, te usefulness of end-to-end
security depends on the architecture in which RSVP is deployed. If
RSVP is only used to signal QoS information into the network, and
other protocols have to be executed beforehand to negotiate the
parameters and to decide which entity is charged for the QoS
reservation, then no end-to-end security is likely to be required.
Introducing end-to-end security to RSVP would then cause problems
with extensions like RSVP proxy [GD+02], Localized RSVP [MS+02], and
others that terminate RSVP signaling somewhere along the path
without reaching the destination end host. Such a behavior could
then be interpreted as a man-in-the-middle attack.
5.6 IPsec protection of RSVP signaling messages
It is assumed throughout that RSVP signaling messages can also be
protected by IPsec [RFC2401] in a hop-by-hop fashion between two
adjacent RSVP nodes. RSVP, however, uses special processing of
signaling messages, which complicates IPsec protection. As explained
in this section, IPsec should only be used for protection of RSVP
signaling messages in a point-to-point communication environment
(i.e., a RSVP message can only reach one RSVP router and not
possibly more than one). This restriction is caused by the
combination of signaling message delivery and discovery into a
single message. Furthermore, end-to-end addressing complicates IPsec
handling considerably. This section describes at least some of these
complications.
RSVP messages are transmitted as raw IP packets with protocol number
46. It might be possible to encapsulate them in UDP as described in
Appendix C of [RFC2205]. Some RSVP messages (Path, PathTear, and
ResvConf) must have the Router Alert IP Option set in the IP header.
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These messages are addressed to the (unicast or multicast)
destination address and not to the next RSVP node along the path.
Hence an IPsec traffic selector can only use these fields for IPsec
SA selection. If there is only a single path (and possibly all
traffic along it is protected) then there is no problem for IPsec
protection of signaling messages. This type of protection is not
common and might only be used to secure network access between an
end host and its first-hop router. Because the described RSVP
messages are addressed to the destination address instead of the
next RSVP node, it is not possible to use IPsec ESP [RFC2406] or AH
[RFC2402] in transport mode--only IPsec in tunnel mode is possible.
If there is more than one possible path an RSVP message can take,
then the IPsec engine will experience difficulties protecting the
message. Even if the RSVP daemon installs a traffic selector with
the destination IP address, still, no distinguishing element allows
selection of the correct security association for one of the
possible RSVP nodes along the path. Even if it possible to apply
IPsec protection (in tunnel mode) for RSVP signaling messages by
incorporating some additional information, there is still the
possibility that the tunneled messages do not recognize a path
change in a non-RSVP router. In this case the signaling messages
would simply follow a different path than the data.
RSVP messages like RESV can be protected by IPsec, because they
contain enough information to create IPsec traffic selectors
allowing differentiation between various next RSVP nodes. The
traffic selector would then contain the protocol number and the
source and destination address pair of the two communicating RSVP
nodes.
One benefit of using IPsec is the availability of key management
using either IKE [RFC2409], KINK [FH+01] or IKEv2 [IKEv2].
5.7 Authorization
[TB+03a] describes two trust models (NJ Turnpike and NJ Parkway) and
two authorization models (per-session and per-channel financial
settlement). The NJ Turnpike model gives a justification for hop-by-
hop security protection. RSVP focuses on the NJ Turnpike model
although the different trust models are not described in detail.
RSVP supports the NJ Parkway model and per-channel financial
settlement only to a certain extent. Authentication of the user (or
end host) can be provided with the user identity representation
mechanism but authentication might in many cases be insufficient for
authorization. The communication procedures defined for policy
objects [Her95] can be improved to support the more efficient per-
channel financial settlement model by avoiding policy handling
between inter-domain networks at a signaling message granularity.
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Additional information about expected behavior of policy handling in
RSVP can also be obtained from [Her96].
[TB+03b] and [Tho02] provide additional information on
authorization. No good and agreed mechanism for dealing with
authorization of QoS reservations in roaming environments is
provided. Price distribution mechanisms are only described in papers
and never made their way through standardization. RSVP focuses on
receiver-initiated reservations with authorization for the QoS
reservation by the data receiver which introduces a fair number of
complexity for mobility handling as described, for example, in
[Tho02].
6. Conclusions
RSVP was the first QoS signaling protocol that provided some
security protection. Whether RSVP provides enough security
protection heavily depends on the environment where it is deployed.
RSVP as specified today should be seen as a building block that has
to be adapted to a given architecture.
This document aims to provide more insights into the security of
RSVP. It cannot not be interpreted as a pass or fail evaluation of
the security provided by RSVP.
Certainly this document is not a complete description of all
security issues related to RSVP. Some issues that require further
consideration are RSVP extensions (for example [RFC2207]), multicast
issues, and other security properties like traffic analysis.
Additionally, the interaction with mobility protocols (micro- and
macro-mobility) from a security point of view demands further
investigation.
What can be learned from practical protocol experience and from the
increased awareness regarding security is that some of the available
credential types have received more acceptance than others. Kerberos
is a system that is integrated into many IETF protocols today.
Public key based authentication techniques are however still
considered to be too heavy-weight (computationally and from a
bandwidth perspective) to be used for per-flow signaling. The
increased focus on denial of service attacks put additional demands
on the design of public key based authentication.
The following list briefly summarizes a few security or
architectural issues that deserve improvement:
* Discovery and signaling message delivery should be separated.
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* For some applications and scenarios it cannot be assumed that
neighboring RSVP-aware nodes know each other. Hence some in-path
discovery mechanism should be provided.
* Addressing for signaling messages should be done in a hop-by-hop
fashion.
* Standard security protocols (IPsec, TLS or CMS) should be used
whenever possible. Authentication and key exchange should be
separated from signaling message protection. In general, it is
necessary to provide key management to establish security
associations dynamically for signaling message protection. Relying
on manually configured keys between neighboring RSVP nodes is
insufficient. A separate, less frequently executed key management
and security association establishment protocol is a good place to
perform entity authentication, security service negotiation and
selection, and agreement on mechanisms, transforms, and options.
* The use of public key cryptography in authorization tokens,
identity representations, selective object protection, etc. is
likely to cause fragmentation, the need to protect against denial
of service attacks, and other problems.
* Public key authentication and user identity confidentiality
provided with RSVP require some improvement.
* Public key based user authentication only provides entity
authentication. An additional security association is required to
protect signaling messages.
* Data origin authentication should not be provided by non-RSVP
nodes (such as the PDP). Such a procedure could be accomplished by
entity authentication during the authentication and key exchange
phase.
* Authorization and charging should be better integrated into the
base protocol.
* Selective message protection should be provided. A protected
message should be recognizable from a flag in the header.
* Confidentiality protection is missing and should therefore be
added
to the protocol. The general principle is that protocol designers
can seldom foresee all of the environments in which protocols will
be run, so they should allow users to select from a full range of
security services, as the needs of different user communities
vary.
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* Parameter and mechanism negotiation should be provided.
7. Security Considerations
This document discusses security properties of RSVP and, as such, it
is concerned entirely with security.
8. IANA considerations
This document does not address any IANA considerations.
9. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Jorge Cuellar, Robert Hancock, Xiaoming Fu,
Guenther Schaefer, Marc De Vuyst and Jukka Manner for their valuable
comments. Additionally, we would like to thank Robert and Jorge for
their time to discuss various issues with me.
Finally we would Allison Mankin and John Loughney for their
comments.
Appendix A: Dictionary Attacks and Kerberos
Kerberos might be used with RSVP as described in this document.
Because dictionary attacks are often mentioned in relationship with
Kerberos, a few issues are addressed here.
The initial Kerberos AS_REQ request (without pre-authentication,
without various extensions, and without PKINIT) is unprotected. The
response message AS_REP is encrypted with the client's long-term
key. An adversary can take advantage of this fact by requesting
AS_REP messages to mount an off-line dictionary attack. Pre-
authentication ([Pat92]) can be used to reduce this problem.
However, pre-authentication does not entirely prevent dictionary
attacks by an adversary who can still eavesdrop on Kerberos messages
along the path between a mobile node and a KDC. With mandatory pre-
authentication for the initial request, an adversary cannot request
a Ticket Granting Ticket for an arbitrary user. On-line password
guessing attacks are still possible by choosing a password (e.g.,
from a dictionary) and then transmitting an initial request
including a pre-authentication data field. An unsuccessful
authentication by the KDC results in an error message and the gives
the adversary a hint to restart the protocol and try a new password.
There are, however, some proposals that prevent dictionary attacks.
The use of Public Key Cryptography for initial authentication
[TN+01] (PKINIT) is one such solution. Other proposals use strong-
password-based authenticated key agreement protocols to protect the
user's password during the initial Kerberos exchange. [Wu99]
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discusses the security of Kerberos and also discusses mechanisms to
prevent dictionary attacks.
Appendix B: Example of User-to-PDP Authentication
The following Section describes an example of user-to-PDP
authentication. Note that the description below is not fully covered
by the RSVP specification and hence it should only be seen as an
example.
Windows 2000, which integrates Kerberos into RSVP, uses a
configuration with the user authentication to the PDP as described
in [MADS01]. The steps for authenticating the user to the PDP in an
intra-realm scenario are the following:
- Windows 2000 requires the user to contact the KDC and to request a
Kerberos service ticket for the PDP account AcsService in the
local realm.
- This ticket is then embedded into the AUTH_DATA element and
included in either the PATH or the RESV message. In case of
Microsoft's implementation, the user identity encoded as a
distinguished name is encrypted with the session key provided with
the Kerberos ticket. The Kerberos ticket is sent without the
Kerberos authdata element that contains authorization information,
as explained in [MADS01].
- The RSVP message is then intercepted by the PEP, which forwards it
to the PDP. [MADS01] does not state which protocol is used to
forward the RSVP message to the PDP.
- The PDP that finally receives the message decrypts the received
service ticket. The ticket contains the session key used by the
user's host to
a) Encrypt the principal name inside the policy locator field of
the AUTH_DATA object and to
b) Create the integrity-protected Keyed Message Digest field in
the INTEGRITY object of the POLICY_DATA element. The protection
described here is between the user's host and the PDP. The RSVP
INTEGRITY object on the other hand is used to protect the path
between the user's host and the first-hop router, because the
two message parts terminate at different nodes and different
security associations must be used. The interface between the
message-intercepting, first-hop router and the PDP must be
protected as well.
c) The PDP does not maintain a user database, and [MADS01]
describes how the PDP may query the Active Directory (a LDAP
based directory service) for user policy information.
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Appendix C: Literature on RSVP Security
Few documents address the security of RSVP signaling. This section
briefly describes some important documents.
Improvements to RSVP are proposed in [WW+99] to deal with insider
attacks. Insider attacks are caused by malicious RSVP routers that
modify RSVP signaling messages in such a way that they cause harm to
the nodes participating in the signaling message exchange.
As a solution, non-mutable RSVP objects are digitally signed by the
sender. This digital signature is added to the RSVP PATH message.
Additionally, the receiver attaches an object to the RSVP RESV
message containing a "signed" history. This value allows
intermediate RSVP routers (by examining the previously signed value)
to detect a malicious RSVP node.
A few issues are, however, left open in the document. Replay attacks
are not covered, and it is therefore assumed that timestamp-based
replay protection is used. To detect a malicious node, it is
necessary that all routers along the path are able to verify the
digital signature. This may require a global public key
infrastructure and also client-side certificates. Furthermore the
bandwidth and computational requirements to compute, transmit, and
verify digital signatures for each signaling message might place a
burden on a real-world deployment.
Authorization is not considered in the document, which might have an
influence on the implications of signaling message modification.
Hence, the chain-of-trust relationship (or this step in a different
direction) should be considered in relationship with authorization.
In [TN00], the above-described idea of detecting malicious RSVP
nodes is improved by addressing performance aspects. The proposed
solution is somewhere between hop-by-hop security and the approach
in [WW+99], insofar as it separates the end-to-end path into
individual networks. Furthermore, some additional RSVP messages
(e.g., feedback messages) are introduced to implement a mechanism
called "delayed integrity checking." In [TN+01], the approach
presented in [TN00] is enhanced.
10. Normative References
[RFC3182] Yadav, S., Yavatkar, R., Pabbati, R., Ford, P., Moore, T.,
Herzog, S., Hess, R.: "Identity Representation for RSVP", RFC 3182,
October, 2001.
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RSVP Security Properties September 2004
[RFC2750] Herzog, S.: "RSVP Extensions for Policy Control", RFC
2750, January, 2000.
[RFC2747] Baker, F., Lindell, B., Talwar, M.: "RSVP Cryptographic
Authentication", RC 2747, January, 2000.
[RFC2748] Boyle, J., Cohen, R., Durham, D., Herzog, S., Rajan, R.,
Sastry, A.: "The COPS(Common Open Policy Service) Protocol", RFC
2748, January, 2000.
[RFC2749] Boyle, J., Cohen, R., Durham, D., Herzog, S., Rajan, R.,
Sastry, A.: "COPS usage for RSVP", RFC 2749, January, 2000.
[RFC2207] Berger, L., O'Malley, T.: "RSVP Extensions for IPSEC Data
Flows", RFC 2207, September 1997.
[RFC1321] Rivest, R.: "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
April, 1992.
[RFC1510] Kohl, J., Neuman, C.: "The Kerberos Network Authentication
Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., Canetti, R.: "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February, 1997.
[RFC2205] Braden, R., Zhang, L., Berson, S., Herzog, S., Jamin, S.:
"Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) - Version 1 Functional
Specification", RFC 2205, September 1997.
11. Informative References
[CA+02] Calhoun, P., Arkko, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., Loughney, J.:
"DIAMETER Base Protocol", <draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-17.txt>, (work in
progress), December, 2002.
[DBP96] Dobbertin, H., Bosselaers, A., Preneel, B.: "RIPEMD-160: A
strengthened version of RIPEMD", in "Fast Software Encryption, LNCS
Vol 1039, pp. 71-82", 1996.
[DG96] Davis, D., Geer, D.: "Kerberos With Clocks Adrift: History,
Protocols and Implementation", in "USENIX Computing Systems Volume 9
no. 1, Winter", 1996.
[Dob96] Dobbertin, H.: "The Status of Md5 After a Recent Attack,"
RSA Laboratories' CryptoBytes, Volume 2, Number 2, 1996.
[GD+02] Gai, S., Dutt, D., Elfassy, N., Bernet, Y.: "RSVP Proxy",
<draft-ietf-rsvp-proxy-03.txt>, (expired), March, 2002.
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RSVP Security Properties September 2004
[HA01] Hornstein, K., Altman, J.: "Distributing Kerberos KDC and
Realm Information with DNS", <draft-ietf-krb-wg-krb-dns-locate-
03.txt>, (expired), July, 2002.
[HH01] Hess, R., Herzog, S.: "RSVP Extensions for Policy Control",
<draft-ietf-rap-new-rsvp-ext-00.txt>, (expired), June, 2001.
[Jab96] Jablon, D.: "Strong password-only authenticated key
exchange", Computer Communication Review, 26(5), pp. 5-26, October,
1996.
[MADS01] "Microsoft Authorization Data Specification v. 1.0 for
Microsoft Windows 2000 Operating Systems", April, 2000.
[RFC2284] Blunk, L. and J. Vollbrecht, "PPP Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 2284, March 1998.
[MHHF01] Malpani, A., Hoffman, P., Housley, R., Freeman, T.: "Simple
Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)", <draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-
11.txt>, (work in progress), December, 2002.
[MS+02] Manner, J., Suihko, T., Kojo, M., Liljeberg, M.,
Raatikainen, K.: "Localized RSVP", <draft-manner-lrsvp-00.txt>,
(expired), May, 2002.
[Pat92] Pato, J., "Using Pre-Authentication to Avoid Password
Guessing Attacks", Open Software Foundation DCE Request for Comments
26, December, 1992.
[PGP] "Specifications and standard documents",
http://www.pgpi.org/doc/specs/ (March, 2002).
[PKTSEC] PacketCable Security Specification, PKT-SP-SEC-I01-991201,
Cable Television Laboratories, Inc., December 1, 1999,
http://www.PacketCable.com/ (June, 2003).
[Rae01] Raeburn, K.: "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
Kerberos 5", <draft-ietf-krb-wg-crypto-05.txt>, (work in progress),
June, 2003.
[RFC2315] Kaliski, B.: "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax
Version 1.5", RFC 2315, March, 1998.
[RFC2440] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Thayer, R.:
"OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 2440, November, 1998.
[RFC2495] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W., Solo, D.: "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 2459,
January, 1999.
Tschofenig, Graveman Expires - March 2005 [Page 43]
RSVP Security Properties September 2004
[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., Adams,
C.: "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate
Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, June, 1999.
[RFC2630] Housley, R.: "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 2630,
June, 1999.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., Simpson, W.: "Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June, 2000.
[SHA] NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1, "Secure Hash Standard", April, 1995.
[TN+01] Tung, B., Neuman, C., Hur, M., Medvinsky, A., Medvinsky, S.,
Wray, J., Trostle, J.: "Public Key Cryptography for Initial
Authentication in Kerberos", <draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-
16.txt>, (expired), October, 2001.
[Wu99] Wu, T.: "A Real-World Analysis of Kerberos Password
Security", in "Proceedings of the 1999 Network and Distributed
System Security", February, 1999.
[TB+03a] H. Tschofenig, M. Buechli, S. Van den Bosch, H.
Schulzrinne: "NSIS Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
Issues", <draft-tschofenig-nsis-aaa-issues-01.txt>, (work in
progress), March, 2003.
[TB+03b] H. Tschofenig, M. Buechli, S. Van den Bosch, H.
Schulzrinne, T. Chen: "QoS NSLP Authorization Issues", <draft-
tschofenig-nsis-qos-authz-issues-00.txt>, (work in progress), June,
2003.
[Her95] Herzog, S.: "Accounting and Access Control in RSVP", <draft-
ietf-rsvp-lpm-arch-00.txt>, (expired), November, 1995.
[Her96] S. Herzog: "Accounting and Access Control for Multicast
Distributions: Models and Mechanisms", PhD Dissertation, University
of Southern California, June 1996, available at:
http://www.policyconsulting.com/publications/USC%20thesis.pdf,
(June, 2003).
[Tho02] M. Thomas: "Analysis of Mobile IP and RSVP Interactions",
<draft-thomas-nsis-rsvp-analysis-00.txt>, (work in progress),
October 2002.
[FH+01] Thomas, M., Vilhuber, J.: "Kerberized Internet Negotiation
of Keys (KINK)", <draft-ietf-kink-kink-05.txt>, (work in progress),
January, 2003.
Tschofenig, Graveman Expires - March 2005 [Page 44]
RSVP Security Properties September 2004
[RFC2402] Kent, S., Atkinson, R.: "IP Authentication Header", RFC
2402, November, 1998.
[RFC2406] Kent, S., Atkinson, R.: "IP Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP)", RFC 2406, November, 1998.
[RFC2409] Harkins, D., Carrel, D.: "The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE)", RFC 2409, November, 1998.
[IKEv2] C. Kaufman: "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
Internet Draft, <draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-08.txt>, (work in progress),
June, 2003.
[WW+99] Wu, T., Wu, F. and Gong, F.: "Securing QoS: Threats to RSVP
Messages and Their Countermeasures", in "IEEE IWQoS, pp. 62-64,
1999.
[TN00] Talwar, V. and Nahrstedt, K.: "Securing RSVP For Multimedia
Applications", in "Proceedings of ACM Multimedia (Multimedia
Security Workshop)", Los Angeles, November, 2000.
[TN+01] Talwar, V., Nath, S., Nahrstedt, K.: "RSVP-SQoS : A Secure
RSVP Protocol", in "International Conference on Multimedia and
Exposition", Tokyo , Japan, August 2001.
Author's Contact Information
Hannes Tschofenig
Siemens AG
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
81739 Munich
Germany
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com
Richard Graveman
RFG Security, LLC
15 Park Avenue
Morristown, NJ 07960 USA
email: rfg@acm.org
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RSVP Security Properties September 2004
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