Internet Engineering Task Force                         S. HomChaudhuri 
Internet Draft                                             M. Foschiano 
Category: Informational                                   Cisco Systems 
Expires: August 2007                                      February 2007 
    
    
              Private VLANs: Addressing VLAN scalability and  
              security issues in a multi-client environment 
                     draft-sanjib-private-vlan-06.txt 
    
    
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Copyright Notice 
    
   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 
 
 
                            Private VLANs                 August 2007 
 
 
Abstract 
    
   This document describes the concept of Layer 2 isolation among 
   devices that are members of the same Layer 2 domain. 
    
   A vlan is a broadcast domain in which all devices can establish 
   direct communication with one another at Layer 2. 
   As a consequence, devices that are connected to the same vlan have 
   an implicit trust relationship with each other. If 'untrusted' 
   devices are introduced into a vlan, security issues may arise 
   because trusted and untrusted devices end up sharing the same 
   broadcast domain. 
    
   The traditional solution to this kind of problem is to assign a 
   separate vlan to each device that is concerned about Layer 2 
   security issues. That however is not a scalable solution. The 
   mechanism proposed in this document can offer total Layer 2 
   isolation between devices connected to the same vlan. What that 
   means is that, on the one hand, each customer will enjoy the 
   benefits that come with a separate dedicated vlan, while on the 
   other hand the service provider will enjoy the benefit of consuming 
   as few as two vlan identifiers. 
    
   Moreover, the scheme described in this document allows end devices 
   to be Layer 2 isolated while sharing the same IP subnet, which in 
   turn allows the network designer to employ larger subnets and reduce 
   the address allocation and management overhead. 
 
 
Conventions used in this document 
    
   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in 
   this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [1]. 
    
    













HomChaudhuri, Foschiano                                       [Page 2] 
 
 
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Table of Contents 
    
   1.   Introduction................................................4 
      1.1 Security Concerns with Sharing a Vlan.....................4 
      1.2 Traditional Solution......................................5 
      1.3 Problems with the Traditional Solution....................5 
   2.   Private Vlans Architecture..................................5 
   3.   Private Vlan Switch Ports and Their Characteristics.........9 
      3.1 Isolated Vlan............................................10 
   4.   Extending Private Vlans across Switches....................11 
   5.   A More Flexible IP Addressing Scheme.......................11 
   6.   Routing Considerations.....................................12 
   Security Considerations.........................................12 
   IANA Considerations.............................................12 
   Deployment Consideration........................................13 
   Changes from the Previous Version...............................13 
   Acknowledgements................................................13 
   Normative References............................................13 
   Informative References..........................................13 
   Authors' Addresses..............................................13 
   IPR Notice......................................................14 
   Full Copyright Notice...........................................14 
    
    

























HomChaudhuri, Foschiano                                       [Page 3] 
 
 
                            Private VLANs                 August 2007 
 
 
1. Introduction 
    
   In an Ethernet network, the data frames can contain a 'vlan ID' 
   field. The IEEE 802.1Q standard [2] specifies that the vlan ID field 
   is 12 bits wide. That allows for a theoretical maximum of 4094 vlans 
   in an Ethernet network (vlan numbers 0 and 4095 are reserved). If 
   the network administrator assigns one vlan per user, then that 
   equates to a maximum of 4094 users that can be supported. The 
   private vlans technology addresses this scalability problem by 
   offering more granular and more flexible Layer 2 segregation, as 
   explained in the following sections. 
    
    
    
1.1 Security Concerns with Sharing a Vlan 
    
   Companies who have Internet presence can either host their servers 
   in their own premises or, alternatively, they can locate their 
   servers at the Internet Service Provider's premises. A typical ISP 
   would have a server farm that offers web hosting functionality for a 
   number of customers. Co-locating the servers in a server farm offers 
   ease of management but at the same time may raise security concerns. 
    
   Let us assume that the ISP puts all the servers in one big vlan. 
   Servers residing in the same vlan can listen to Layer 2 broadcasts 
   from other servers. Once a server learns the MAC address associated 
   to the IP address of another computer in the same vlan, it can 
   establish direct Layer 2 communication with that device without 
   having to go through a Layer 3 gateway/firewall. If for example a 
   hacker gets access to one of the servers, he can use that 
   compromised host to launch an attack on other servers in the server 
   farm. To protect themselves from malicious attacks, ISP customers 
   want their machines to be isolated from other machines in the same 
   server farm. 
    
   The security concerns become even more apparent in metropolitan area 
   networks. Metropolitan Service Providers may want to provide Layer 2 
   Ethernet access to homes, rental communities, businesses, etc. In 
   this scenario, the subscriber next door could very well be a hacker. 
   It is therefore very important to offer Layer 2 traffic isolation 
   among customers. Customer A would not want his Layer 2 frames being 
   broadcast to customer B, who happens to be in the same vlan. Also, 
   customer A would not want customer B to bypass a router or a 
   firewall and establish direct Layer 2 communication with him/her. 
    
    
    
    
    
HomChaudhuri, Foschiano                                       [Page 4] 
 
 
                            Private VLANs                 August 2007 
 
 
1.2 Traditional Solution 
 
   The traditional solution would be to assign a separate vlan to each 
   customer. That way, each user is assured of Layer 2 isolation from 
   devices belonging to other users. 
    
    
    
1.3 Problems with the Traditional Solution 
 
   In the vlan-per-customer model, if an ISP offers web-hosting 
   services to, say, 4000 customers it would consume 4000 vlans. 
   Theoretically, the maximum number of vlans that an 802.1Q-compliant 
   networking device can support is 4094.  In reality, many devices 
   support a much lesser number of active vlans. Even if all devices 
   supported all 4094 vlans, there would still be a scalability problem 
   when the 4095th customer signed up. 
    
   A second problem with assigning a separate vlan per customer is 
   management of IP addresses. Since each vlan requires a separate 
   subnet, there can be potential wastage of IP addresses in each 
   subnet. This issue has been described by RFC3069 [3] and will not be 
   discussed in detail in this document. 
    
    
    
2. Private Vlans Architecture 
 
   The private vlans architecture is similar but more elaborate than 
   the aggregated vlan model proposed in RFC3069. The concepts of 
   'super vlan' and 'sub vlan' used in that RFC are functionally 
   similar to the concepts of 'primary vlan' and 'secondary vlan' used 
   in this document. 
    
   A regular vlan is a single broadcast domain. The private vlan 
   technology partitions a larger vlan broadcast domain into smaller 
   sub-domains. So far two kinds of sub-domains have been defined: an 
   'isolated' sub-domain and a 'community' sub-domain. Each sub-domain 
   is defined by assigning a proper designation to a group of switch 
   ports. 
    
   Within a private vlan domain three separate port designations exist. 
   Each port designation has its own unique set of rules which regulate 
   a connected endpoint's ability to communicate with other connected 
   endpoints within the same private vlan domain.  The three port 
   designations are: promiscuous, isolated, and community. 
    
    
    
HomChaudhuri, Foschiano                                       [Page 5] 
 
 
                            Private VLANs                 August 2007 
 
 
   An endpoint connected to a promiscuous port has the ability to 
   communicate with any endpoint within the private vlan.  Multiple 
   promiscuous ports may be defined within a single private vlan domain.  
   In most networks, Layer 3 default gateways or network management 
   stations are commonly connected to promiscuous ports. 
    
   Isolated ports are typically used for those endpoints that only 
   require access to a limited number of outgoing interfaces on a 
   private-vlan-enabled device.  An endpoint connected to an isolated 
   port will only possess the ability to communicate with those 
   endpoints connected to promiscuous ports.  Endpoints connected to 
   adjacent isolated ports cannot communicate with one another.  For 
   example, within a web hosting environment, isolated ports can be 
   used to connect hosts that require access only to default gateways. 
    
   A private vlan community is a grouping of ports connected to devices 
   belonging to the same entity (for example, an ISP customer or a 
   household).  Within a community, endpoints can communicate with one 
   another and can also communicate with any configured promiscuous 
   port. Endpoints belonging to one community cannot instead 
   communicate with endpoints belonging to a different community or 
   with endpoints connected to isolated ports. 
    
    
   Figure 1 illustrates the private vlan model. 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
HomChaudhuri, Foschiano                                       [Page 6] 
 
 
                            Private VLANs                 August 2007 
 
 
                                     ----------- 
                                     |    R    | 
                                     ----------- 
                                          | 
                                          | 
                                          | 
                 ---------------------------------------- 
                 |                        p1            | 
                 |                     [--Vp--]         | 
            =====| t1                                   | 
                 |                switch                | 
                 |                                      | 
                 |  [--Vi--]                [--Vc--]    | 
                 |i1         i2          c1          c2 | 
                 ---------------------------------------- 
                  |          |           |           | 
                  |          |           |           | 
                  |          |           |           | 
                  A          B           C           D 
    
    
                 Vp - Primary vlan 
                 Vi - Isolated vlan 
                 Vc - Community vlan 
                 A, B - Isolated devices 
                 C, D - Community devices 
                 R - Router (or other L4-L7 device) 
                 i1, i2 - Isolated switch ports 
                 c1, c2 - Community switch ports 
                 p1 - Promiscuous switch port 
                 t1 - Inter-switch link port (a vlan-aware port) 
    
    
    
                 Fig 1. Private vlan classification of switch ports 
                 -------------------------------------------------- 
    
    
   With reference to Figure 1, each of the port types is described 
   below. 
    
   Isolated ports: An isolated port (i1 or i2) cannot talk to any other 
   port in that private vlan domain except for promiscuous ports. If a 
   customer device needs to have access only to a gateway router, then 
   it should be attached to an isolated port. An isolated port is 
   typically an access port, but in certain applications it can also be 
   a hybrid or trunk port (according to Annex D's terminology in [2]). 
    
    
HomChaudhuri, Foschiano                                       [Page 7] 
 
 
                            Private VLANs                 August 2007 
 
 
   Community ports: A community port (c1 or c2) is part of a group of 
   ports. The ports within a community can have Layer 2 communications 
   with one another and can also talk to any promiscuous port. If an 
   ISP customer has, say, 4 devices and wants his/her machines to be 
   isolated from other customers' machines but to be able to 
   communicate among themselves, then community ports should be used. 
    
   Promiscuous ports: As the name suggests, a promiscuous port (p1) can 
   talk to all other types of ports. A promiscuous port can talk to 
   isolated ports as well as community ports and vice versa. Layer 3 
   gateways, DHCP servers and other 'trusted' devices that need to 
   communicate with the customer endpoints are typically connected via 
   a promiscuous port. A promiscuous port can be either an access port 
   or a hybrid/trunk port according to the terminology presented in 
   Annex D of the IEEE 802.1Q spec [2]. 
    
   The table below summarizes the communication privileges between the 
   different private vlan port types. 
    
    
   Table 1. 
    
   --------------------------------------------------------------- 
   |             | isolat-| promis-| commu-| commu-| interswitch | 
   |             | ted    |cuous   | nity1 | nity2 | link port   | 
   --------------------------------------------------------------- 
   | isolated    | deny   | permit | deny  | deny  | permit      | 
   --------------------------------------------------------------- 
   | promiscuous | permit | permit | permit| permit| permit      | 
   --------------------------------------------------------------- 
   | community1  | deny   | permit | permit| deny  | permit      | 
   --------------------------------------------------------------- 
   | community2  | deny   | permit | deny  | permit| permit      | 
   --------------------------------------------------------------- 
   | interswitch |        |        |       |       |             | 
   | link port   | deny(*)|  permit| permit| permit| permit      | 
   --------------------------------------------------------------- 
    
    
   (*) Please note that this asymmetric behavior is for traffic 
   traversing inter-switch link ports over an isolated vlan only. 
   Traffic from an inter-switch link port to an isolated port will be 
   denied if it is in the isolated vlan. Traffic from an inter-switch 
   link port to an isolated port will be permitted if it is in the 
   primary vlan. 
    
   N.B.: An interswitch link port is simply a regular port that 
   connects two switches (and that happens to carry two or more vlans). 
    
HomChaudhuri, Foschiano                                       [Page 8] 
 
 
                            Private VLANs                 August 2007 
 
 
   The concept of sub-domains within a vlan domain cannot be easily 
   implemented with only one vlan ID. However, a mechanism of pairing 
   of vlans can be used to achieve this notion. A sub-domain can be 
   represented by a pair of vlan numbers: 
    
    
             <Vp,Vs>        Vp is the primary vlan 
                            Vs is the secondary vlan 
    
    
                                           ----- 
                                           | Vp| 
                                           ----- 
                                        /          \ 
                                       /            \ 
                                      /              \ 
                                   -----           ----- 
                                   | Vi|           | Vc| 
                                   -----           ----- 
    
    
   Fig 2 A private vlan can be implemented with 2 or more vlan numbers 
   -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    
    
   A private vlan is built with at least one pair of vlans: one (and 
   only one) primary vlan plus one or more secondary vlans. Secondary 
   vlans can be of two types: isolated vlans (Vi) or community vlans 
   (Vc). The specific characteristic of an isolated vlan is that it 
   allows all its ports to have the same degree of segregation that 
   could be obtained from using one separate dedicated vlan per port. 
   Note that a total of only two vlan identifiers are consumed in 
   providing this port isolation characteristic. 
    
   Also please note that this vlan pairing scheme simply requires that 
   all traffic transported within primary and secondary vlans be tagged 
   according to the IEEE 802.1Q standard [2], i.e., with at most a 
   single standard vlan tag (no special double-tagging is necessary due 
   to the 1:1 correspondence between a secondary vlan and its primary). 
    
    
    
3. Private Vlan Switch Ports and Their Characteristics 
 
   The switch ports in a private vlan domain have special 
   characteristics, as described in section 2. One key characteristic 
   is port segregation within an isolated vlan. 
    
    
HomChaudhuri, Foschiano                                       [Page 9] 
 
 
                            Private VLANs                 August 2007 
 
 
3.1 Isolated Vlan 
    
   An isolated vlan is a component of the private vlan architecture. It 
   is one type of secondary vlan. While there can be multiple community 
   vlans in a private vlan domain, only one isolated vlan is sufficient 
   to serve multiple customers. 
    
   In the private vlan architecture, each of the secondary vlans is 
   'bound' or 'associated' to a primary vlan. Only one isolated vlan 
   may be bound to a specific primary vlan to serve any number of 
   customers. 
    
   With reference to Figure 1, a router R connected to the promiscuous 
   port can have Layer 2 communication with a device A connected to the 
   isolated port and also with a device C connected to the community 
   port. Devices C and D can also have Layer 2 communication between 
   themselves, since they are part of the same community vlan. However, 
   devices A and B cannot communicate at Layer 2 due to the special 
   port segregation property of the isolated vlan. Also, devices A and 
   C cannot communicate at Layer 2 since they belong to different 
   secondary vlans. 
    
   The distinctive characteristic of an isolated vlan is that all 
   endpoints connected to its ports are isolated at Layer 2. The impact 
   of this enforced restriction is two-fold. Firstly, service providers 
   can assign multiple customers to the same isolated vlan, thereby 
   conserving vlan IDs. Secondly, customers can be assured that their 
   Layer 2 traffic cannot be sniffed by other customers sharing the 
   same isolated vlan. 
    
   Some switch vendors have attempted to provide this port isolation 
   feature within a vlan, by implementing the logic at the port level. 
   When implemented at the port level, the isolation behavior is 
   restricted to a single switch. When a vlan spans multiple switches, 
   there is no standard mechanism to propagate port-level isolation 
   information to other switches and, consequently, the isolation 
   behavior fails in other switches. In this document, the proposal is 
   to implement the port isolation information at the vlan level. A 
   particular vlan ID can be configured to be the isolated vlan. All 
   switches in the network would give special "isolated vlan" treatment 
   to frames tagged with this particular vlan ID. Thereby, the isolated 
   vlan behavior can be maintained consistently across all switches in 
   a Layer 2 network. 
    
    
    
    
    
    
HomChaudhuri, Foschiano                                      [Page 10] 
 
 
                            Private VLANs                 August 2007 
 
 
4. Extending Private Vlans across Switches 
    
   Isolated, community and primary vlans can span across switches, just 
   like regular vlans. Inter-switch link ports need not be aware of the 
   special vlan type and will carry frames tagged with these vlans just 
   like they do any other frames. 
    
   One of the objectives of the private vlan architecture is to ensure 
   that traffic from an isolated port in one switch does not reach 
   another isolated or community port in a different switch even after 
   traversing an inter-switch link. By embedding the isolation 
   information at the vlan level and by transporting it along with the 
   packet, it is possible to maintain a consistent behavior throughout 
   the network. Therefore, the mechanism discussed in section 2, which 
   will restrict Layer 2 communication between two isolated ports in 
   the same switch, will also restrict Layer 2 communication between 
   two isolated ports in two different switches. 
    
    
    
5. A More Flexible IP Addressing Scheme 
    
   The common practice of deploying multiple vlans in a network for 
   security reasons and of allocating a subnet to each vlan has led to 
   a certain number of inefficiencies in network designs, such as the 
   suboptimal utilization of the IP addressing space (as exemplified  
   in the introduction of RFC3069 [3]). Moreover, each subnet requires 
   a certain number of addresses to be set aside for internetworking 
   purposes (a subnetwork address, a directed broadcast address, 
   default gateway address(es), etc.). A high number of used vlans 
   traditionally translates into a significant number of special 
   addresses to be consumed. 
    
   On the other hand, in a private vlan domain all members can share a 
   common address space which is part of a single subnet associated to 
   the primary vlan. An end device can be assigned an IP address 
   statically or by using a DHCP server connected to a promiscuous port. 
   Since IP addresses are no longer allocated on a smaller subnet basis 
   but are assigned from a larger address pool shared by all members in 
   the private vlan domain, address allocation becomes much more 
   efficient: fewer addresses are consumed for internetworking purposes 
   while most of the address space is allotted to end devices, leaving 
   ample flexibility in the way available addresses are (re-)assigned. 
    
    
    
    
    

HomChaudhuri, Foschiano                                      [Page 11] 
 
 
                            Private VLANs                 August 2007 
 
 
6. Routing Considerations 
    
   The entire private vlan architecture confines secondary vlans within 
   the 2nd layer of the OSI model. With reference to Figure 2, the 
   secondary vlans are internal to a private vlan domain. Layer 3 
   entities are not directly aware of their existence: to them it 
   appears as if all the end devices are part of the primary vlan. 
    
   With reference to Figure 1, the isolation behavior between devices A 
   and B is at the Layer 2 level only. Devices A and B can still 
   communicate at the layer 3 level via the router R. Since A and B are 
   part of the same subnet, the router assumes that they should be able 
   to talk directly to each other. That however is prevented by the 
   isolated vlan's specific behavior. So, in order to enable A and B to 
   communicate via the router, a proxy-ARP-like functionality needs to 
   be supported on the router interface. 
    
    
    
Security Considerations 
    
   In a heterogeneous Layer 2 network that is built with switches from 
   multiple vendors, the private vlans feature should be supported and 
   configured on all the switches. If a switch S in that network does 
   not support this feature, then there may be undesired forwarding of 
   packets including permanent flooding of Layer 2 unicast frames. That 
   is because switch S is not aware of the association between primary 
   and secondary vlans and consequently cannot apply the segregation 
   rules and constraints characteristic of the private vlan 
   architecture (an example of one such constraint is explained in [2] 
   B.1.3). This impact is limited to traffic within the private vlan 
   domain and will not affect the regular Layer 2 forwarding behavior 
   on other vlans. 
    
   If the private vlans feature is properly deployed, it can be used to 
   segregate at Layer 2 individual users or groups of users from each 
   other: this segregation allows a network designer to more 
   effectively constrain Layer 2 forwarding so as to, for instance, 
   block or contain unwanted inter-device communication like port scans 
   or ARP poisoning attacks. 
    
    
    
IANA Considerations 
    
   This document has no actions for IANA. 
    
    
    
HomChaudhuri, Foschiano                                      [Page 12] 
 
 
                            Private VLANs                 August 2007 
 
 
Deployment Consideration 
    
   Cisco Systems has supported the Private Vlans technology in the 
   Cisco Catalyst family of switches since year 2000. 
    
    
    
Changes from the Previous Version 
    
   This version incorporates further edits based on reviewer's 
   feedback, including an expanded section on IP addressing. 
    
    
    
Acknowledgements 
    
   Many people have contributed to the Private Vlans architecture. We 
   would particularly like to thank, in alphabetical order, Senthil 
   Arunachalam, Jason Chen, Tom Edsall, Michael Fine, Herman Hou, 
   Milind Kulkarni, Kannan Kothandaraman, Prasanna Parthasarathy, Heng-
   Hsin Liao, Tom Nosella, Ramesh Santhanakrishnan, Mukundan Sudarsan, 
   Charley Wen and Zhong Xu for their significant contributions. 
    
    
    
Normative References 
    
   [1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement 
      Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 
    
   [2] IEEE Std 802.1Q-2003, IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan 
   Area Networks: Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks 
 
    
Informative References 
    
    [3] RFC 3069, Vlan Aggregation for Efficient IP Address Allocation 
    
    
    
Authors' Addresses 
    
   Marco Foschiano, Cisco Systems, Inc., Via Torri Bianche 7, Vimercate, 
   MI, 20059, Italy, email address: foschia@cisco.com 
    
   Sanjib HomChaudhuri, Cisco Systems, Inc., 170 West Tasman Drive, San 
   Jose, CA, 95134, email address: sanjib@cisco.com 
    
    
HomChaudhuri, Foschiano                                      [Page 13] 
 
 
                            Private VLANs                 August 2007 
 
 
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Full Copyright Notice 
 
   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 
    
   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions 
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors 
   retain all their rights. 
    
   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
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HomChaudhuri, Foschiano                                      [Page 14] 
 
 
                            Private VLANs                 August 2007 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the 
   Internet Society. 
 
 
   This Internet-Draft will expire in August 2007. 
 









































HomChaudhuri, Foschiano                                      [Page 15]