Crypto Forum M. Campagna
Internet-Draft Amazon Web Services
Intended status: Informational A. Maximov
Expires: 15 June 2025 J. Preuß Mattsson
Ericsson
12 December 2024
Galois Counter Mode with Secure Short Tags (GCM-SST)
draft-mattsson-cfrg-aes-gcm-sst-09
Abstract
This document defines the Galois Counter Mode with Secure Short Tags
(GCM-SST) Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)
algorithm. GCM-SST can be used with any keystream generator, not
just 128-bit block ciphers. The main differences from GCM are the
use of an additional subkey Q, the derivation of fresh subkeys H and
for each nonce, and the replacement of the GHASH function with the
POLYVAL function from AES-GCM-SIV. This enables truncated tags with
near-ideal forgery probabilities, even against multiple forgery
attacks, which are significant security improvements over GCM. GCM-
SST is designed for unicast security protocols with replay protection
and addresses the strong industry demand for fast encryption with
less overhead and secure short tags. This document registers several
instances of GCM-SST using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and
Rijndael-256-256.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at
https://emanjon.github.io/draft-mattsson-cfrg-aes-gcm-sst/draft-
mattsson-cfrg-aes-gcm-sst.html. Status information for this document
may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mattsson-cfrg-
aes-gcm-sst/.
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Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Galois Counter Mode with Secure Short Tags (GCM-SST) . . . . 6
3.1. Authenticated Encryption Function . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Authenticated Decryption Function . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Encoding (ct, tag) Tuples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. AES and Rijndael-256-256 in GCM-SST . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. AES-GCM-SST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2. Rijndael-GCM-SST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. AEAD Instances and Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. AES-GCM-SST Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.1. AES-GCM-SST Test #1 (128-bit key) . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Case #1a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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Case #1b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Case #1c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Case #1d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Case #1e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.2. AES-GCM-SST Test #2 (128-bit key) . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
A.3. AES-GCM-SST Test #3 (256-bit key) . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Case #3a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Case #3b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Case #3c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Case #3d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Case #3e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.4. AES-GCM-SST Test #4 (256-bit key) . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1. Introduction
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Galois Counter Mode (AES-GCM)
[GCM] is a widely used AEAD algorithm [RFC5116] due to its attractive
performance in both software and hardware as well as its provable
security. During the NIST standardization, Ferguson pointed out two
weaknesses in the GCM authentication function [Ferguson],
particularly problematic when short tags are used. The first
weakness significantly increases the probability of successful
forgery. The second weakness reveals the subkey H if an attacker
succeeds in creating forgeries. Once H is known, the attacker can
consistently forge subsequent messages, drastically increasing the
probability of multiple successful forgeries.
In a comment to NIST, Nyberg et al. [Nyberg] explained how small
changes based on proven theoretical constructions mitigate these
weaknesses. Unfortunately, NIST did not follow the advice from
Nyberg et al. and instead specified additional requirements for use
with short tags in Appendix C of [GCM]. NIST did not give any
motivations for the parameter choices or the assumed security levels.
Mattsson et al. [Mattsson] later demonstrated that attackers can
almost always obtain feedback on the success or failure of forgery
attempts, contradicting the assumptions NIST made for short tags.
Furthermore, NIST appears to have relied on non-optimal attacks when
calculating the parameters. Rogaway [Rogaway] criticizes the use of
GCM with short tags and recommends prohibiting tags shorter than 96
bits. Reflecting the critique, NIST is planning to remove support
for GCM with tags shorter than 96 bits [Revise]. While Counter with
CBC-MAC (CCM) [RFC5116] with short tags has forgery probabilities
close to ideal, its performance is lower than that of GCM.
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Short tags are widely used, 32-bit tags are standard in most radio
link layers including 5G [Sec5G], 64-bit tags are very common in
transport and application layers of the Internet of Things, and 32-,
64-, and 80-bit tags are common in media-encryption applications.
Audio packets are small, numerous, and ephemeral. As such, they are
highly sensitive to cryptographic overhead, but forgery of individual
packets is not a big concern as it typically is barely noticeable as
each packet often only encodes 20 ms of audio. Due to its
weaknesses, GCM is typically not used with short tags. The result is
either decreased performance from larger than needed tags [MoQ], or
decreased performance from using much slower constructions such as
AES-CTR combined with HMAC [RFC3711][RFC9605]. Short tags are also
useful to protect packets whose payloads are secured at higher
layers, protocols where the security is given by the sum of the tag
lengths, and in constrained radio networks, where the low bandwidth
preclude many repeated trial. For all applications of short tags it
is essential that the MAC behaves like an ideal MAC, i.e., the
forgery probability is ≈ 2^(-tag_length) even after many generated
MACs, many forgery attempts, and after a successful forgery. Users
and implementors of cryptography expect that MACs behaves like an
ideal MACs. For a comprehensive discussion on the use cases and
requirements of short tags, see [Comments38B].
This document defines the Galois Counter Mode with Secure Short Tags
(GCM-SST) Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)
algorithm following the recommendations from Nyberg et al. [Nyberg].
GCM-SST is defined with a general interface, allowing it to be used
with any keystream generator, not just 128-bit block ciphers. The
main differences from GCM [GCM] are the introduction of an additional
subkey Q, the derivation of fresh subkeys H and for each nonce, and
the replacement of the GHASH function with the POLYVAL function from
AES-GCM-SIV [RFC8452], see Section 3. These changes enable truncated
tags with near-ideal forgery probabilities, even against multiple
forgery attacks, see Section 5. GCM-SST is designed for use in
unicast security protocols with replay protection, where its
authentication tag behaves like an ideal MAC. Its performance is
similar to GCM [GCM], with the two additional AES invocations
compensated by the use of POLYVAL, the â€little-endian version†of
GHASH, which is faster on little-endian architectures. GCM-SST
retains the additive encryption characteristic of GCM, which enables
efficient implementations on modern processor architectures, see
[Gueron] and Section 2.4 of [GCM-Update].
This document also registers several GCM-SST instances using Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) [AES] and Rijndael with 256-bit keys and
blocks (Rijndael-256-256) [Rijndael] in counter mode as keystream
generators and with tag lengths of 32, 64, 96, and 112 bits, see
Section 4. The authentication tags in all registered GCM-SST
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instances behave like ideal MACs, which is not the case at all for
GCM [GCM]. 3GPP has standardized the use of Rijndael-256-256 for
authentication and key generation in 3GPP TS 35.234–35.237 [WID23].
NIST is anticipated to standardize Rijndael-256-256 [Options],
although there may be revisions to the key schedule.
GCM-SST was originally developed by ETSI SAGE, under the name Mac5G,
following a request from 3GPP, with several years of discussion and
refinement contributing to its design [SAGE23][SAGE24]. Mac5G is
constructed similarly to the integrity algorithms used for SNOW 3G
[UIA2] and ZUC [EIA3]. 3GPP has decided to standardize GCM-SST for
use with AES-256 [AES], SNOW 5G [SNOW], and ZUC-256 [ZUC] in 3GPP TS
35.240–35.248 [WID24].
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
The following notation is used in the document:
* K is the key as defined in [RFC5116]
* N is the nonce as defined in [RFC5116]
* A is the associated data as defined in [RFC5116]
* P is the plaintext as defined in [RFC5116]
* Z is the keystream
* ct is the ciphertext
* tag is the authentication tag
* = is the assignment operator
* != is the inequality operator
* x || y is concatenation of the octet strings x and y
* XOR is the bitwise exclusive OR operator
* len(x) is the length of x in bits.
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* zeropad(x) right pads an octet string x with zeroes to a multiple
of 128 bits
* truncate(x, t) is the truncation operation. The first t bits of x
are kept
* n is the number of 128-bit chunks in zeropad(P)
* m is the number of 128-bit chunks in zeropad(A)
* POLYVAL is defined in [RFC8452]
* BE32(x) is the big-endian encoding of 32-bit integer x
* LE64(x) is the little-endian encoding of 64-bit integer x
* V[y] is the 128-bit chunk with index y in the array V; the first
chunk has index 0.
* V[x:y] are the range of chunks x to y in the array V
3. Galois Counter Mode with Secure Short Tags (GCM-SST)
This section defines the Galois Counter Mode with Secure Short Tags
(GCM-SST) AEAD algorithm following the recommendations from Nyberg et
al. [Nyberg]. GCM-SST is defined with a general interface so that
it can be used with any keystream generator, not just a 128-bit block
cipher.
GCM-SST adheres to an AEAD interface [RFC5116] and the encryption
function takes four variable-length octet string parameters. A
secret key K, a nonce N, the associated data A, and a plaintext P.
The keystream generator is instantiated with K and N. The keystream
MAY depend on P and A. The minimum and maximum lengths of all
parameters depend on the keystream generator. The keystream
generator produces a keystream Z consisting of 128-bit chunks where
the first three chunks Z[0], Z[1], and Z[2] are used as the three
subkeys H, Q, and M. The following keystream chunks Z[3], Z[4], ...,
Z[n + 2] are used to encrypt the plaintext. Instead of GHASH [GCM],
GCM-SST makes use of the POLYVAL function from AES-GCM-SIV [RFC8452],
which results in more efficient software implementations on little-
endian architectures. GHASH and POLYVAL can be defined in terms of
one another [RFC8452]. The subkeys H and are field elements used in
POLYVAL while the subkey M is used for the final masking of the tag.
Both encryption and decryption are only defined on inputs that are a
whole number of octets. Figures illustrating the GCM-SST encryption
and decryption functions can be found in [SST1], [SST2], and [Inoue].
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For every computational procedure that is specified in this document,
a conforming implementation may replace the given set of steps with
any mathematically equivalent set of steps. In other words,
different procedures that produce the correct output for every input
are permitted.
3.1. Authenticated Encryption Function
The encryption function Encrypt(K, N, A, P) encrypts a plaintext and
returns the ciphertext along with an authentication tag that verifies
the authenticity of the plaintext and associated data, if provided.
Prerequisites and security:
* The key MUST be randomly chosen from a uniform distribution.
* For a given key, a nonce MUST NOT be reused under any
circumstances.
* Each key MUST be restricted to a single tag_length.
* Definitions of supported input-output lengths.
Inputs:
* Key K (variable-length octet string)
* Nonce N (variable-length octet string)
* Associated data A (variable-length octet string)
* Plaintext P (variable-length octet string)
Outputs:
* Ciphertext ct (variable-length octet string)
* Tag tag (octet string with length tag_length)
Steps:
1. If the lengths of K, N, A, P are not supported return error and
abort
2. Initiate keystream generator with K and N
3. Let H = Z[0], = Z[1], M = Z[2]
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4. Let ct = P XOR truncate(Z[3:n + 2], len(P))
5. Let S = zeropad(A) || zeropad(ct)
6. Let L = LE64(len(ct)) || LE64(len(A))
7. Let X = POLYVAL(H, S[0], S[1], ...)
8. Let full_tag = POLYVAL(Q, X XOR L) XOR M
9. Let tag = truncate(full_tag, tag_length)
10. Return (ct, tag)
3.2. Authenticated Decryption Function
The decryption function Decrypt(K, N, A, ct, tag) decrypts a
ciphertext, verifies that the authentication tag is correct, and
returns the plaintext on success or an error if the tag verification
failed.
Prerequisites and security:
* The calculation of the plaintext P (step 10) MAY be done in
parallel with the tag verification (step 3-9). If the tag
verification fails, the plaintext P and the expected_tag MUST NOT
be given as output.
* Each key MUST be restricted to a single tag_length.
* Definitions of supported input-output lengths.
Inputs:
* Key K (variable-length octet string)
* Nonce N (variable-length octet string)
* Associated data A (variable-length octet string)
* Ciphertext ct (variable-length octet string)
* Tag tag (octet string with length tag_length)
Outputs:
* Plaintext P (variable-length octet string) or an error indicating
that the authentication tag is invalid for the given inputs.
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Steps:
1. If the lengths of K, N, A, or ct are not supported, or if
len(tag) != tag_length return error and abort
2. Initiate keystream generator with K and N
3. Let H = Z[0], = Z[1], M = Z[2]
4. Let S = zeropad(A) || zeropad(ct)
5. Let L = LE64(len(ct)) || LE64(len(A))
6. Let X = POLYVAL(H, S[0], S[1], ...)
7. Let full_tag = POLYVAL(Q, X XOR L) XOR M
8. Let expected_tag = truncate(full_tag, tag_length)
9. If tag != expected_tag, return error and abort
10. Let P = ct XOR truncate(Z[3:n + 2], len(ct))
11. If N passes replay protrection, return P
The comparison of tag and expected_tag in step 9 MUST be performed in
constant time to prevent any information leakage about the position
of the first mismatched byte. For a given key, a plaintext MUST NOT
be returned unless it is certain that a plaintext has not been
returned for the same nonce. Replay protection can be performed
either before step 1 or during step 11.
3.3. Encoding (ct, tag) Tuples
Applications MAY keep the ciphertext and the authentication tag in
distinct structures or encode both as a single octet string C. In
the latter case, the tag MUST immediately follow the ciphertext ct:
C = ct || tag
4. AES and Rijndael-256-256 in GCM-SST
This section defines Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Rijndael
with 256-bit keys and blocks (Rijndael-256-256) [Rijndael] in Galois
Counter Mode with Secure Short Tags.
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4.1. AES-GCM-SST
When GCM-SSM is instantiated with AES (AES-GCM-SST), the keystream
generator is AES in counter mode
Z[i] = ENC(K, N || BE32(i))
where ENC is the AES Cipher function [AES]. Big-endian counters
align with existing implementations of counter mode.
4.2. Rijndael-GCM-SST
When GCM-SST is instantiated with Rijndael-256-256 (Rijndael-GCM-
SST), the keystream generator is Rijndael-256-256 in counter mode
Z[2i] = ENC(K, N || BE32(i))[0]
Z[2i+1] = ENC(K, N || BE32(i))[1]
where ENC is the Rijndael-256-256 Cipher function [Rijndael].
4.3. AEAD Instances and Constraints
We define twelve AEAD instances, in the format of [RFC5116], that use
AES-GCM-SST and Rijndael-GCM-SST with tag lengths of 32, 64, 96, and
112 bits. The key length and tag length are related to different
security properties, and an application encrypting audio packets with
small tags might require 256-bit confidentiality.
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+==========================+=========+===============+============+
| Name | K_LEN | P_MAX = A_MAX | tag_length |
| | (bytes) | (bytes) | (bits) |
+==========================+=========+===============+============+
| AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SST_4 | 16 | 2^36 - 48 | 32 |
+--------------------------+---------+---------------+------------+
| AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SST_8 | 16 | 2^36 - 48 | 64 |
+--------------------------+---------+---------------+------------+
| AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SST_12 | 16 | 2^35 | 96 |
+--------------------------+---------+---------------+------------+
| AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SST_14 | 16 | 2^19 | 112 |
+--------------------------+---------+---------------+------------+
| AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SST_4 | 32 | 2^36 - 48 | 32 |
+--------------------------+---------+---------------+------------+
| AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SST_8 | 32 | 2^36 - 48 | 64 |
+--------------------------+---------+---------------+------------+
| AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SST_12 | 32 | 2^35 | 96 |
+--------------------------+---------+---------------+------------+
| AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SST_14 | 32 | 2^19 | 112 |
+--------------------------+---------+---------------+------------+
| AEAD_RIJNDAEL_GCM_SST_4 | 32 | 2^36 - 48 | 32 |
+--------------------------+---------+---------------+------------+
| AEAD_RIJNDAEL_GCM_SST_8 | 32 | 2^36 - 48 | 64 |
+--------------------------+---------+---------------+------------+
| AEAD_RIJNDAEL_GCM_SST_12 | 32 | 2^35 | 96 |
+--------------------------+---------+---------------+------------+
| AEAD_RIJNDAEL_GCM_SST_14 | 32 | 2^19 | 112 |
+--------------------------+---------+---------------+------------+
Table 1: AEAD Algorithms
Common parameters for the six AEAD instances:
* N_MIN = N_MAX (minimum and maximum size of the nonce) is 12 octets
for AES, while for Rijndael-256-256, it is 28 bytes.
* C_MAX (maximum size of the ciphertext and tag) is P_MAX +
tag_length (in bytes)
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The maximum size of the plaintext (P_MAX) and the maximum size of the
associated data (A_MAX) have been lowered from GCM [RFC5116]. To
enable forgery probability close to ideal, even with maximum size
plaintexts and associated data, we set P_MAX = A_MAX = min(2^(131 -
tag_length), 2^36 - 48). Just like [RFC5116], AES-GCM-SST and
Rijndael-GCM-SST only allow a fixed nonce length (N_MIN = N_MAX) of
96-bit and 224-bits respectively. For the AEAD algorithms in Table 1
the worst-case forgery probability is bounded by ≈ 2^(-tag_length)
[Nyberg]. This is true for all allowed plaintext and associated data
lengths. For a given key, the total number of invocations of the
authenticated encryption function shall not exceed 2^32.
5. Security Considerations
GCM-SST introduces an additional subkey Q, alongside the subkey H.
The inclusion of enables truncated tags with forgery probabilities
close to ideal. Both and H are derived for each nonce, which
significantly decreases the probability of multiple successful
forgeries. These changes are based on proven theoretical
constructions and follows the recommendations in [Nyberg]. Inoue et
al. [Inoue] prove that GCM-SST is a provably secure authenticated
encryption mode, with security guaranteed for evaluations under fresh
nonces, even if some earlier nonces have been reused.
GCM-SST is designed for use in unicast security protocols with replay
protection. Every key MUST be randomly chosen from a uniform
distribution. GCM-SST MUST be used in a nonce-respecting setting:
for a given key, a nonce MUST only be used once in the encryption
function and only once in a successful decryption function call. The
nonce MAY be public or predictable. It can be a counter, the output
of a permutation, or a generator with a long period. GCM-SST MUST
NOT be used with random nonces [Collision] and MUST be used with
replay protection. Reuse of nonces in successful encryption and
decryption function calls enable universal forgery [Lindell][Inoue].
For a given tag length, GCM-SST has stricly better security
properties than GCM. GCM allows universal forgery with lower
complexity than GCM-SST, even when nonces are not reused.
Implementations MAY add randomness to the nonce by XORing a unique
number like a sequence number with a per-key random secret salt.
This improves security against pre-computation attacks and multi-key
attacks [Bellare]. By increasing the nonce length from 96 bits to
224 bits, Rijndael-256-256-GCM-SST can offer significantly greater
security against pre-computation and multi-key attacks compared to
AES-256-GCM-SST. GCM-SST SHOULD NOT be used in multicast or
broadcast scenarios. While GCM-SST offers better security properties
than GCM for a given tag length in such contexts, it does not behave
like an ideal MAC.
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The GCM-SST tag_length SHOULD NOT be smaller than 4 bytes and cannot
be larger than 16 bytes. When tag_length < 128 - log2(n + m + 1)
bits, the worst-case forgery probability is bounded by ≈
2^(-tag_length) [Nyberg]. The tags in the AEAD algorithm listed in
Section 4.3 therefore have an almost perfect security level. This is
significantly better than GCM where the security level is only
tag_length - log2(n + m + 1) bits [GCM]. Note that n and m in this
context represent the maximum values allowed by the decryption
function. For a graph of the forgery probability, refer to Fig. 3 in
[Inoue]. As one can note, for 128-bit tags and long messages, the
forgery probability is not close to ideal and similar to GCM [GCM].
If tag verification fails, the plaintext and expected_tag MUST NOT be
given as output. In GCM-SST, the full_tag is independent of the
specified tag length unless the application explicitly incorporates
tag length into the keystream or the nonce.
When tag_length < 128 - log2(n + m + 1) bits, the expected number of
forgeries is ≈ q' ⋅ 2^(-tag_length), where q' is the number of
decryption queries, which is ideal. This far outperforms GCM, where
the expected number of forgeries is ≈ q'^2 ⋅ (n + m + 1) ⋅
2^(-tag_length) [Multiple]. BSI states that an ideal MAC with a
96-bit tag length is considered acceptable for most applications
[BSI], a requirement that GCM-SST with 96- and 112-bit tags
satisfies. Achieving a comparable level of security with GCM, CCM,
or Poly1305 is nearly impossible.
The confidentiality offered by AES-GCM-SST against passive attackers
is equal to AES-GCM [GCM] and given by the birthday bound.
Regardless of key length, an attacker can mount a distinguishing
attack with a complexity of approximately 2^129 / k, where k is the
number of invocations of the AES encryption function. In contrast,
the confidentiality offered by Rijndael-256-256-GCM-SST against
passive attackers is significantly higher. The complexity of
distinguishing attacks for Rijndael-256-256-GCM-SST is approximately
2^257 / k, where k is the number of invocations of the Rijndael-
256-256 encryption function. While Rijndael-256-256 in counter mode
can provide strong confidentiality for plaintexts much larger than
2^36 octets, GHASH and POLYVAL do not offer adequate integrity for
long plaintexts. To ensure robust integrity for long plaintexts, an
AEAD mode would need to replace POLYVAL with a MAC that has better
security properties, such as a Carter-Wegman MAC in a larger field
[Degabriele] or other alternatives such as [SMAC].
The confidentiality offered by AES-GCM-SST against active attackers
is directly linked to the forgery probability. Depending on the
protocol and application, forgeries MAY significantly compromise
privacy, in addition to affecting integrity and authenticity. It
MUST be assumed that attackers always receive feedback on the success
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or failure of their forgery attempts. Therefore, attacks on
integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality MUST all be carefully
evaluated when selecting an appropriate tag length.
In general, there is a very small possibility in GCM-SST that either
or both of the subkeys H and are zero, so called weak keys. If H is
zero, the authentication tag depends only on the length of P and A
and not on their content. If is zero, the authentication tag does
not depend on P and A. There are no obvious ways to detect this
condition for an attacker, and the specification admits this
possibility in favor of complicating the flow with additional checks
and regeneration of values. In AES-GCM-SST, H and are generated with
a permutation on different input, so H and cannot both be zero.
The details of the replay protection mechanism is determined by the
security protocol utilizing GCM-SST. If the nonce includes a
sequence number, it can be used for replay protection.
Alternatively, a separate sequence number can be used, provided there
is a one-to-one mapping between sequence numbers and nonces. The
choice of a replay protection mechanism depends on factors such as
the expected degree of packet reordering, as well as protocol and
implementation details. For examples of replay protection
mechanisms, see [RFC4303] and [RFC6479].
A comparision with GCM and Poly1305 in unicast security protocols
with replay protection is presented in Table 2, where q' represents
the number of decryption queries, and â„“ is the maximum length of
plaintext and associated data in 128-bit chunks, see
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits][Multiple]. Additionally, Table 3
provides a comparison with GCM and Poly1305 in the context of
protocols like QUIC [RFC9000][RFC9001], where the size of plaintext
and associated data is less than ≈ 2^16 bytes, i.e. ℓ ≈ 2^12. When ℓ
≈ 2^12, AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SST_14 offers better confidentiality and
integrity compared to AEAD_AES_128_GCM [RFC5116], while also reducing
overhead by 2 bytes. Both algorithms provide similar security
against passive attackers; however, AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SST_14
significantly enhances security against active attackers by reducing
the expected number of successful forgeries. Similarly,
AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SST_12 offers superior integrity compared to
AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 [RFC7253], with a 4-byte reduction in
overhead. For GCM-SST and Poly1305, the expected number of forgeries
are linear in q' when replay protection is employed. For GCM, replay
protection does not help, and the expected number of forgeries grows
quadratically with q.
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+============+====================+=============+==================+
| Name | Forgery | Forgery | Expected number |
| | probability before | probability | of forgeries |
| | first forgery | after first | |
| | | forgery | |
+============+====================+=============+==================+
| GCM_16 | â„“ / 2^127 | 1 | q'^2 â‹… â„“ / 2^128 |
+------------+--------------------+-------------+------------------+
| POLY1305 | â„“ / 2^103 | â„“ / 2^103 | q' â‹… â„“ / 2^103 |
+------------+--------------------+-------------+------------------+
| GCM_SST_14 | 1 / 2^112 | 1 / 2^112 | q' / 2^112 |
+------------+--------------------+-------------+------------------+
| GCM_SST_12 | 1 / 2^96 | 1 / 2^96 | q' / 2^96 |
+------------+--------------------+-------------+------------------+
Table 2: Comparision with GCM and Poly1305. q' is the number of
decryption queries, and â„“ is the maximum length of plaintext and
associated data, measured in 128-bit chunks.
+============+====================+=============+==============+
| Name | Forgery | Forgery | Expected |
| | probability before | probability | number of |
| | first forgery | after first | forgeries |
| | | forgery | |
+============+====================+=============+==============+
| GCM_16 | 1 / 2^115 | 1 | q'^2 / 2^116 |
+------------+--------------------+-------------+--------------+
| POLY1305 | 1 / 2^91 | 1 / 2^91 | q' / 2^91 |
+------------+--------------------+-------------+--------------+
| GCM_SST_14 | 1 / 2^112 | 1 / 2^112 | q' / 2^112 |
+------------+--------------------+-------------+--------------+
| GCM_SST_12 | 1 / 2^96 | 1 / 2^96 | q' / 2^96 |
+------------+--------------------+-------------+--------------+
Table 3: Comparision with GCM and Poly1305 in a protocol
like QUIC, where the maximum packet size 65536 bytes.
6. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to assign the entries in the first column of
Table 1 to the "AEAD Algorithms" registry under the "Authenticated
Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) Parameters" heading with this
document as reference.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
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[AES] "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", NIST Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 197, May
2023, <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.197-upd1.pdf>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5116>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8452] Gueron, S., Langley, A., and Y. Lindell, "AES-GCM-SIV:
Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption",
RFC 8452, DOI 10.17487/RFC8452, April 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8452>.
[Rijndael] Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, "AES Proposal: Rijndael",
September 2003,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-
standards-and-guidelines/documents/aes-development/
rijndael-ammended.pdf>.
7.2. Informative References
[Bellare] Bellare, M. and B. Tackmann, "The Multi-User Security of
Authenticated Encryption: AES-GCM in TLS 1.3", November
2017, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/564.pdf>.
[BSI] "Cryptographic Mechanisms Recommendations and Key
Lengths", BSI Technical Guideline TR-02102-1, February
2024, <https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI
/Publications/TechGuidelines/TG02102/BSI-TR-02102-1.html>.
[Collision]
Preuß Mattsson, J., "Collision Attacks on Galois/Counter
Mode (GCM)", September 2024,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/236>.
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[Comments38B]
NIST, "Public Comments on SP 800-38B", September 2024,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/crypto-
publication-review-project/documents/initial-comments/
sp800-38b-initial-public-comments-2024.pdf>.
[Degabriele]
Degabriele, J., Gilcher, J., Govinden, J., and K.
Paterson, "Universal Hash Designs for an Accordion Mode",
June 2024,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Presentations/2024/
universal-hash-designs-for-an-accordion-mode/images-media/
sess-7-degabriele-acm-workshop-2024.pdf>.
[EIA3] ETSI SAGE, "128-EEA3 and 128-EIA3 Specification", January
2019, <https://www.gsma.com/solutions-and-
impact/technologies/security/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/
EEA3_EIA3_specification_v1_8.pdf>.
[Ferguson] Ferguson, N., "Authentication weaknesses in GCM", May
2005, <https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Block-
Cipher-Techniques/documents/BCM/Comments/CWC-GCM/
Ferguson2.pdf>.
[GCM] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC",
NIST Special Publication 800-38D, November 2007,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/
nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf>.
[GCM-Update]
McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "GCM Update", May 2005,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/block-cipher-
techniques/documents/bcm/comments/cwc-gcm/gcm-update.pdf>.
[Gueron] Gueron, S., "Constructions based on the AES Round and
Polynomial Multiplication that are Efficient on Modern
Processor Architectures", October 2023,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Presentations/2023/
constructions-based-on-the-aes-round/images-media/sess-5-
gueron-bcm-workshop-2023.pdf>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits]
Günther, F., Thomson, M., and C. A. Wood, "Usage Limits on
AEAD Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
irtf-cfrg-aead-limits-09, 9 October 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-
aead-limits-09>.
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[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aegis-aead]
Denis, F. and S. Lucas, "The AEGIS Family of Authenticated
Encryption Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-irtf-cfrg-aegis-aead-13, 14 October 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-
aegis-aead-13>.
[Inoue] Akiko Inoue, Ashwin Jha, Bart Mennink, and Kazuhiko
Minematsu, "Generic Security of GCM-SST", November 2024,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1928.pdf>.
[Lindell] Lindell, Y., "Comment on AES-GCM-SST", May 2024,
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/
cfrg/?gbt=1&index=cWpv0QgX2ltkWhtd3R9pEW7E1CA>.
[Mattsson] Mattsson, J. and M. Westerlund, "Authentication Key
Recovery on Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)", May 2015,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/477.pdf>.
[MoQ] IETF, "Media Over QUIC", September 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/moq/about/>.
[Multiple] David McGrew and Scott Fluhrer, "Multiple Forgery Attacks
Against Message Authentication Codes", November 2024,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/block-cipher-
techniques/documents/bcm/comments/cwc-gcm/multi-forge-
01.pdf>.
[Nyberg] Nyberg, K., Gilbert, H., and M. Robshaw, "Galois MAC with
forgery probability close to ideal", June 2005,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Block-Cipher-
Techniques/documents/BCM/Comments/general-comments/papers/
Nyberg_Gilbert_and_Robshaw.pdf>.
[Options] NIST, "NIST Options in for Encryption Algorithms and Modes
of Operation", June 2024,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Presentations/2024/
options-for-encryption-algorithms-and-modes/images-media/
sess-3-regenscheid-acm-workshop-2024.pdf>.
[Revise] NIST, "Announcement of Proposal to Revise SP 800-38D",
August 2023, <https://csrc.nist.gov/news/2023/proposal-to-
revise-sp-800-38d>.
[RFC3711] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
RFC 3711, DOI 10.17487/RFC3711, March 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3711>.
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[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4303>.
[RFC6479] Zhang, X. and T. Tsou, "IPsec Anti-Replay Algorithm
without Bit Shifting", RFC 6479, DOI 10.17487/RFC6479,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6479>.
[RFC7253] Krovetz, T. and P. Rogaway, "The OCB Authenticated-
Encryption Algorithm", RFC 7253, DOI 10.17487/RFC7253, May
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7253>.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000>.
[RFC9001] Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using TLS to Secure
QUIC", RFC 9001, DOI 10.17487/RFC9001, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9001>.
[RFC9605] Omara, E., Uberti, J., Murillo, S. G., Barnes, R., Ed.,
and Y. Fablet, "Secure Frame (SFrame): Lightweight
Authenticated Encryption for Real-Time Media", RFC 9605,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9605, August 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9605>.
[Rogaway] Rogaway, P., "Evaluation of Some Blockcipher Modes of
Operation", February 2011,
<https://www.cryptrec.go.jp/exreport/cryptrec-ex-
2012-2010r1.pdf>.
[SAGE23] ETSI SAGE, "Specification of the 256-bit air interface
algorithms", February 2023,
<https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/TSG_SA/WG3_Security/
TSGS3_110_Athens/docs/S3-230642.zip>.
[SAGE24] ETSI SAGE, "Version 2.0 of 256-bit Confidentiality and
Integrity Algorithms for the Air Interface", August 2024,
<https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/WG3_Security/
TSGS3_117_Maastricht/docs/S3-243394.zip>.
[Sec5G] 3GPP TS 33 501, "Security architecture and procedures for
5G System", September 2024,
<https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/
SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=3169>.
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[SMAC] Wang, D., Maximov, A., Ekdahl, P., and T. Johansson, "A
new stand-alone MAC construct called SMAC", June 2024,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/819>.
[SNOW] Ekdahl, P., Johansson, T., Maximov, A., and J. Yang,
"SNOW-Vi: an extreme performance variant of SNOW-V for
lower grade CPUs", March 2021,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/236>.
[SST1] Campagna, M., Maximov, A., and J. Preuß Mattsson, "Galois
Counter Mode with Secure Short Tags (GCM-SST)", October
2023, <https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Events/2023/third-
workshop-on-block-cipher-modes-of-operation/documents/
accepted-papers/Galois%20Counter%20Mode%20with%20Secure%20
Short%20Tags.pdf>.
[SST2] Campagna, M., Maximov, A., and J. Preuß Mattsson, "Galois
Counter Mode with Secure Short Tags (GCM-SST)", October
2023,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Presentations/2023/
galois-counter-mode-with-secure-short-tags/images-media/
sess-5-mattsson-bcm-workshop-2023.pdf>.
[UIA2] ETSI SAGE, "UEA2 and UIA2 Specification", March 2009,
<https://www.gsma.com/solutions-and-
impact/technologies/security/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/
uea2uia2d1v21.pdf>.
[WID23] 3GPP, "New WID on Milenage-256 algorithm", November 2023,
<https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/WG3_Security/
TSGS3_113_Chicago/Docs/S3-235072.zip>.
[WID24] 3GPP, "New WID on Addition of 256-bit security
Algorithms", March 2024,
<https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/TSG_SA/
TSGS_103_Maastricht_2024-03/Docs/SP-240476.zip>.
[ZUC] ZUC Design Team, "An Addendum to the ZUC-256 Stream
Cipher", September 2024,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1439>.
Appendix A. AES-GCM-SST Test Vectors
A.1. AES-GCM-SST Test #1 (128-bit key)
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KEY = { 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f }
NONCE = { 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3a 3b }
H = { 22 ce 92 da cb 50 77 4b ab 0d 18 29 3d 6e ae 7f }
Q = { 03 13 63 96 74 be fa 86 4d fa fb 80 36 b7 a0 3c }
M = { 9b 1d 49 ea 42 b0 0a ec b0 bc eb 8d d0 ef c2 b9 }
Case #1a
AAD = { }
PLAINTEXT = { }
encode-LEN = { 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 }
full-TAG = { 9b 1d 49 ea 42 b0 0a ec b0 bc eb 8d d0 ef c2 b9 }
TAG = { 9b 1d 49 ea }
CIPHERTEXT = { }
Case #1b
AAD = { 40 41 42 43 44 }
PLAINTEXT = { }
encode-LEN = { 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 }
full-TAG = { 7f f3 cb a4 d5 f3 08 a5 70 4e 2f d5 f2 3a e8 f9 }
TAG = { 7f f3 cb a4 }
CIPHERTEXT = { }
Case #1c
AAD = { }
PLAINTEXT = { 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b }
encode-LEN = { 60 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 }
full-TAG = { f8 de 17 85 fd 1a 90 d9 81 8f cb 7b 44 69 8a 8b }
TAG = { f8 de 17 85 }
CIPHERTEXT = { 64 f0 5b ae 1e d2 40 3a 71 25 5e dd }
Case #1d
AAD = { 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f }
PLAINTEXT = { 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 7a 7b 7c 7d 7e }
encode-LEN = { f8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 }
full-TAG = { 93 43 56 14 0b 84 48 2c d0 14 c7 40 7e e9 cc b6 }
TAG = { 93 43 56 14 }
CIPHERTEXT = { 64 f0 5b ae 1e d2 40 3a 71 25 5e dd 53 49 5c e1
7d c0 cb c7 85 a7 a9 20 db 42 28 ff 63 32 10 }
Case #1e
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AAD = { 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e }
PLAINTEXT = { 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f
70 }
encode-LEN = { 88 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 78 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 }
full-TAG = { f8 50 b7 97 11 43 ab e9 31 5a d7 eb 3b 0a 16 81 }
TAG = { f8 50 b7 97 }
CIPHERTEXT = { 64 f0 5b ae 1e d2 40 3a 71 25 5e dd 53 49 5c e1
7d }
A.2. AES-GCM-SST Test #2 (128-bit key)
KEY = { 29 23 be 84 e1 6c d6 ae 52 90 49 f1 f1 bb e9 eb }
NONCE = { 9a 50 ee 40 78 36 fd 12 49 32 f6 9e }
AAD = { 1f 03 5a 7d 09 38 25 1f 5d d4 cb fc 96 f5 45 3b
13 0d }
PLAINTEXT = { ad 4f 14 f2 44 40 66 d0 6b c4 30 b7 32 3b a1 22
f6 22 91 9d }
H = { 2d 6d 7f 1c 52 a7 a0 6b f2 bc bd 23 75 47 03 88 }
Q = { 3b fd 00 96 25 84 2a 86 65 71 a4 66 e5 62 05 92 }
M = { 9e 6c 98 3e e0 6c 1a ab c8 99 b7 8d 57 32 0a f5 }
encode-LEN = { a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 }
full-TAG = { 45 03 bf b0 96 82 39 b3 67 e9 70 c3 83 c5 10 6f }
TAG = { 45 03 bf b0 96 82 39 b3 }
CIPHERTEXT = { b8 65 d5 16 07 83 11 73 21 f5 6c b0 75 45 16 b3
da 9d b8 09 }
A.3. AES-GCM-SST Test #3 (256-bit key)
KEY = { 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f }
NONCE = { 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3a 3b }
H = { 3b d9 9f 8d 38 f0 2e a1 80 96 a4 b0 b1 d9 3b 1b }
Q = { af 7f 54 00 16 aa b8 bc 91 56 d9 d1 83 59 cc e5 }
M = { b3 35 31 c0 e9 6f 4a 03 2a 33 8e ec 12 99 3e 68 }
Case #3a
AAD = { }
PLAINTEXT = { }
encode-LEN = { 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 }
full-TAG = { b3 35 31 c0 e9 6f 4a 03 2a 33 8e ec 12 99 3e 68 }
TAG = { b3 35 31 c0 e9 6f 4a 03 }
CIPHERTEXT = { }
Case #3b
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AAD = { 40 41 42 43 44 }
PLAINTEXT = { }
encode-LEN = { 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 }
full-TAG = { 63 ac ca 4d 20 9f b3 90 28 ff c3 17 04 01 67 61 }
TAG = { 63 ac ca 4d 20 9f b3 90 }
CIPHERTEXT = { }
Case #3c
AAD = { }
PLAINTEXT = { 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b }
encode-LEN = { 60 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 }
full-TAG = { e1 de bf fd 5f 3a 85 e3 48 bd 6f cc 6e 62 10 90 }
TAG = { e1 de bf fd 5f 3a 85 e3 }
CIPHERTEXT = { fc 46 2d 34 a7 5b 22 62 4f d7 3b 27 }
Case #3d
AAD = { 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f }
PLAINTEXT = { 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 7a 7b 7c 7d 7e }
encode-LEN = { f8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 }
full-TAG = { c3 5e d7 83 9f 21 f7 bb a5 a8 a2 8e 1f 49 ed 04 }
TAG = { c3 5e d7 83 9f 21 f7 bb }
CIPHERTEXT = { fc 46 2d 34 a7 5b 22 62 4f d7 3b 27 84 de 10 51
33 11 7e 17 58 b5 ed d0 d6 5d 68 32 06 bb ad }
Case #3e
AAD = { 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e }
PLAINTEXT = { 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f
70 }
encode-LEN = { 88 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 78 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 }
full-TAG = { 49 7c 14 77 67 a5 3d 57 64 ce fd 03 26 fe e7 b5 }
TAG = { 49 7c 14 77 67 a5 3d 57 }
CIPHERTEXT = { fc 46 2d 34 a7 5b 22 62 4f d7 3b 27 84 de 10 51
33 }
A.4. AES-GCM-SST Test #4 (256-bit key)
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KEY = { 29 23 be 84 e1 6c d6 ae 52 90 49 f1 f1 bb e9 eb
b3 a6 db 3c 87 0c 3e 99 24 5e 0d 1c 06 b7 b3 12 }
NONCE = { 9a 50 ee 40 78 36 fd 12 49 32 f6 9e }
AAD = { 1f 03 5a 7d 09 38 25 1f 5d d4 cb fc 96 f5 45 3b
13 0d }
PLAINTEXT = { ad 4f 14 f2 44 40 66 d0 6b c4 30 b7 32 3b a1 22
f6 22 91 9d }
H = { 13 53 4b f7 8a 91 38 fd f5 41 65 7f c2 39 55 23 }
Q = { 32 69 75 a3 3a ff ae ac af a8 fb d1 bd 62 66 95 }
M = { 59 48 44 80 b6 cd 59 06 69 27 5e 7d 81 4a d1 74 }
encode-LEN = { a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 }
full-TAG = { c4 a1 ca 9a 38 c6 73 af bf 9c 73 49 bf 3c d5 4d }
TAG = { c4 a1 ca 9a 38 c6 73 af bf 9c }
CIPHERTEXT = { b5 c2 a4 07 f3 3e 99 88 de c1 2f 10 64 7b 3d 4f
eb 8f f7 cc }
Change Log
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Changes from -07 to -08:
* Changed replay requirements to allow replay protection after
decryption to align with protocols like QUIC and DTLS 1.3.
* Added a comparision between GCM_SST_14, GCM_SST_12, GCM_16,
POLY1305 in protocols like QUIC
* Added text on the importance of behaving like an ideal MAC
* Consideration on replay protection mechanisms
* Added text and alternative implementations borrowed from NIST
* Added constrainst of 2^32 encryption invocations aligning with
NIST
* Added text explainting that GCM-SST offer strictly better security
than GCM and that "GCM allows universal forgery with lower
complexity than GCM-SST, even when nonces are not reused", to
avoid any misconceptions that Lindell's attack makes GCM-SST
weaker than GCM in any way.
Changes from -06 to -07:
* Replaced 80-bit tags with 96- and 112-bit tags.
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* Changed P_MAX and A_MAX and made them tag_length dependent to
enable 96- and 112-bit tags with near-ideal security.
* Clarified that GCM-SST tags have near-ideal forgery probabilities,
even against multiple forgery attacks, which is not the case at
all for GCM.
* Added formulas for expeted number of forgeries for GCM-SST (q â‹…
2^(-tag_length)) and GCM (q^2 â‹… (n + m + 1) â‹… 2^(-tag_length + 1))
and stated that GCM-SST fulfils BSI recommendation of using 96-bit
ideal MACs.
Changes from -04 to -06:
* Reference to Inoue et al. for security proof, forgery probability
graph, and improved attack when GCM-SST is used without replay
protection.
* Editorial changes.
Changes from -03 to -04:
* Added that GCM-SST is designed for unicast protocol with replay
protection
* Update info on use cases for short tags
* Updated info on ETSI and 3GPP standardization of GCM-SST
* Added Rijndael-256-256
* Added that replay is required and that random nonces, multicast,
and broadcast are forbidden based on attack from Yehuda Lindell
* Security considerations for active attacks on privacy as suggested
by Thomas Bellebaum
* Improved text on H and Q being zero.
* Editorial changes.
Changes from -02 to -03:
* Added performance information and considerations.
* Editorial changes.
Changes from -01 to -02:
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* The length encoding chunk is now called L
* Use of the notation POLYVAL(H, X_1, X_2, ...) from RFC 8452
* Removed duplicated text in security considerations.
Changes from -00 to -01:
* Link to NIST decision to remove support for GCM with tags shorter
than 96-bits based on Mattsson et al.
* Mention that 3GPP 5G Advance will use GCM-SST with AES-256 and
SNOW 5G.
* Corrected reference to step numbers during decryption
* Changed T to full_tag to align with tag and expected_tag
* Link to images from the NIST encryption workshop illustrating the
GCM-SST encryption and decryption functions.
* Updated definitions
* Editorial changes.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Richard Barnes, Thomas Bellebaum, Scott Fluhrer,
Eric Lagergren, Yehuda Lindell, and Erik Thormarker for their
valuable comments and feedback. Some of the formatting and text were
inspired by and borrowed from [I-D.irtf-cfrg-aegis-aead].
Authors' Addresses
Matthew Campagna
Amazon Web Services
Canada
Email: campagna@amazon.com
Alexander Maximov
Ericsson
Sweden
Email: alexander.maximov@ericsson.com
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John Preuß Mattsson
Ericsson
Sweden
Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com
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